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Summary of Thesis 
The fear of crime is one of the most widely researched phenomena in criminology. 
Traditionally, researchers have relied upon the 'sociological staples' of sex, race, age 
and social class to explain the fear of crime. However, it has been shown that the 
relationships between fear and these factors are both uncertain and unreliable. In this 
thesis, I suggest by analysing the fear of crime within an explanatory framework of 
well-being, we move towards a better understanding of fear at an individual level. I 
demonstrate that, by interpreting crime as a violation of autonomy and well-being, 
individual levels of fear are more easily understood. 
The thesis is driven by a critical analysis of the traditional approaches to the study of 
fear of crime. From a contextual perspective, I argue that, in order to understand fear in 
a modem, evolving society, one must look to the future and explore the changing nature 
of crime. Thus, I aim to force a reconsideration of the concept of 'crime' within the 
paradigm of the victimisation survey. In recognising the imminent increase in 
fraudulent crimes, I challenge the traditional exclusion of fraud from victimisation 
surveys. I demonstrate that the victims of plastic card fraud are worthy subjects for 
study. 
The thesis is informed by empirical work carried out during the period of doctoral 
research. Having been commissioned by the Research Development and Statistics 
Directorate of the Home Office to review the survey measurement of the fear of crime, I 
was given the opportunity to design questions about plastic card fraud for the British 
Crime Survey 2000. Analysis of the data suggests that plastic card fraud prompts 
different reactions than do other crimes. I conclude that the harm suffered by the 
victims of card fraud may extend beyond pure financial loss to a violation of identity. 
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Introduction 
It has almost become inevitable that any academic piece on the fear of crime will begin 
with the restatement of two assertions. Firstly, that the fear of crime is one of the most 
widely researched phenomena in modem criminology. Secondly, and perhaps 
perversely, that the fear of crime is one of the least developed criminological constructs 
in ten-ns of conceptualisation, operationalisation and theoretical explanation (Hale 1996, 
Ditton and Farrall 2000). 1 make no apologies for my lack of originality in adopting this 
'introductory habit', indeed it was these two assertions which sparked off the research 
process which has culminated in this thesis. 
Anyone who chooses to embark upon research in the field is, in my opinion, faced with 
two possible avenues to pursue. One can, on one hand, approach the concept of the fear 
of crime from the explanatory perspective, contributing to the seemingly endless search 
for explanatory variables in a plethora of complex combinations. Alternatively, one can 
adopt a 'bottom-up' approach and focus instead on the methodological weaknesses 
which we have inherited from nearly 30 years of policy-driven research. The latter 
option presents, for me, the most pressing challenge and it is that approach which drives 
the underlying research agenda in this thesis. In short, the broad aim of this research is 
to make a contribution to what is essentially a much larger academic challenge: the 
reconsideration of the measurement of the fear of crime. 
Stated in its broadest terms, the central theme of this thesis is that an understanding of 
the fear of crime can only be achieved by widening the aperture through which we view 
it. I intend to show that this process of 'widening' requires two major shifts in 
approach. Firstly, I suggest it is necessary to reconsider the interpretation of 
victimisation of different crimes within a context of well-being and autonomy. 
Secondly, I argue that by adopting a forward-looking approach to the study of fear of 
crime, we can interpret it against the significant contextual backdrop of the 
contemporary characteristics of society. 
Essentially, the development of these arguments has been propelled by the empirical 
element of my research, the introduction of plastic card fraud to the British Crime 
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Survey 2000. From the outset, the research process has been geared towards my 
making a significant contribution to the BCS questionnaire in 2000.1 was given the 
opportunity to develop questions for the survey and undertake in depth analysis of the 
data, and this has allowed me to present a unique perspective on the fear of crime. 
Indeed, through the development of questions about the victimisation of and attitudes 
towards plastic card fraud, my major achievement has been to successfully challenge 
the assumption that the BCS cannot be used to measure fraudulent crimes. Thus, the 
analysis of the card fraud data, and the debates which are prompted by the major 
findings, form the original and innovative content of the overall thesis. 
In this introductory section I intend to provide a detailed summary of the thesis as a 
whole by presenting an outline of the major themes and developments contained in each 
of the seven chapters which follow. For ease of interpretation, I have attempted to 
avoid a lengthy chapter-by-chapter account and instead present the thesis here in three 
stages; the identification and development of the research questions, the design of and 
results from the BCS and, finally, the discussion of the findings and final conclusions. 
Development of the research questions 
As we have seen, the stating point for the research process was the recognition of the 
major methodological weaknesses in survey-based fear of crime research. Chapter I 
contains a discussion of these weaknesses through a comprehensive analysis of previous 
literature on the fear of crime. 
Two dominant propositions emerge from this discussion. The first is the assertion that, 
since crime does not take place in a vacuum, reactions to crime can only be understood 
in terms of the quality of life enjoyed by the victims (Mawby & Walklate 1997). The 
second is the need to question the assumption that there are no differences in the effects 
of individual crimes on fear (Rountree 1998). 1 argue that to focus on the effects of 
crime generally on fear is to fail to understand the fear of crime as a multi-factorial 
concept. Indeed, the case for conceptualising 'crime' is as strong as the case for 'fear', 
yet very little work has been developed from this perspective. Thus, the major question 
which drives the thesis is posed at the earliest stage: what makes one crime different 
from another? 
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I have approached this question from two perspectives, beginning in chapter three with 
Sutherland's attempt to distinguish between street crimes and white collar crimes and 
moving on, in chapter five, to the dichotomy of personal vs. property crime. However, 
before embarking upon development of the research question, it is necessary to pause 
and place the thesis in a clear context (chapter two). The context, I argue, is unusual in 
that it is forward looking. I consider the merits of looking to the future of crime, 
questioning the backward- I ooking trend in criminological thought. I consider the 
potential benefits of predicting changes in crime, focussing on the work of Leslie 
Wilkins (1973) and Foresight (2000) on the changing nature of crime. 
Many of the ideas presented in this chapter inform the underlying themes of the thesis 
as a whole. I begin by discussing the changes in population, societal structure and day- 
to-day lifestyles that we are likely to experience in the next twenty years. Inevitably, 
when one discusses change in society, one finds oneself quickly immersed in an 
analysis of the effect of technology, in particular the internet. One only has to watch an 
hour of television or wander down the nearest high street to experience the growth of a 
service and information economy and the move towards 24 hour society. However, 
less easy to observe is the impact of the internet on crime. Whether the internet will 
change crime as a vehicle for communication, create new opportunities in a global 
environment or facilitate new forms of harmful activity remains to be seen (Wall 2001). 
The most striking conclusion to be drawn from this discussion is that one of the major 
benefits of the internet, and yet at the same time one of the greatest challenges it 
presents, is the facilitation of access to information. Information is gaining increasing 
value as a commodity in a new climate of e-commerce and consumerism, a value which 
is as attractive to criminals as it is to legitimate parties. Paradoxically, as data 
processing techniques advance, so too does the threat to the control of personal 
information, perceived by many as a fundamental individual right. The result is a 
growing awareness of the need to protect one's privacy. 
From the criminological perspective, I suggest that the impact of the increasing value of 
information is likely to be evident in the emergence of the 'new' crime of identity theft. 
Until very recently, identity theft was recognised as a problem in only a few countries 
(including the United States) but attention, both political and academic, is mounting in 
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the UK. In chapter two, I discuss a recent move by the Home Office to open 
consultation on the possibility of legislating against crimes involving the misuse of 
identity. This in itself is an indication of the growing importance of personal 
information on the policy agenda. 
Having set the context, I then move on in chapter three to begin consideration of the 
question of what makes one crime different from another. The starting point for this 
part of the discussion was a stock-taking exercise to review which crimes are included 
in and excluded from the BCS. The key observation is that victimisation surveys tend 
to exclude white-collar crimes and offences of fraud. It is traditionally argued that the 
victims of these crimes are either unaware of or unaffected by the offence and thus are 
not worthy of criminological study. However, through an historical account of the 
development of the concept of white collar crime, I demonstrate that the assumption that 
all frauds are white-collar offences is not a helpful one. I raise the possibility that the 
victims of personal fraud may be the subjects of survey-based research and conclude the 
chapter by selecting plastic card fraud as the focus for further exploration. 
Chapter four reviews the somewhat sparse literature on the problem of plastic card 
fraud. It becomes clear that card fraud presents us with problems in positioning risk, 
due in part to the number of parties involved in the processes of card application and 
payment transaction. It is usually the retailer or the card company rather than the card 
holder (the victim for our purposes) who is deceived. In terms of financial harm, it is 
usually the retailer or financial institution which suffers loss. 
The data presented in chapter four suggests that fraud using this kind of information is 
relatively easy to commit and this kind of crime is on the increase. Not only are we 
seeing a marked rise in counterfeit production of fake cards, but we are also 
increasingly faced with the problem of fraud using stolen, or 'borrowed', card and card 
details. It seems that the problem of 'identity theft' is more complex than initial studies 
suggest, particularly in the context of plastic card fraud which involves an intricate set 
of exchanges of personal information. However, what becomes clear is that the existing 
data sources for card fraud are inadequate for studying these issues. Thus, I suggest that 
a great deal is to be gained from the collection of victimisation data. 
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The British Crime Survey: Methodological design and results 
Having made the case for the inclusion of card fraud to the BCS, I move on in chapter 
five to describe the processes of question development and hypotheses design. 
Returning to the question 'what makes one crime differentfrom another? 'I consider the 
traditional distinction between property and personal crimes. I suggest that there are 
three deten-ninants of crime type: the nature of the act, the nature of contact with the 
perpetrator and the nature of the han-n. According to this framework, card fraud is 
classified as a property crime. 
The most important finding in this study is that the operationalisation of card fraud as a 
BCS crime was successful. Previous fears of a lack of victims and uninteresting worry 
distribution were convincingly dispelled. The fact that the data was of sufficient 
quantity and quality for in depth analysis was both surprising and pleasing. In short, 
analysis of the BCS data showed that card fraud provokes different reactions than the 
other property crimes and that the victims of card fraud have different characteristics to 
victims of other crimes. Therefore, I have concluded that it is not meaningful to assume 
that all financial crimes are property crimes for the purposes of studying the fear of 
crime. 
One of the challenges of working with the BCS is to develop valid fear measures whilst, 
at the same time, maintaining consistency with previous sweeps of the survey. Having 
carried out the analysis of BCS data in this study, I have been able to highlight two 
general principles which may go some of the way to addressing some previous 
weaknesses. Firstly, in the analysis of worry levels, I strongly recommend that we 
should look beyond the 'very worried'. Indeed, for card fraud and the personal crimes, 
which have more widely dispersed worry levels, I suggest that those who are 'not 
worried' are just as worthy of inquiry as 'the worried'. The second principle I hope to 
have established, or rather strengthened, is the importance of maintaining a crime 
specific approach to the study of the fear of crime. I have shown that, whilst personal 
and property crimes may have similarities, important differences can be missed by not 
treating each crime individually. 
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Discussion of the findings and final conclusions 
In the final chapter of the thesis (chapter seven), I reflect on the empirical findings and 
explore what might be learned about the fear of crime from the successful inclusion of 
card fraud to the BCS. From the data, we are able to say how many respondents are 
worried about card fraud and we can, to an extent, describe their personal 
characteristics. What the data does not allow us to do is explain different worry levels. 
Thus, one is restricted to making suggestions for theoretical explanations for worry 
about card fraud. What becomes clear is that it is necessary to reconsider the conceptual 
framework of the fear of crime itself. 
Worry about card fraud is shown to be different to worries about other crimes in terms 
of its distribution and correlates. I argue that in order to understand these differences, 
we must deconstruct the concept of vulnerability and the first step in this process is to 
develop the concept of seriousness. The key to identifying what makes one crime 
different from another is the concept of seriousness. I suggest that by focussing on what 
makes one crime more serious than another, we can move towards an understanding of 
fear at a crime specific level. I demonstrate that, if crime is interpreted as a violation of 
autonomy, seriousness can be determined by the different levels of value attached to 
different aspects of that autonomy. In this way, seriousness must be interpreted within 
the context of well-being. 
In summary, then, I suggest that the concept of value is the key to understanding 
perceptions of crime seriousness, which, in turn, is the key to understanding the concept 
of vulnerability. Ultimately, then, this thesis forms the first stage of development of a 
value-based approach to fear. 
For me, the most striking question to have emerged from this thesis is: why do so many 
people say they are worried about card fraud? The comparatively high worry levels, 
after all, were unexpected. In the final section of the chapter, I suggest that the most 
persuasive explanation is that respondents are actually more worried about having their 
identity or personal information stolen. I have discussed at some length the growing 
importance of information in today's society and have highlighted the impact of the 
harm which may be experienced by individual victims of identity related crimes. 
Moreover, placed within a framework of autonomy, the importance of privacy and 
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control of one's own information becomes all the more striking. I conclude that it may 
very well be the case that the key to understanding worry about card fraud can be found 
in the sphere of identity. 
II 
1- The Fear of Crime 
Introduction 
This chapter not only serves as a review of the vast literature on the fear of crime, but 
also as the starting block for the thesis as a whole. In providing a summary and critique 
of the work done to date, I highlight the major weaknesses in previous research which 
have prevented an understanding of the phenomenon itself. I conclude the chapter by 
selecting a path for my own research, identifying the modest aims that underpin 
subsequent chapters. 
I begin with an introduction to the fear of crime, tracing its historical development in 
both a political and criminological context. We will see how the fear of crime evolved 
from being the driving force for the study of public attitudes towards crime into the very 
object of that study. Having established the fear of crime as an object for criminological 
enquiry, I go on to consider the various attempts at explaining fear, focusing on the 
major factors associated with fear (for example gender, age and socio-economic 
characteristics). Finally, I embark upon an examination of the methodological 
weaknesses of previous fear of crime research. This includes a discussion about the 
potential benefits of a qualitative approach to research. Particular emphasis will be 
placed on the criticism surrounding the use of the 'global measure' which provides the 
basis for so many of the findings on the fear of crime, and I argue strongly for a crime 
specific approach to the study of fear. 
I finish by highlighting the serious conceptual weaknesses of the fear of crime and 
suggest that there are two avenues for conceptual development. The first is to clarify 
what is meant by the term 'fear', an approach which has been the focus of research in 
more recent years. The second, and perhaps the less trodden path, is to reconsider the 
concept of 'crime'. I conclude by selecting this second avenue for research and pose the 
question which threads through the thesis as a whole: what makes one crime different 
from another? 
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1.1 The historical perspective 
'... the fear of crime has gradually been transformed from being a reason for conducting 
criminological enquiry into being the object of that enquiry, and from being a national 
concern about crime into a local fear of victimisation'. (Ditton and Farrall 2000, p. xvi). 
The origins of the fear of crime are rarely taken into account by those attempting to 
explain it. It is arguable that it is negligent to attempt to study a social phenomenon 
without taking into account its history and, therefore, I begin by considering how the 
fear of crime as a phenomenon has developed over the last 30 years. 
An examination of the history of the fear of crime reveals a firm rooting in the social 
politics of the USA in the late 20th Century. Very few authors have noted how the fear 
of crime began its life as the 'fear of blacks' (Ditton and Farrall 2000, Harris 1969). In 
the early 1960s the introduction of new civil rights for the poor and black marked the 
first attempt to remove injustice from the criminal justice system. The focus of the 
reforms was on protecting the criminal or suspected criminal, a shift in political 
philosophy which immediately posed a threat to the anxious right-wing - the white and 
powerful. 
Faced with this threat, coupled with a rising crime rate and increasing violence problem, 
the response was to shift a sympathetic focus from the criminal onto the victim. Raising 
concern for the white victim was the route to reasserting power. The American 
administration became interested in counting crime and in 1967 the United States' 
President's Commission on Crime decided to use the victimisation survey for the first 
time to establish levels of unrecorded victimisation. Three pioneering crime surveys in 
1967 (Biderman et al. 1967, Ennis 1967 and Reiss 1967) revealed an epidemic of public 
anxiety about crime, a new dimension to the crime problem, and paved the way for the 
development of a new branch of criminological study - the fear of crime. 
In 19 81, what had become the 'phenomenon of fear of crime' found its way onto the 
political agenda in the UK. The National Crime Survey had been running in the US for 
10 years and many other countries had followed suit (Australia, the Netherlands and 
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Sweden to name a few). 1982 saw the birth of the British Crime Survey, the largest 
crime survey ever to be carried by the Home Office at that time. Today it continues to 
grow, developing alongside a plethora of smaller scale surveys from both the academic 
sphere and criminal justice agencies. 
Fear, then, had originally driven the move to study victimisation, but soon it became the 
actual object of study. Williams et al. (2000) discuss that, as researchers became aware 
of fear of crime, they began to search for related independent variables. The usual 
'sociological staples' of sex, race, age, and social class were quickly identified as 
explanatory factors of fear and, as we will see in the discussion that follows, continue to 
be prioritised as primary correlates despite having chequered empirical histories 
(Williams et al. 2000, p. 2). 
1.2 Explaining the fear of crime 
In this section I attempt to summarise the various explanations which have been put 
forward for the phenomenon of the fear of crime. The discussion in this section is 
heavily infon-ned by the work done by Chris Hale in his extensive review of the 
literature (1996). It is not the intention here to re-work Hale's achievement: to do so 
would be fruitless. Instead, I aim to discuss the advances in the fear of crime field since 
his review and build on his recommendations for future research. 
I begin with the factors which are most commonly cited as correlates of fear - gender, 
age, and socio-economic characteristics (including race). Next I consider the 
relationship between fear and experience of crime. Experience of crime may be direct, 
through personal victimisation, or indirect, through learning about other people's 
victimisation experiences via community networks or the media, and the effect 
experience has on fear has proven to be complex and hard to pinpoint. Finally, I discuss 
how environmental factors might affect fear levels and perceptions of crime. 
1.2.1 Gender 
Of all the covariates of the fear of crime, gender is consistently shown to have the most 
significant relationship with fear. Fear is generally accepted to be a female propensity- 
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However, feminist writers in particular have made a strong case for reconsidering what 
has been accepted as 'the female fear', a fear which so often is deemed irrational. 
Stanko, for example, writes, 
'Over this past decade, criminology has theorised about women's fear of crime, 
suggesting that it can be understood as heightened social and physical vulnerability 
(Skogan and Maxfield 1982), as fear of rape (Warr 1985), as fear of men (Stanko 1987), 
as rational or irrational (Hanmer and Saunders 1984, Young 1992, Pain 1993, Painter 
1993). 'The female fear' (Gordon and Riger 1988) is ultimately linked to femininity 
and women's sexual vulnerabilities, but criminology all to often overlooked the crucial 
link with this and the way we as individual women understood our 'selves', our 
identities as women' (Stanko 1997, p. 491). 
Stanko illustrates how feminist researchers have worked towards a better 
conceptualisation of female fear. Women, she argues, deal with encounters of a sexual 
nature as part of their everyday lives, negotiating physical and sexual safety in private 
and public situations (Madriz 1997, Pain 1997a). For example, threatening phone calls, 
being followed, and sexual harassment are seen to be ordinary and private encounters 
which are not considered serious enough to contribute to a fear of crime. 
Fundamentally, domestic violence and harassment at work' can fall into this category 
(Pain 1993). Importantly, these types of experiences are not included in standard 
surveys but are crucial in forming an understanding of women's insecurities. 
Madriz (1997) pursues the question of why these crimes are not seen as 'serious'. Her 
research addresses how stereotypes of criminals and victims can affect women's fear of 
crime. She argues that criminals are commonly seen as poor, minority men: out of 
control 'monsters' who randomly attack their stranger victims. Victims, on the other 
hand, are seen to be white, middle class women who are innocent, submissive and 
unable to protect themselves. She concludes that these stereotypes may go some of the 
way to explaining why domestic crimes and white-collar crimes are not considered as 
4serious' as other crimes. 
When women are asked about safety and fear of victimisation, it has been shown that 
they not only express concern for their own safety but also for the well being of their 
1 The 1988 BCS revealed that half of the threats which women received were job related. 
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children. Research from Israel suggests that more women express concerns about safety 
for their families than themselves (Fishman and Mesch 1996, Mesch and Fishman 
1998). Vicarious fear, then, seems to be an essential element of the 'female fear'. 
Combined with the 'violation is a part of daily life' thesis, we come to question the 
assumption that women are irrationally fearful. 
On the flipside, of course, it is arguable that men are irrationally unfearful. Recent work 
has highlighted the need for a study of men's crime. Walklate (1997) calls for a 
gendered, subjective approach to risk. Gilchrist et al. (1998) discuss some important 
findings which suggest that men and women should not be treated as separate 
homogenous groups. There are greater differences, they find, between high fear and 
low fear men, and high fear and low fear women, than between the two genders. 
Women talk similarly to men with similar fear levels, referring to a wide range of 
situations, people and factors which inform their fears. Men, it seems, are only more 
expansive in terms of car crime. 
Therefore, we can conclude that, although gender is generally accepted as the most 
reliable indicator of fear of crime, the relationship between the two is far from clear. 
We must be mindful of the need to distinguish between fear and perceived risk in future 
research in an attempt to address the problem of irrationality. We must also recognise 
the potential value of incorporating measures of men's fears and fears for others into our 
methods. 
1.2.2 Age 
The research into the effect of age on fear has not been as consistent as that on gender, 
with evidence conflicting at various levels (see Hale 1996, Chadee and Ditton 2002). 
Yet the image of the elderly trembling behind locked doors is a common one. 
Traditionally, the elderly, like women, have been classed as an irrational fear group but 
many studies have shown that this is a tenuous assumption (Dowds and Ahrendt 1995, 
LaGrange and Ferraro 1989 and 1992, Hale et al. 1990, Greve 1998). 
LaGrange and Ferraro blame the poor design of survey questions for the inconsistency 
in previous findings and conclude that '... older adults are probably less fearful of most 
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types of crime than younger adults' (1989, p. 715). Chadee and Ditton (2002) are 
particularly critical of research design and provide a comprehensive, well referenced 
discussion of the methodological weaknesses associated with previous research into age 
and fear. They observe that the majority of studies to date have failed to develop a clear 
concept of 'old' or 'aged' and, moreover, have neglected to make comparisons between 
older and younger age groups. The implications of this criticism are persuasively 
illustrated by Greve (1998), who found that the effect of age on fear can be eliminated 
by simply changing age group categories at the stage of analysis. He suggests that the 
age-fear paradox may not be as striking as we have previously thought. 
Indeed, recent studies on the relationship between age and fear have increasingly found 
that the old are not unduly fearful or irrational. Ferraro (1995 )2 suggests that the impact 
of age on fear is mediated by perceived risk, i. e. older people were less fearful only to 
the extent that they saw themselves at lower risk. He proposes that it is the young who 
have the highest levels of perceived risk and fear of specific crimes. Australian research 
confirms this idea (Tulloch et al. 1999). Their findings reveal that the elderly do feel 
that they live in an increasingly dangerous society but they adopt lifestyles to protect 
themselves from risk. In contrast, young people live more active and risky lifestyles. 
Pain (1997b), too, rejects the tendency to class the elderly as weak or vulnerable. She 
aims to explore the meanings of crime to respondents, the nature of their reactions, and 
3 how their concerns are situated in space and time , using a 
biographical method of 
analysis. Her conclusion is that ageism, as opposed to old age, explains the risks and 
fears of older people. Thus, we should study the elderly as individuals who live in 
different social conditions and relations (see also McCoy et al. 1996): 
'Treating people over the age of 60 or 65 as homogenous is to ignore the rapid economic 
and spatial polarisations taking place amongst elderly people; those on private and those 
on state pensions, the 'young' old and 'old' old, single and married women and so on' 
(Pain 1997b p. 126). 
2 Ferraro uses a complex model of cognitive and emotional processes related to crime assessment. He 
distinguishes between perceived risk, a judgement as to the likelihood of becoming a victim of a specific 
crime and the emotional aspects of fear. 
3 Ferraro (1995) also uses a temporal measure of behavioural and avoidance changes over a year but this 
does not take into account long term adjustments. 
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Factors other than crime related issues may have an impact on risk assessment and this 
may be important in understanding age related differences in fear of crime. It is likely 
that future work on fear will develop further the significance of temporal and spatial 
effects on fear, concentrating on how individuals assess risk in their on-going everyday 
activities. Research by Tulloch et al. (1999), for example, involved a study of the use 
of public transport. One of their most interesting findings suggested that teenage girls 
interpret the threat of others differently from their male peers or older travellers when 
they are using public transport. 
Indeed, it seems that research focusing on the young can prove to be as important as 
research focusing on the elderly. May (1998) found that adolescent fear, in relation to 
sexual and non-sexual victimisation, is influenced by several variables including race, 
perceived risk, perceived neighbourhood incivility and gender. However, in agreement 
with Ferraro's findings (1995), once fear of sexual victimisation is controlled for, 
females are no more likely than males to be fearful of victimisation. Fear amongst this 
age group, then, is increasingly becoming a topic of interest. Fisher (1995) discusses 
the recent attention (political and academic) given to the issue of campus crime, an area 
for increasing concern on this side of the Atlantic 4. 
In terms of future developments in this area of research, the emphasis seems to be a 
move towards a more rigid research design and significant improvements in 
conceptualisation. Chadee and Ditton (2002) warn strongly against the reliance on 
univariate analysis and demonstrate how the effect of age on fear can easily be 'washed 
out' using multivaritate techniques. In addition, Greve (1998) concludes that future 
research into the age-fear paradox must include a component measure of fear (see also 
Rountree and Land 1996). 
1.2.3 Socio-economic factors 
'Based on empirical evidence from mainly American work, race, income and education 
appear as significant covariates of fear of crime. Ethnic minorities, the poor and the less 
well educated tend to be more fearful than the affluent, whites and the better educated' 
(Hale 1996 p. 105). 
4 The Guardian newspaper recently reported on the implications of campus crime in the UK, focusing 
specifically on the Home office report 'Policing The Campus: Providing a safe and secure environment' 
and security policies laid down by Birmingham University. (Kingston, 1999a and 1999b). 
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Research on the relationship between fear and socio-economic factors is weak, 
especially in comparison to the growing body of work on age and gender. Will and 
McGrath (1995) note that this a fundamental failing since all of these variables are 
linked under the concept of the 'underclass'. They argue that poverty, race, 
unemployment, education and marital status all contribute to one's quality of life. Since 
it is within this framework of 'quality of life' that we develop our fears, to exclude these 
elements is to narrow our conceptualisation of the fear of crime. Interestingly, their 
analysis of data from the General Social Survey reveals that, even when controlling for 
age and gender, fear among the 'underclass' is greater than among the non-poor. 
The relationship between race and fear remains relatively unexplored. In a review of the 
literature, Skogan says that white fear is 'one of the most compelling political constructs 
of our time' (1995 p. 60), yet there is a significantly limited number of studies on fear 
and race. Existing studies seem to indicate that race does have a significant effect on 
fear, but the extent to which this is the case remains unclear. 
Skogan and Maxfied (19 8 1) note that most of the research on race and fear has been 
focused on 'white fears', (i. e. the relationship between fear and white attitudes towards 
blacks) and the anxiety created by close residential proximity between the two groups, 
'It is widely argued that among whites discussions of crime are in fact covert 
conversations about their fear of Black Americans' (p. 55). 
However, using discriminant analysis, they go on to show that fear is independent of 
racial intolerance. 
Goodey (1998) argues that there is a need for research to address the extent and impact 
of black-against-white and black-against-black racially motivated crime (black racism). 
Webster (1997) concurs, using some very interesting work on the Asian community to 
illustrate the importance of dispelling the white racist/minority victim stereotype. His 
findings show how the Asian community is evolving from its stereotype of the passive 
victim and, in reaction to aggressive behaviour from groups of white males, has turned 
back on itself to adopt a more fearless and protective stance. Goodey concludes that 
this illustrates how racial stereotypes evolve over time, a fundamental point when one 
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recalls that most of the research into race and fear was conducted in the 1970s and 
1980s. Thus, future research should take account of the dynamics of race, crime and 
fear, in a time very different (both criminally and racially) from these earlier years 
(Chiricos et al. 1997). 
As with the recent work on age and gender, researchers have recognised the importance 
of a subjective approach to race and fear. Bazargan (1994), for example, argues that 
black elderly individuals should be treated as a separate group for study and particular 
attention should be paid to studying the differences in fear inside and outside of the 
home (see also Joseph 1997). Similarly, Onyeozili (1994), arguing that the fear of 
crime literature is particularly thin where black population groups are concerned, 
investigates fear among sample of 'urban historically black college students'. His 
findings are particularly interesting since he finds no relationship between fear and 
national origin for this population groUP5 . 
Skogan (1995) discusses the relationship between whites' fear and residential proximity 
to black neighbourhoods, raising some interesting points about racial tensions, 
the persistent links between fear, proximity, and whites' desire to retain their 
dominance of their most intimate institution are not likely to wane any time soon' 
(1995, p. 7 1). 
It does indeed seem that residential integration has a key role to play in the race-fear 
relationship. Liska et al. (1982) found that racial segregation was directly related to 
lower levels of white fear. Stinchcombe et al. (1980) found that white fear was related 
to proximity to blacks and prejudice. Finally, more recently, Covington and Taylor 
(199 1) found that blacks or whites, where they were different in terms of race from their 
neighbours, were more fearful. The picture is not entirely clear, a result perhaps of 
differences in methodology 6, but we can say that for whites at least, residential 
proximity is related to fear. 
5 However, he does note that this might be due to the fact that most foreign students in this sample lived 
off campus and thus were less exposed to campus crime. 
6 Chiricos et aL (1997) argue that these types of study have been based on cognitive assessments of safety 
and risk, as opposed to the affective state of fear. Their study uses a concrete and crime specific measure 
of fear and, interestingly, measures of actual and perceived racial composition. Their findings show that 
the fear of crime among whites is significantly linked to the perception that African-Americans live by in 
substantial numbers. 
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Not only is it unclear who is affected by the fear-race relationship, but research has 
neglected to ask why. An interesting article by Houts and Kassab (1997) describes how 
social learning theory (Rotter 1966) can provide a framework for test differences by 
race and ethnicity in fear of crime. The authors note that many researchers have used 
elements of the theory previously but failed to explore the issues far enough (for 
example, Baumer 1985). By incorporating measures of experience of crime, belief in 
external forces (belief in chance and the belief in others), belief in one's ability to 
control outcomes, and trust of neighbours, they found that the extent to which these 
variables were relevant predictors of crime were dependent on race. 
More recent research, then, edges us away from the perspective of white attitudes 
towards blacks and towards a more complex understanding of fear within the context of 
a multi-cultural society. 
1.2.4 Experience of crime 
The link between fear of crime and experience of crime has long been debated and 
contradictory evidence has prompted calls for better conceptual and operational 
development of both 'fear' and 'victimisation' (for a good discussion see Bilsky and 
Wetzels 1997). Experience can take two forins, firstly direct experience through 
victimisation and, secondly, indirect experience. 
Direct experience 
The relationship between fear and victimisation is another of the much debated fear 
mysteries. Findings over the years have varied from a strong positive relationship 
(Liska et al. 1988, Skogan 1987, Yin 1980) to no relationship at all (Baker et al. 1983, 
Hill et al. 1985). 
Kury and Ferdinand (1998), in their comparison of international findings, argue that the 
main reason for the contradictory findings on direct victimisation are due to the fact that 
previous studies have failed to take into account 'key background variables'. These 
may include, in addition to the number and severity of any criminal victimisations in a 
lifetime, the victim's living conditions and individual personality. For example, they 
found that although victimisation does effect avoidance reactions, gender and 
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community size have greater influence (see also Myers and Chung (1998) who found 
that racial composition of the area and the stability of the neighbourhood often have 
stronger effects on fear than victimisation). However, previous victimisation does 
affect the expectation of further victimisation regardless of gender, age, income and 
community size. Clearly, more advanced statistical methods allow for multi-factorial 
analysis and this can reveal a web of intricate relationships between victimisation, 
gender, age, income and community size. 
Denkers and Winkel (1998) note that fear is not the only reaction to a criminal 
victimisation: such an experience can affect a person's well-being generally. 
Longitudinal studies have shown that the most serious psychological damage occurs to 
the victims of the most severe crimes in the few months after the victimisation (Norris 
and Kaniasty 1994). In comparison, prospective studies have suggested that reactions 
to victimisation are related to 'pre-crime differences between victims and non-victims' 
(p. 143). Their prospective study reveals three important findings. Firstly, victims and 
non-victims differ in levels of fear and well-being, with victims reporting lower levels 
of well-being and, to some extent, higher levels of fear. Secondly, different types of 
crime inflict different levels of psychological damage (they found some evidence of 
increased psychological distress for violent crime over property crime). Finally, 
differences in fear and well-being levels were apparent both before and after the 
victimisation (victims were reported to be unhappier than non-victims after the 
victimisation, and to some extent before the victimisation). 
Psychological work on reactions to criminal victimisation by Kilpatrick et al. (in 
various author combinations 1979a, 1979b, 1981,1985,1987 is in a class of its own and 
worth far more discussion than space here allows. Their work is scientific, methodical 
and well developed, although it is restricted to the study of rape. In a series of 
experiments comparing victims and non-victims, they find that post-victimisation fear 
patterns fluctuate with time. Reactions also tend to vary according to the type of 
victimisation. They find differences between reactions to different crimes (be they 
violent or sexual, for example) and differences between reactions to attempted and 
completed crimes. Importantly, their assessment of fear depends upon complex scales 
of mental health, post-traumatic stress and anxiety measures. 
Mawby and Walklate (1997), in their study of the impact of burglary, found that fear 
was not the most common immediate reaction to victimisation, for adults at least. The 
most common reaction was anger, followed by shock and then fear. They suggest that 
experience as a victim and perceptions of victimisation are closely related to the living 
environment, concluding that, 
'Crime does not take place in a vacuum, and reactions to crime are more readily 
understood in terms of the quality of life 'enjoyed' by the victims' (p. 293). 
Interestingly, for children, the most common reaction was fear. Work by Goodey 
(1994) has illustrated the potential for studies of children's fear. Dull and Wint (1997), 
in a study designed to test the effect of victimisation on the fear of crime and attitudes 
towards the criminal justice system 7 on college students, explore some interesting ideas. 
They consider evidence that suggests our attitudes and feelings of well-being are shaped 
during our 'education experience' and seek to assess the role criminal victimisation 
might have in this education. Their findings suggest that those students who had been 
victimised became significantly more fearful of becoming a victim of property crime, 
but their fear of personal crime showed no increase. Non-victims, in comparison, 
became more fearful of becoming a victim of personal crime but showed no increase in 
the fear of property victimisation. In addition, they found that, over the four years of 
the study, non-victims showed greater change in attitudes towards the police whereas 
victims showed greater change in attitudes towards the court. Neither victims nor non- 
victims showed significant change in their attitudes towards the death penalty. 
These differences in fear of property victimisation and the fear of personal victimisation 
raise an important issue. Rountree (1998) argues that previous studies examining the 
crime-fear linkage neglect to distinguish between individual and neighbourhood crime 
experiences, and property and violent crime experiences. Her study, then, aims to 
examine the effects of both individual and aggregate crime experiences on crime- 
specific, emotion-based fear, while controlling for the level of community disorder. 
This involved a comprehensive range of variables which merit more discussion than this 
review allows. In short, measures of violence specific fear, burglary specific fear, 
socio-demographic details, lifestyle patterns and routine activities, target attractiveness, 
7 Such attitudes are significant when one considers that often there is 
'secondary victimisation' as one 
progresses through the criminal 
justice system, see Tontodonato and Erez (1994). 
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guardianship, previous victimisation and perceived incivilities, formed her multi- 
dimensional model of fear. 
The findings do suggest that individual and neighbourhood crime level experiences 
have differential effects on fear of violence in comparison to fear of burglary. Violent 
victimisation increases the fear of violence and burglary, but burglary victimisation only 
increases the fear of burglary. Neighbourhood levels of burglary have the same effect 
on fear of violence and fear of burglary as does individual level burglary victimisation. 
However, the neighbourhood rate of violent crime increases the fear of violence, but 
decreases the fear of burglary. Rountree suggests that residents living in violent 
neighbourhoods have more potentially serious concerns than worrying about burglary. 
It is, however, not only the type of victimisation which is relevant to fear, but also the 
number of victimisations. Indeed, the effects of repeat victimisation on the fear of 
crime has attracted a significant amount of attention by researchers in the past decade. 
The emergent literature is particularly interesting since it seems to suggest that crime is 
not randomly distributed (Denkers and Winkel, 1998). 
According to the 1998 British Crime Survey, the risks of repeat victimisation vary 
between crimes and between victim types. For example, a fifth of burgled households 
experienced more than one burglary in 1997, a quarter of victims of vehicle related 
thefts experienced two or more incidents, and almost a third of victims of violence 
experienced more than one violent incident (Mirrlees-Black et al., 1998, pp. 40-41). 
Groups such as single-parent families and those in council estate areas were identified 
as most likely to be repeat victims for all three types of crime. 
Research has shown that the risk of repeat victimisation is highest immediately after the 
original victimisation (Polvi et al., 1990 and 19918 , Farrell and Pease, 
19939), thus 
emphasising the value of short term crime prevention policies. Hope and Walklate 
(1995) advocate a structuralist approach to studying repeat victimisation. They 
conclude that we should not only be asking why certain people are re-victimised, but 
also why others are not. This, they suggest, will help us to understand how behaviour 
and avoidance routines relate to fear and victimisation. 
8 In relation to burglary. 
' In relation to burglary, vandalism in schools, racial attacks in a public 
housing project, and domestic 
violence. 
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The discussion so far has illustrated that we cannot assume that experience of crime 
actually increases fear. Agnew (1985) discusses how victimisation can prompt reactions 
to crime which actually mediate fear. Reid et al. (1998), for example, say that perceived 
risk and actual fear motivate different coping strategies. They find that those who have 
a high emotion-based fear are more likely to adopt collective coping strategies. Winkel 
(1998) shows that a victim's fear levels will be influenced by changes in two 
dimensions of vulnerability, the perception of personal risk and the perception of the 
seriousness of consequences resulting from that risk. When a person becomes a victim 
of crime, s/he goes through a coping process, and it is during this time of adaptation that 
perceptions of personal risk and seriousness of consequences tend to rise and fall. 
Winkel's findings suggest that the former tend to rise and the latter tend to fall and the 
result is that they cancel each other out. Thus, the fear of crime level does not rise. But, 
in cases where both dimensions rise, where a person is 'susceptible' to this kind of 
response, the fear level is enhanced. It is possible, then, that victimisation is just as 
likely to reduce fear as it is to increase it. This is an important point and should be kept 
in mind as we move on to consider the effect of indirect victimisation on fear levels. 
Hale writes, 
'If neutralisation techniques are the explanation for weak relationships between 
victimisation and fear they may also provide an insight into the reasons for the stronger 
relationship sometimes found between fear and indirect victimisation' (1996, p. 107). 
Indirect experience 
Indirect victimisation refers to information about specific crimes which is received 
either via the media or through local 'gossip' networks. Research in this area is patchy 
(recent findings continue to find weak or no effects on fear, see Kuttschreuter and 
Wiegman 1998) and the link between fear and indirect victimisation is by no means 
soundly established. The major reason for this is that the effects of the media and 
'fear 
of crime discourse' are notoriously difficult to measure. 
In a time when technology is fast evolving, research needs to 
develop quickly In order 
to examine the full effects media might 
have on fear. For example, Perse et al. (1994) 
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discuss how new technology, such as remote controls and cable television, increase 
access to a greater range of media and, thus, future studies should take into account 
factors such as ownership of technology, channel changing habits and video use. 
In a good review of the literature on the media-fear link, Heath and Gilbert (1996) 
suggest that future research should address three main points. Firstly, the characteristics 
of the message (for example, the sensationalism or randomness of the crime, the news 
content of the message, whether the story ends injustice, etc. ). Secondly, the 
characteristics of the audience (not merely demographic details but, for example, 
whether they believe in fictional programmes). Finally, whether the relationship 
between fear and the media is stronger at a personal or societal level (distinguishing 
between local and national/intemational crimes and fears in urban and rural areas). 
They conclude, '[tlhe message is clear. Media messages do not affect all of the people 
all of the time, but some of the messages affect some of the people some of the time'. 
(p. 385)10 
Chiciros et al. (1997) focus on the first of these perspectives, identifying the importance 
of studying audience effects, an area which they note is neglected. They consider five 
audience circumstances which have the potential to influence the media/fear 
relationship, identifying those groups most likely to display these characteristics. They 
found that, when gender, age and other variables are controlled for, television news 
consumption is only significantly related to fear for white females between the ages of 
30 and 54. This, they suggest, could be due to resonance and substitution but, for white 
women at least, they suggest that affinity may have the most likely effect in the 
media/fear relationship. 
In terms of the characteristics of the message delivered, Altheide (1997) focuses on the 
role of the news media in promoting a public discourse of fear. In particular, he says 
that stories tend to be presented with a 'problem frame' within which news worthy 
stories can be presented in a way suitable for entertainment. This, he argues, promotes 
messages that resonate fear. 
'0 See also Altheide (1997), who uses a qualitative method called 'tracking 
discourse' to show how the 
focus and content of fear shifts between time and place. 
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Finally, questioning the level at which fear is perpetuated by the media (i. e. personal or 
societal levels) several researchers have emphasised the significant role public discourse 
of fear can have. Caldeira (1996) identifies the importance of discourse, describing how 
continual repetition of stories can magnify violence and emphasise prejudices. Girling 
et al. (1998) focus on a case of vigilante action in Macclesfield and observe that, '[t]alk 
of crime, and the passions and anxieties such talk discloses, speaks directly to people's 
sense of the habitability of the place in which they live and, in turn, of its place in its 
surrounding economic and cultural environments and hierarchies' (p. 475). This kind of 
discourse, they argue, is linked to levels of fear, worry, and concern, thus emphasising 
the important role the narrative method can play in the future conceptualisation of fear. 
What it shows is that, although there is a strong case for advocating a subjective 
approach to fear conceptualisation, we cannot neglect to recognise the fact that 
individual fears exist within an environment. 
1.2.5 Environmental factors 
'The most recent research shows that individuals' fears are better understood within a 
neighbourhood or community context rather than by simply concentrating on individual 
characteristics' (Hale 1996, p. 121). 
Brantingham and Brantingham (1995) argue that is essential that crime and fear are 
studied against an environmental backcloth. This backeloth is constructed of several 
elements; the geographical nature of the area, the level of incivilities and social 
cohesion. In each case, the actual and perceived levels are important. 
In terms of the geographical nature of the area, research has shown that fear levels tend 
to be higher in urban areas. Brantingham and Brantingham (1995) identify four types of 
urban sites; crime generators, crime attractors, fear generators and crime-neutral sites' 
All of these types exist alongside each other and paths between them determine where 
people go and what they do. Moreover, the juxtaposition between land uses can 
influence the crime rates of the neighbourhood and, importantly, create areas where 
strangers are more easily accepted. 
" This type of approach is usually used for understanding the distribution of crime itself, but evidently 
it 
can be just as useful in studying the 
fear of crime. 
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It is, of course, arguable that it is the perceptions of the surrounding area which may be 
more relevant to fear than the objective geographical characterisation of the area. For 
example, Mattson and Rengert (1995) show that there is a relationship between 
perceived distance (i. e. the distance involved moving from one location to another) and 
perceived danger which determines how people use their environments. They say that 
respondents in their survey perceived distance to be greater when they perceived the 
journey to be through a dangerous neighbourhood. 
Hale (1996, pp. 117-119) observes that much of the work on the environment of fear 
has tended to focus on theories of incivility, although it is acknowledged that much of 
this research has been contradictory (Miethe, 1995). Traditionally, incivility has been 
measured in terms of perceptions of symbols of deterioration, such as noisy neighbours, 
abandoned buildings, litter, graffiti and gangs of youths loitering in the streets. Social 
incivilities are, to varying degrees, often shown to be more strongly linked to fear than 
are physical incivilities (Taylor and Kurtz, 1997, but see also Perkins and Taylor, 1996). 
However, Taylor (1998) illustrates that the incivilities thesis is more complicated than 
that. The effects of incivilities can be ecological (neighbourhood outcomes) or 
psychological (differences between neighbours) and can vary over time. What is 
needed then, is a measure of perceptions of incivility which operates at individual and 
aggregate levels, taking into account social and temporal changes. In addition, of 
paramount importance is the inclusion of some kind of measure of actual incivility. 
Perkins and Taylor (1996) advocate this combination of approaches, incorporating into 
their study a stage of observational measurement of the physical environment by trained 
raters. 
Taylor (1996) describes how community dynamics can influence residents' feelings of 
vulnerability and the actions they take to reduce exposure to risk. He suggests that 
crime can atomise communities (see Conklin, 1975), but it can also mobilise them. 
Thus future research should expand on studies of responses to disorder and investigate 
the impact on local social climate and person-place bonds (his findings suggest that 
neighbourhood stability deepens residents' attachment to their 
locale and their 
involvement with their neighbours). 
Evans et al. (1996) say that the fear of crime is much 
better understood through an 
appreciation of the way trust manifests 
in a community. They argue that whom one 
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trusts, when and by how much, mediates the way in which people living in a certain 
area manage their routine daily lives, and within that their sense of security. Their study 
examined the process of 'grassing' in an area characterised by its local networks held 
together by family ties. This type of socialisation provided a framework by which 
residents have a shared belief that if they are seen as 'locals' they are safe from 
intimidation. In this way, trust is linked to the possibility of co-operation and 
assessments of who it is safe to co-operate with. 
Clearly, crime, and the fear of crime have significant effects on the social cohesion of 
the area. This can trigger a variety of responses. For example, Caldeira (1996) 
describes how the changes in crime and fear levels in Sao Paulo are helping to create 
distance and separation among social groups, thus enforcing segregation (see also 
Doeksen 1997). Taylor (1995) says that the outcome can either be psychological (in 
terms of attachment to the area, territorial functioning, neighbourhood satisfaction and 
the intent to move), behavioural (local participation and mobility) and economic (house 
values and socio-economic status). Although the consequences of the fear of crime are 
beyond the scope of this review, they are certainly important in terms of its political 
usefulness. 
1.3 Methodological Concems 
The survey tool has been the dominant research instrument in the study of the fear of 
crime and at international, national and local levels has provided academics and Policy 
makers alike with empirical evidence of both the existence of and causal factors relating 
to fear. To suggest that it is of paramount importance that these instruments must be 
valid and reliable is perhaps to state the obvious. However, Hale's analysis 
demonstrates that this is not the case and so this thesis is written at a time when concem 
for validity in fear of crime research is at its greatest. 
Indeed, in recent years, the fear of crime debate has been underpinned by an increasing 
concern as to the methodological weaknesses within the research itself. Williams et al. 
(2000) write, 
'As soon as researchers became aware of fear of crime, they 
focused on a search for 
related independent variables. 
Several important relationships were located, including 
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the usual sociological staples of sex, race, age, and social class. Yet on the whole, and 
as with examinations of crime and delinquency, concern over the measurement of fear 
of crime itself took a back seat to more interesting independent variables. Several 
approaches to measuring fear of crime were used without any real determination of 
exactly what was being measured and with little concern for the methodological 
adequacy of the measuring instruments. Recent work on fear of crime has been more 
sensitive to these issues and some researchers are now focusing on the measurement 
issues. ' (Williams et al. 2000, p. 2) 
These methodological weaknesses, as Farrall et al. (1997) note, can occur at a variety of 
levels; from the epistemological basis through to conceptualisation, operationalisation 
and, finally, at a technical level. So, it is by no means an original observation on my 
part that traditional research methods in the fear of crime field have their failings. The 
purpose of this discussion is to examine how researchers are acknowledging these 
failings, especially those at conceptual and operational levels, and working to improve 
methods in the field. 
As we have seen, fear of crime research has traditionally been based on quantitative 
methods, making extensive use of the survey tool. However, this reliance has been 
recently blamed for serious mis-measurement of the fear of crime - perhaps even an 
overestimation in its occurrence (Farrall et al. 1997). In his review, Hale states that, 
'[e]thnographic studies, life histories and individual and group interviews all have much 
to contribute and are currently relatively ignored by researchers into fear' (1996, p. 
132). 
More recent work has echoed this sentiment and increasingly researchers are adopting 
multi-methodological approaches to their work on the fear of crime (for example 
Hollway and Jefferson 1997a and 1997b, Farrall et al. 1997). It seems that qualitative 
work has a major role to play in the future development of 
fear of crime research. 
In particular, qualitative work has highlighted the 
importance of survey design. The 
research by Farrall et al. was designed to test the reliability of the survey tool, using a 
qualitative interview to follow up the quantitative questionnaire and check 
for any 
methodological problems, identified as 
'mismatches'. Their findings reveal an alarming 
rate of inconsistencies and they make a number of recommendations 
for future research. 
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In particular, in identifying the usefulness of qualitative methods, they recommend the 
use of open ended questions, more thorough codes and the use of vignettes (1997, p. 
676). 
The usefulness of open ended questions has been acknowledged by other authors, 
(Bryman, 1984, Fattah, 1993) and this research emphasised how ineffective closed 
questions can be. A significant 40% of the mismatches noticed by Farrall et al. (1997) 
(indeed, many were categorised 'serious' or 'catastrophic') identified inconsistencies 
between open and closed questions. The use of open questions, then, can aid 
conceptualisation and facilitate the development of better codes for use in surveys. 
Work by Jefferson and Hollway illustrates this point nicely (Hollway and Jefferson, 
1997c). Their analysis of qualitative data' 2 allowed them to separate specific fears for 
coding, creating a three pronged measure of fear; 'fear of crime inside', 'fear of crime 
outside' and 'fear of crime discourse'. Under each category, respondents were labelled 
either 'unafraid', 'cautious' or 'fearful'. The implications of this will become clear 
when we consider the conceptual weaknesses of the fear of crime later. Evidently, this 
type of approach is useful for designers of future surveys. 
The validity of fear measures can also be monitored at a quantitative level. Kury and 
Ferdinand (1998) emphasise this issue, discussing how changes in question order can 
produce variations in responses. In addition, Schuman and Presser (1996, chapters 6 
and 7) consider how the wording of questions can be influential on responses. Thus, 
they recommend that the effects of formal and substantive balance should be kept in 
mind. Both of these effects are beyond the scope of this discussion, but they suggest 
that the use of back-checks (the same or similar question asked at a later point in the 
questionnaire) and question and answer' 3 rotation may allow for more accountable 
results. 
1.3.1 Types of measure 
The global question. 
12 For a desciption of the open nature of their interview techniques see Hollway and Jefferson (I 997a). 
13 Answer rotation would also enable the testing of primacy effects, see Schuman and Presser (1996), 
Chapter 2. 
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The most common, and yet most criticised, measure of fear is the 'global' question, 
which can take a variety of forms. Examples include: 
How safe do you/would you feel walking alone in this area after dark? 
How safe do you/would you feel when you are alone in your home at night? 
How safe do you/would you feel walking alone in this area during the day? 
There are numerous problems with this measure (for a good discussion see Hale, 1996). 
Firstly, questions of this sort rarely mention crime specifically (even when crime is 
mentioned it is 'formless' - Figgle Report, 1980 - usually in the form of an introductory 
statement 14). So, feelings of 'unsafety' may relate to things other than crime (a simple 
example is a mere 'fear of the dark'). 
This is not to say that the use of a 'concrete' measure is less problematic. Such 
measures tend to be subjective assessments of risk, which, like the subjective 
assessment of safety contained within the global, are dependent on each respondent's 
ability to make those assessments. This is an important point. The survey instrument 
relies on the ability of the respondent to recall events and answer honestly. Problems of 
fabrication, careless replies and memory (forward and backward telescoping) are well 
documented by Belson (1986), Block and Block (1984), Schuman and Presser (1996), 
and Schneider (198 1). These problems are of particular relevance to fear of crime 
research due to the nature of the questions (for example, recalling the number of 
victimisations in the last year or gauging how often one worries about crime). 
Secondly, what the respondent understands as 'in this area' or 'in this neighbourhood' 
will vary between individuals. This problem is alleviated, to an extent, by the inclusion 
of a clarifying statement (such as 'the area within a mile of your home') but again 
assumes that all respondents are equally able to make this judgement. 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, is the fact that such questions refer to a situation 
(i. e. going out alone, or being at home alone, during the night or day) that many people 
encounter either rarely or not at all (Hough, 1995). Attempts to address this problem 
have resulted in the inclusion of a hypothetical alternative (e. g. 'if you don't go out 
14 For example, the National Crime Survey uses the statement 'Now I'd like to get your opinion about 
crime in general... '. 
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alone, how would you feel? ') but this has simply clouded the vision further (Hale, 
1996). Researchers need to consider dropping this hypothetical from surveys since it 
clearly can do more harm than good (Farrall et al., 1997 found that hypothetical 
responses caused a significant amount of mis-matched data). 
Despite these somewhat crucial failings, the global questions continue to be central 
elements of most crime surveys. In many cases this is because of the need to be able to 
compare data with data from previous sweeps of the same survey (for example the 
BCS) or with data from different surveys. Survey designers, however, should not be 
blinkered as to the points discussed above, and should aim to consider the following 
questions; 
9 Who does go out/stays home alone, during both the day and the night? In which of 
these situations do they feel safe? 
* How long do these people spend out/at home alone during the day and night 
(perhaps in terms of how many hours in the past week were spent in these 
situations)? 
9 For what reasons do these people go out/stay at home alone? 
Behavioural measures. 
'Advocates of the use of behavioural indicators would stress that what people do is a 
better guide to their level of fear than what they say' (Hale 1996, p. 92). 
These types of measures attempt to measure people's fear by their actions, that is, do 
they take security precautions or, for example, avoid certain areas at certain times in 
order to reduce their risk or fear? Sceptics cast doubt on the reliability of such measures 
(see Fattah and Sacco 1989) but major surveys do tend to include them. Recent work, 
therefore, has continued to include a behavioural element. 
Mesch and Fishman (1998) investigate the hypothesis that the fear for others' safety 
may promote the use of precautionary measures more than the fear for one's own safety 
(see also Warr 1992). Their findings only support the hypothesis for personal protective 
behaviour but they recommend that future research should take into account two 
distinctions. Firstly, the difference between personal and vicarious fear, and secondly 
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the difference between personal precautionary behaviour and household protective 
behaviour. 
An interesting study by Vander Ven (1998) illustrates how behavioural measures can be 
used to develop the concept of fear in a striking way. His study focuses on a Latino 
urban neighbourhood which is characterised by its groups of young men hanging 
around on street comers. By observing pedestrian behaviour on encountering these 
groups, he shows how different reactions can increase or decrease fear, and in some 
cases encourage a more threatening situation. When a pedestrian approached a group of 
men, Vander Ven noticed that s/he could either exit the situation or employ some sort of 
strategic behaviour to reduce feelings of vulnerability. The choice to exit the situation, 
he observed, can communicate feelings of vulnerability by either avoidance techniques 
or demonstrative caution. Either way, the possible consequence was a 'temporary 
labelling' of the youths which led to the encouragement of further behaviour (perhaps 
because they felt it was 'expected' of them, or because it was simply 'fun'). A more 
assertive reaction was different in that it disarmed the feared stranger. 
It is this type of work which paths the way to a better understanding of the behavioural 
effects of fear, which should be a priority for future research into the fear of crime. 
Vander Ven shows that when one individual fears another, it is an emotionally powerful 
and physically transforming experience, '... both the fearful and the feared are moved to 
interact in extraordinary ways' (p. 374). As we move on to discuss the concept of 
emotion based fear, this is an important point to bear in mind. 
Emotion-basedfear. 
Emotion-based fears are usually measured with affective measures of fear, i. e. global 
measures, formless measures and questions about worry or fear of specific crimes. 
These questions have traditionally attempted to quantify levels of worry, concern or 
anxiety but, in responses to the criticism that they do not measure fear, more recent 
research has included questions which contain a notion of fear (for example, how afraid 
or howfearful are you? (Ferraro, 1995, Farrall et al., 1997, Reid et al., 1998 - to name 
but a few). 
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What has become clear is the urgent need for better conceptualisation of all of these 
emotion-based concepts. In their methodological study, Farrall et al. (1997) found that 
often respondents have feelings other than concern and worry which are not traced by 
surveys. Their results showed that feelings of 'anger' about the prospect of criminal 
victimisation are more common than feelings of fear (Ditton et al., 1999). In addition, 
they found a variety of substitutes for the word 'worry', for example, 'distress', 'shock' 
and 'thinking about crime' (see also Mawby and Walklate, 1997). 
This is important because it illustrates that 'fear' may be interpreted in different ways by 
different people, a fact which remains undetected by the survey tool. Hollway and 
Jefferson rightly note that previous research has amalgamated the personal fears of 
individuals into one, arguing that 'there is no reason why their fears should be 
commensurate' (1997c, p. 11). Their argument is quite convincing when one considers 
that the analysis of their fear data contradicted many of the findings relating to 
demographic variables (particularly age and gender) existing within the literature. Calls 
have also been made for fear measures to take into account the effects of temporal, 
spatial and social influences on attitudes and emotions about crime (Bannister, 1993, 
Farrall et al., 1997). So, not only do fears vary between individuals, but also can vary 
across time and situational circumstances. It is the task of future research to develop the 
multi-dimensional concept of emotion-based fear in accordance with these findings. 
Risk-basedfear. 
The concept of risk has sparked a great deal of debate in the last two decades, not only 
within the fear of crime field, but on a much wider scale (Furedi, 1998). It attracts 
particular attention in the fear of crime debate because of the infamous 'fear-risk 
paradox'; the fact that those least at risk of victimisation seem to be the most fearful 
(and vice versa). 
How, thený do we measure who is at risk of criminal victimisation? Crime and 
victimisation statistics are usually used to calculate two kinds of risk. Firstly, incidence 
risks count the number of crimes per adult/household in a sample. Secondly, prevalence 
risks count the percentage of people who are victimised over a period of time. 
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Hope (1995) suggests that both victim prevalence and victim concentration are essential 
to our understanding of the distribution of victimisation (see also Barr and Pease, 1990). 
Both, he says, are fundamentally dependent on changes in temporal and spatial 
conditions and thus we should incorporate some element of what he calls 'crime-flux' 
into our measures. In order to measure change over time, a survey would ideally need 
to interview the same respondents over a series of sweeps and this is not compatible 
with the aims of most major crime surveys (Aye Maung, 1995). 
One of the most common criticisms of the BCS and other large scale crime surveys is 
that they do not measure crime at the small area level very well (Kershaw et al. 2000, p. 
2). Trickett et al. (1995) emphasise how important it is to focus on the effects of the 
characteristics of the individual household and the direct surrounding area. Their results 
showed that both factors are significant predictors of risk of victimisation, but area is 
the strongest predictor. This approach allowed them to conclude, '[flo caricature our 
overall results, young professionals, living in detached or semi-detached houses in poor 
areas are particularly likely to fall victim to crime' (p. 273). 
The tone of recent literature is critical of the way risk has been used in fear of crime 
research. Varnava (1995) suggests that research has neglected to use the concept of risk 
to its full potential, claiming that it can be used to develop the crime-fear relationship by 
providing 'an explanatory framework for the range of emotions which have been 
uncovered' (p. 133). This is an important point, since it highlights the fact that much of 
the previous work on the fear of crime has been descriptive, rather than explanatory. Of 
course, it is necessary to find out who is fearful, but the reasons why they are fearful are 
central to our understanding of the phenomenon (for a discussion see Bilsky, 1993). 
Bilsky suggests that the reason for this emphasis on descriptive work is that most of the 
research has been sociologically, rather than psychologically, based. The work by 
Hollway and Jefferson goes some of the way to bridging this gap. Their methods 
allowed for a more complex conceptualisation of risk (to include details of lifestyle, 
resources and any history of victimisation) which revealed that respondents who were 
coded high or low risk, were high or low risk for different reasons. Thus, when we talk 
about risk of criminal victimisation in terms of measures of incidence or prevalence, we 
are neglecting to take into account risk variations at an individual level. They argue that 
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by moving our focus from 'a rational, risk avoiding' subject, to an 'anxious, defended' 
one, we can build a clearer picture of the risk-fear relationship (1997a, p. 53). 
There is, of course, a clear and important distinction between objective (actuaO and 
subjective (perceived) risk. It has been shown, to varying extents, that certain groups of 
people (specifically women and the elderly) perceive their risk of victimisation to be far 
greater than it actually is. As we have seen, measures of perceived risk (especially the 
global measure) have in the past been taken as surrogates for fear. Thus, these groups 
of people are deemed to be more fearful. Rountree and Land (1996) challenge this 
assumption, arguing that perceived risk is conceptually distinct from fear and should 
instead be seen as one of the components of fear. 
How, then, do we construct our perceptions of risk and how do these perceptions relate 
to our fears? Significantly, people with the same perceived risks do not necessarily have 
the same level of fear. Hale (1996) notes that it has been convincingly argued that fear 
depends on both perceived risk and sensitivity to that risk (Warr, 1984,1987), '[tlhe 
task for research is now to specify more clearly the determinants of perceived risk, 
crime seriousness and sensitivity' (Hale 1996, p. 110). Warr (1987) suggests that 
sensitivity to risk is dependent on two factors, the perceived seriousness of the offence 
and vulnerability. The two, as Killias (1990) illustrates, are inextricably linked. Fear, 
he says, is determined by three factors. Firstly, the exposure to non-negligible risk. 
Secondly, the ability to control exposure in terms of protective measures and the ability 
to escape. Finally, the anticipation of how serious the consequences might be. The way 
we assess these factors is linked to our notion of vulnerability, how we see ourselves' 
5 
in terms of physical, social and situational strengths or weaknesses. 
1.3.2 Conceptual isi ng 'fear' of 'crime' 
'In reality, the term 'fear of crime' is an artefact of a broad interest in what is presumed 
to be the psychological effect of crime. ' (Williams et al. 2000 p. 6). 
15 The subjectivity of this is important. Killias and Clerici (2000) compared respondents self assessment 
of vulnerability with the interviewer's visible assessment of the respondent's vulnerability. Results 
indicate that vulnerability, as assessed by the respondents themselves, explained fears and worries about 
crime better than the interviewer-assessed measures of vulnerability. 
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What is evident from the discussion so far is that any new contribution to the study of 
the fear of crime inevitably carries the baggage of a poorly developed concept with a 
haphazard history of operationalisation. Williams et al. (2000) emphasise the effect of 
years of scientific neglect: 
'What has evolved after hundreds of studies is an overemphasis on independent 
variables as specific and fully developed concepts, while the dependent variable remains 
less sophisticated and much more ambiguous. ' (p. 3) 
In this final section, we take a step back and consider the fundamental question - what is 
thefear of crime? We have seen where it came from and how attempts have been made 
to explain it but I have, up until now, failed to offer a definition of the concept. The 
major reason for this is that there is no accepted definition and the need to address this 
problem propels my thesis into the chapters that follow. What I intend to demonstrate 
in the closing stages of this chapter is that the little work which has been done at a 
conceptual level has focused on extracting the meaning of the Jear of crime'. While I 
accept that the work on the psychological reactions to crime is a priority, I feel it 
equally important to ask what role the concept of 'crime' plays - what is the 'fear of 
crime'9 
Conceptualising fear 
The distinction between cognitive, affective and behavioural. measures of fear' 6 
continues to be a paramount issue. It is important to recognise that, as individuals, we 
have cognitive and affective perceptions of crime at personal and general levels. We 
make judgements as to how much we are at risk of criminal victimisation, judgements 
which are made in accordance with our values and concerns about our environment. 
Armed with these perceptions, we go about our daily lives and adjust our behaviour 
accordingly. All exist independently of each other but are inextricably linked. The 
important point is that none represent fear. Fear is an emotion and, whilst it may be 
related to our risk judgements, concerns and behaviours, they cannot be used as 
surrogates for fear. 
" For details of this distinction see DuBow et A (1979) and Ferraro and LaGrange (1987). For a more 
general overview see Hale (1996). 
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What has become clear, then, is the fact that the questions traditionally used in surveys 
are rarely measures of fear. They may be subjective assessments of safety, risk, 
disinterested concern, anxiety or worry, but they are clearly not measures of fear 
(Hough 1995). However, this does not render such questions useless. Rather, we 
should be alerted to the need to develop a multi-dimensional approach to the fear of 
crime. Any measure of fear should include both emotion-based and risk-based fears. In 
this way, fear, risk, concern, worry, anxiety and safety (which are all concepts in their 
own rights) can be collectively measured under the umbrella of 'the fear of crime'. 
The (sparse) work on fear of white collar crime illustrates that reactions to crime extend 
beyond a level of fear. They can be seen to impinge on a more general state of well- 
being, the effects of which should not be underestimated. In his review, Hale (1996) 
proposes that the fear of crime exists within broader framework, 
'More broadly, is 'fear of crime' simply measuring fear of crime, or, perhaps in 
addition, some other attribute which might be better characterised as 'insecurity with 
modem living', 'quality of life', 'perception of disorder' or 'urban unease'T (Hale 
1996, p. 84). 
This is, in fact, an important conceptual issue. Taylor and Jamieson (1998) say that this 
type of approach is essential to our understanding of the fear of crime. Current 
research, they argue, fails to consider how attitudes are affected by recent historical and 
economic developments and the failings of governments to address social problems (for 
example, divorce rates, drugs, random violence and unemployment), 
'Our argument here, however, is that this continually reinforced fear of crime now 
works to condense a series of other inter-connected anxieties about the current 
experience of middle class life in England, which includes the real danger of crime (car 
theft, burglary and incivility) but which really can only be comprehended in terms of 
this wider set of political, cultural and social anxieties' (p. 173) 
Work carried out as part of the British Social Attitudes Survey 1994 merits particular 
mention in this discussion. In a much under-rated piece of work, Dowds and Ahrendt 
(1995) illustrate how the fear of crime can be seen as a reflection of a more general 
insecurity about the modem world. The survey used two fear of crime measures; firstly 
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a standard global fear measure (How safe do you feel walking alone in this area after 
dark? ) and secondly a new measure: 
'Because of worries about crime, some people change their everyday life, for example 
where they go or what they do. Other people don't change their lives at all. Do worries 
about crime affect your everyday lifeT 
This second measure produced some very interesting results. Using the first measure, 
women and the elderly were found to be more fearful than men and the young. 
However, using the second measure, age and gender were found to be less significant 
indicators. Of particular interest were the ways in which different people let their 
worries about crime affect their behaviours in different ways. Women were found to be 
more likely to restrict going out alone at certain times and men were more likely to take 
security precautions in the home. 
Questions about 'worry' were not restricted to crime. Respondents were asked how 
worried they were about their family, money and health in addition to some remote 
world-wide events. Results revealed that for elderly men these sorts of worries were 
related to fear of crime. For example, worries about their health related to going out 
alone at night and worries about world events were related to allowing worries about 
crime affecting daily lives. However, for women and young men, there was no real 
significance in being 'one of life's worriers'. The authors argue that this is an important 
finding. The fear of crime, for some, is linked to a general feeling of anxiousness. For 
others , it relates more to specific problems 
in society which are identified as in need of 
attention to prevent further decline. 
A further set of questions were used to measure political leanings (left/right wing) and 
authoritarianism, which is defined as 'to have an ideology consistent set of attitudes 
which relate to punitiveness, conformity and anti-welfarism' (p. 25). Of the two, 
authoritarianism seems to have the most significant effects on fear. For elderly women, 
strong negative attitudes towards people on welfare benefits (regarded by many as 
6 scroungers') were significantly linked to unsafe feelings when out alone at night. 
For 
middle aged men, fear of crime was related significantly to the belief that immigration 
practices should be restricted. Interestingly, for young men, those who 
felt unsafe going 
out alone at night were more likely to 
hold libertarian views. In contrast, those who 
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claimed that crime affected their everyday lives, tended to hold more authoritarian 
views. 
Questions attempting to asses unease within a changing society focused on attitudes 
towards issues such as the move towards equal opportunities for women and ethnic 
minorities, changes in legal aid provisions and the availability of pornography. Among 
elderly women, concern about the development of opportunities for homosexuals and 
the provision of sites for gypsies were related to feeling unsafe going out alone at night. 
Interestingly, those elderly women who claimed that worry about crime affected their 
daily lives tended to be of the opinion that equal opportunities for women have gone too 
far. Finally, for middle aged men, the key factor is the belief that the right to show 
nudity and sex in films has gone too far 17 . 
All of these results have far reaching implications for the future of fear of crime 
research. Placing the fear of crime in the context of the quality of life may help us to 
explain the phenomenon. 
Conceptualising crime 
We have already seen how it is important for measures of fear to be concrete and it is 
widely accepted that questions should be crime specific (Figgie Report, 1980). 
However, most articles conclude with statements summarising the reactions to crime 
generally with very few recognising the implications of crime specific analysis. As 
Rountree states, '[s]tudies examining the crime-fear linkage tend to estimate the effects 
of any type of victimisation or a total crime rate on fear. Such an approach implies that 
there are no important differences in the effects of various crime or victimisation types 
on fear' (Rountree 1998, p. 342). The case for conceptualising 'crime' is as strong as the 
case for 'fear', yet very little work has been developed from this perspective. 
The fundamental question seems to be: what makes one crime different from another? 
Indeed, this is will be a recurring question throughout this thesis. Most attempts to 
distinguish between types of crime have led to the distinction between property and 
personal (or violent) crimes. It is well documented 
in the fear of crime literature that 
17 Indeed, the survey found that the best predictor of the fear of crime amongst women us their attitude 
towards the availability of sexually explicit pornography. This, the authors suggest, reflects the 
idea 
posed within the feminist literature that women's 
fears are rel ated to their vulnerability to sexual threats. 
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property crime evokes different reactions than does personal crime. LaGrange and 
Ferraro explain that, '[t]he type of crime has a profound effect on the pervasiveness and 
intensity of reported fears', citing crimes against the person, high risk crimes and crimes 
that result in substantial monetary loss as high fear generators (1987, p. 382). The 
problem is that previous research does not allow us to say that people generally worry 
about personal crime more than property crime (or vice versa). The literature suggests 
that an individual's level of 'fear' may be related to a number of factors: perceptions of 
risk of victimisation, the type of loss potentially suffered and the ability to resist or 
recover from the crime (all possibly linked to a perception of self vulnerability). 
Indeed, it is not always the most serious crimes which prompt the highest fear levels. 
LaGrange and Ferraro suggest that, 'serious street crime may not be as important in 
generating fear as mundane, everyday events and situations that signify a lack of 
community order and control'(1987 p. 386). Similarly, Skogan (1987) argues that 
property victimisation has more measured effects than personal victimisation since 
personal crime is generally less common and rarely forms part of an individual's direct 
experience of crime. There are many dimensions, then, to the problem. Simple property 
crime may be perceived as less serious but more likely to happen. Mugging and 
burglary may be perceived as being more serious and fairly likely. Further, mugging is 
a good example of a type of crime that cannot easily be assigned to either the personal 
or property categories. Personal crime may be perceived as more serious but less likely 
to happen. At the end of the day, how an individual reacts to all of these perceptions 
may depend on a multitude of other characteristics or influences. 
The crucial observation to make at this stage of the discussion is the fact that financial 
crimes are generally excluded from crime surveys generally and, thus, the concept of 
property crime. This, in my view, is a major failing. Crime surveys, on the whole, 
neglect to measure reactions to white-collar crimes. The main reason 
for this is that 
many of its victims remain unaware of its impact and are thus not easily 
identifiable 
(Fattah 1986). In addition, white-collar crime is not seen to impact the well being of 
victims as greatly as property or personal crime. In a sense, 
fear of white-collar crime 
lies beyond the scope of 'fear of crime' in its traditional cloak - 'stranger danger'. 
However, Pearce and Tombs (1992) note that when surveys do include questions on 
white-collar crime, often it has been rated as 
being more serious than many other types 
of crime. It can take the form of fraud, embezzlement, 
financial deception, tax evasion, 
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consumer fraud or corruption and, it seems, can have significant, long-term effects on 
the well being of its victims. Spalek (1995), in a study of pensioners who were victims 
of the Maxwell affair, found that their experiences did indeed have a profound effect on 
their lives. In particular, their mistrust of financial institutions and advisers left them in 
serious doubt of their financial stability. She concludes that any measure of the fear of 
crime should include a measure of white-collar crime. 
We will return to these issues in chapter 3, but for now I wish to make the point on 
which the whole thesis hinges. If victimisation surveys are intended to build an 
accurate picture of crime and the fear of crime, it is a distortion to exclude all financial 
crimes on the basis of the blanket assumption that they are 'victimless'. Thus the task I 
set myself is to challenge the traditional boundaries of what we consider to be 'property 
crime' and to test the feasibility of introducing financial crimes to crime surveys. 
Conclusion 
I have attempted in this chapter to provide an overview of the current state of play in the 
field of fear of crime. In the process of tracing its roots and critiquing its development, 
I have suggested that there is a great deal of work to be done at conceptual, operational 
and technical levels. I am not suggesting that my aim in this thesis is to embark on a 
problem-solving mission on a grand scale. Instead, I hope to have illustrated how my 
own evaluation of the phenomenon as an object for criminological study has determined 
the direction of my own (albeit small) contribution to the field. I intend to pursue the 
issues relating to crime specific fears and return in later chapters to the need for 
reconsideration of the crimes that are dismissed as 'victimless'. In the next chapter, 
however, I discuss the underlying themes of the thesis and call for a forward-looking 
approach to the study of crime. 
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2. The changing nature of crime -a context of crimes 
of the future 
Introduction 
In Chapter one, it was argued that there are two paths one can choose from when 
attempting to develop the measurement of fear of crime. The first is to develop the 
concept of fear, a tricky task which has been repeatedly considered in recent years and 
reasonably well documented in the academic literature. The second, less trodden, path 
is the development of the concept of crime. We have seen that it is meaningless to talk 
about 'fear of crime' without a clear idea of what we mean by 'crime'. Chapter one 
concluded by selecting this second path. 
This chapter begins by questioning the desire, or rather lack of it, to predict the future of 
crime. I suggest that examining the future entails the extraction of societal contexts, 
rather than making statistical estimates as to the trends in crime rates. The next stage of 
the discussion is to place the concept of crime in such a context. I explore the changing 
nature of crime in the context of a developing global society. There is an emphasis on 
looking to the future and exploring how technological advances, globalisation and an 
increased reliance on information might impact on crimes, criminals and victims (as 
well as on society generally). Many issues are raised and developed as far as is possible 
but it has been necessary at times to only scratch the surface as many of the theoretical 
ideas are worthy of a thesis in their own right. 
In the final part of the chapter, I considered our ability to predict the future of crime. A 
number of predictions are made but the most important is the suggestion that there will 
be a shift in what things, for want of a better word, we attach value to. I will be 
exploring in particular the value attached to information and will talk about the growing 
phenomenon of identity theft. 
The underlying tone of this chapter is intended to be critical of the anti-futurist nature of 
criminological thought. In a recent article, Pease wrote, '[c]riminology is a discipline 
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with a long past, a short history and no future'(2001, p. 19). The theme, then, which 
runs through this chapter, and indeed through the thesis as a whole, is that in order to 
understand crime (and fear of crime) it is not enough to look back at the changes in 
crime in the last one, ten or even fifty years. The criminological agenda should be 
driven by a desire to know what is around the comer. 
In 1973, Leslie Wilkins made an insightful attempt at predicting what crime would be 
like at the turn of the 2 I't Century (Wilkins 1973). Not only did he predict a complete 
breakdown in the criminal justice system, 18 but also he made some accurate predictions 
about the nature of crime. Firstly, he recognised the important role technology was to 
have in our lives, enabling crimes to be both committed and detected in new ways. 
Secondly, he recognised that our ideas of 'property' would change and that more 
information would be held by private companies, leading us to challenge the idea of 
theft of information. 
A quarter of a century on these are still, on the large part, new, unexplored ideas in the 
field of criminology' 9. Only now are we just beginning to recognise the implications of 
changes in society in the latter part of the 20th Century and it is only in the last couple of 
years that we have seen a murmur of academic activity in the field of technology related 
crime. It is a sobering thought that 30 years after Wilkins made these predictions, the 
ideas are presented as 'new developments' in this PhD thesis. 
18 Not as outrageous a suggestion as one might think in the wake of the recent Auld report, Halliday 
report and the latest government white paper on reform of the criminal justice system. 
19 Indeed, Lloyd (2000) notes that the subject of technology has struggled to receive recognition from 
academia generally. He credits the recent surge 
in interest to three factors; the well publicised panic 
about the Millennium Bug, the increasing awareness of the implications of electronic commerce and the 
global communications networks (supporting computers which exchange 
data) which are increasingly 
becoming a part of every day life. 
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2.1 Crime and the future :A desire to predict the future of 
crime? 
'No-one can predict the future. What we can do is look ahead and think about what 
might happen so that we can begin to prepare for it' (Foresight 2000a, p. 3 1). 
Ultimately, for many, the quest for an understanding of crime is driven by a desire to 
prevent it. But before we can begin to think about crime reductive strategies, we need 
to accept that crime changes, '... crime is 100% stable and 100% volatile, depending on 
the aspects of the criminal event in focus' (Pease 2001, p. 19). Thus, as Pease argues, to 
move forward we need to construct a system which acknowledges the future, a context 
of change in which to place the future and a way of thinking about crime reductive 
strategies. 
However, criminology as a discipline has been slow to acknowledge the importance of 
looking to the future. Wall (2001) argues that, while cybercrime is the crime of the 
future, criminologists are faced with several problems when researching it. Firstly, the 
lack of statistics is a major problem, those which are available are usually conducted by 
commercial bodies and are the result of unsound methodologieS20. This lack of 
statistics is a product of the fact that it is not easy to study victims and offenders of 
these types of crimes (usually due to invisibility of the victims and the problem of 
under-reporting). Moreover, problems of trans-jurisdiction mean that crime 
classification becomes a challenge. Finally, and of great importance, is the political 
economy of cyberspace and the power struggle for control. Wall asks, to what extent 
does this shape and control the motivations of the criminologist? 
Outside of the academic sphere, however, the importance of the future of crime has 
been better recognised and the opportunity to study it has been seized with enthusiasm. 
In 1993 the Government launched the Foresight programme, a panel based programme 
20 The desire to quantify crime is an important feature of criminal justice policy. The problem we are 
facing now is can we build a picture of global crime? Can we make meaningful comparisons of crime 
indicators internationally, across different cultures? Findlay (1999) argues that patterns of crime are 
usually analysed within temporal and spatial contexts (spatial analysts have focused on comparisons 
between crime inside different geographical boundaries, for example urban crime compared with rural 
crime, and temporal analysts have looked at the development of crime trends across time, examining 
stages of transition at different stages in history). If globalisation and the internet represent the collapse 
of time and space, cybercrimes cannot easily be studied in this way. 
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which works on a five year cycle. Foresight brings together representatives from 
academia, business and the public sector, creating a number of different panels which 
consult and report on a number of different issues. One of these panels, The Crime 
Prevention Panel, published a consultation document in March 2000, entitledJust 
Around the Comer', as part of their project to '... help Government, law enforcement, 
business, science and society prepare for the future' (Foresight 2000b, p. 5). This paper 
explores the potential developments in society in the next 20 years and highlights the 
'drivers' which may effect crime. Indeed, this paper, and the report which followed 
(Foresight 2000b), heavily inform this chapter since they represent a significant move 
towards a forward looking, multi-agency crime policy. 
Foresight pioneers a forward-looking way of thinking about crime reductive strategies 
but its work to date has received little academic recognition. Indeed, the suggestion that 
the future of crime prevention lies in technology and design leaves many feeling 
bemused and suspicious. However, I intend to illustrate in this chapter that it is not 
unreasonable to make certain predictions. For example, developments in sequencing 
the human genome will increase the information available at the scene of a crime from 
DNA samples. Biometrics are indeed likely to become key tools in identification, with 
biometric templates being stored in data retrieval centres or on smart cards. 
On the whole, criminology has been happy to accept that we will probably need an 
international response to crime and the different skills may be needed to tackle crime. 
But, with the urgent need for reduction in crime levels increasing, ... 
instant solutions 
are required to today's problems - preferably by using yesterday's methods' 
(Wilkins 
1973, p. 15). The time has come to recognise the potential for looking towards 
tomorrow. 
2.2 Drivers of Crime: Society in the Information Age 
If one were to make a list of the things we wanted to 
know about crime in, say, ten years 
time, we would probably include the following: 
What crimes will be committed? How 
many crimes will be committed? 
How many people will be in prison? What new 
crimes will emerge? However, we cannot predict 
the future of crime within such 
47 
accurate parameters. Instead, we must identify trends and themes, based on what we 
know now about the social context in which crime occurs. 
In this chapter, I intend to demonstrate how such an approach can be effective. I begin, 
then, by discussing the drivers of crime in the context of the Information Age since, 
'.... it is clear that a key driver for change in the future will be changing demographics as 
well as the continuing impact of technological change and the increasing integration of 
the global economy' (Scase 1999, p. 68). 
2.2.1 Globalisation and crime 
'Where time and space have collapsed through the internet so too have the conventional 
representations of crime and control' (Findlay 1999, p. 52). 
Few would dispute that globalisation is having a profound effect on societal structures 
and interactions around the world (Beck 2000, Giddens 1990). Changes in technology, 
commerce and communication have prompted the development of a more mobile, faster 
way of life, in the Western world, at least. The internet has brought with it an increased 
access to information, opening the door to a deluge of opportunities for travel and 
business and the sharing of cultural diversity on a global scale. 
But does this new economic and social climate necessarily set the scene for a 
globalisation of crime? Castells (1996,1998) suggests that the technologies which 
enable multinational business to function and which challenge state control across 
borders also open up opportunities for globally organised crime networks. He argues 
that the effects of transnational crime extend to economics, politics, security and 
societies at large (see also Nelken 1997 and Ruggiero 2000 for good discussions of new 
opportunities for transnational crime). Findlay illustrates this point, arguing that, '[t]he 
'new' political context of crime is now global, as is the stage for its control' (Findlay 
1999, p. 28). He argues that certain crimes have been prioritised for 'collaborative 
action' by governments across the globe because they have realised the potential for 
devastating harm on world markets, capital transfers, national security and transport and 
communication. The attack on the World Trade Centre in 2001 and resulting 'united' 
drive to combat terrorism is an obvious example of this. 
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However, the effect that globalisation is having and will continue to have, on crime is 
unclear (Held et al. 1999). It is important to recognise that the changes in society may 
not revolutionise the nature of criminal behaviour. Crime is not likely to mutate into an 
unrecognisable and uncontrollable phenomenon. Rather, globalisation is more likely to 
have an effect on where crimes occur and how they are executed. Crimes may be 
committed with more ease around the globe and crime scenes may even become virtual. 
But these changes will be more a feature of evolution than reinvention. Findlay (1999) 
warns against becoming swamped with images of organised master criminals, seizing 
power over a limitless population of victims (see also Levi 2002). The danger, he 
argues, of glorifying the collapse of time and space by the internet, is to lose sight of the 
meaning of crime. The inevitable response is to demonise the means for communication 
rather than the crime or criminal. 
What we can be sure of is that the boundaries and the role of the law are becoming 
blurred. The most significant changes in the near future are likely to relate to the 
establishment of control mechanisms. A good example is the recent case of the lifetime 
injunction preventing the publication of the new identities of Jon Venables and Robert 
Thomson 21 . Demon, a major internet service provider, challenged the original 
injunction on the grounds of it being inappropriate for the internet. Internet providers, 
they argued, were concerned that they might face fines for contempt of court for 
unknowingly providing access to the material. However, Dame Elizabeth Butler-Sloss, 
who granted the injunction, resisted requests for more specific terms, stating that it 
would be impossible to cover all eventualities in the light of future technological 
development and, thus, the injunction should be in general terms. Eventually, an 
amendment was made restricting the liability of ISPs to where they have knowledge of 
the publication (or likelihood of publication) or where they fail to take reasonable steps 
to stop the publication (including removal of or blocking access to the information, 
Dyer 2001). This type of case raises a barrage of questions, particularly in the context 
of the criminal law. If an act is not considered to be criminal in one jurisdiction, but is 
in another, whose role is it to deten-nine the criminality? Whose morality should be 
taken into consideration? Whose interests should the criminal law protect? The debates 
are likely to inform crime policy for years to come. 
21 Thomson and Venables were convicted for the murder of James Bulger and, having completed 
itish press were prohibited from sentences in young offender institutions, were released in 2001. 
The Bri II 
publishing details about where they were to be 
located. Fears arose that the information might be 
published on the internet, by someone in a 
different jurisdiction. 
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2.2.2 Changes in society 
From the British perspective, it has been recognised that changes in demographics will 
be a key force of change in society over the next ten years (Lee et al. 1995). In the first 
decade of the 2 I't Century, the population size is predicted to remain static (possibly 
even decrease) but, as birth rates fall and life expectancy increases, we will see the rise 
of an ageing population (Scase 1999). This demographic shift, coupled with a 
continuing trend towards technological advancement is likely to have considerable 
social and economic implications. 
Although we will inevitably be submerged in the problems associated with caring for 
the elderly, Scase (1999) argues that the emerging feature of British society over the 
coming decades will be the rejuvenation of the middle-aged. Middle-age, once deemed 
to signify 'the beginning of the end, brings new opportunities for travel and leisure. This 
will have a marked effect on the economy. For example, advertising agencies, the 
leisure and entertainment industries and the media who currently all target the young 
will need to focus on a new middle aged audience. 
The change in population is likely to result in a growing number of households, in 
particular an increase in single person households and women living alone 22 . Not only 
will we see a higher proportion of those in their 20s living alone but also, as divorce 
rates increase and more women choose careers over families, we will see an increase 
number of middle-aged lone dwellers. The growth of single person households, already 
being experienced with the explosive development of luxury studio apartments in most 
British cities, may revive inner cities, prompting the influx of businesses tailored 
towards the health and lifestyle choices of the new population. 
Routines are also likely to change. Many have predicted the growth of a service and 
information economy (Andersen et al. 2000). The major feature of such an economy is 
low-paid, insecure employment and it is likely that people will be required to work 
longer hours. As people juggle their working and personal lives, it is anticipated that 
they will demand a 24 hour society. 
22 Scase (1999) predicts that by 20 10 , single person 
households will become the predominant household 
type in Britain, with 40% of all households containing one person only. 
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How these changes will impact on crime remains to be seen. We should not neglect to 
acknowledge that, together with an ageing population, we can expect to see more young 
men between 15 and 24 in the next decade (within which lie the current peak offending 
ages for crime, Foresight 2000b). Does this necessarily point towards an increase in 
both young offenders and middle-aged crime victims? Findlay (1999) argues that an 
expanding proportion of young males may increase the potential for an expansion of 
crime choices and relationships which are traditionally criminalised. But as the context 
within which crime occurs evolves, it becomes more difficult to predict how changes in 
the demographics of the population will impact the demographics of criminals and 
victims. 
It has been argued that the effect of economic change on community will have 
repercussions on crime (Castells 1996). The destruction of the traditional household, 
neighbourhood and community relations has the potential to divide society into those 
who are socially incorporated and those who are excluded. Moreover, the breakdown of 
the traditional model of the extended family may result in the dissolution of 
socialisation networks. Technology, it seems, allows more people to remain isolated. 
Physical society may indeed become a more hostile place. The tendency to isolation 
may change the relationship between the offender and the victim - neither is aware of 
the other person. 
Findlay (1999) argues that globalisation represents a radical repositioning of 
relationships, within the contexts of power and authority. Thus it 
has the power to 
marginalise or reintegrate the individual, and which effect it has 
depends on the place an 
individual takes within these relationships. Marginalisation is a consequence of social 
development and affects certain individuals and groups within a culture more 
directly 
and extensively than do others. Indeed, the trend towards consumerism, rather 
than 
communitarianism, as the predominant social philosophy 
is a worry for some. Findlay 
goes on to argue that for communitarianism to 
be a successful force against crime, 
group loyalties need to form a strong moral consensus. 
He suggests that to understand 
individual interdependencies and relationships which promote/resist crime, we need to 
place them in a framework of group 
loyalties. 
2.2.3 The Information Age 
51 
'Today it has become a truism to assert that 'Information is power' and to state that we 
live in an information society' (Lloyd 2000, p. xxxvii). 
Are we in the Information Age? Indeed, do we even know what the Information Age 
is? Ever since man landed on the moon in 1970 we have been said to be entering a new 
'age' of some sort, be it the Space Age, the Network Age, the Digital Age, the Age of 
Computers or some other technological revolution. We have no clear definition of what 
we mean by the Information Age or the Infon-nation Society, yet most people are 
familiar with the contexts that the terms represent and the challenges which arise from 
them. 
The development of information technology has had a considerable impact on modem 
society in the last 30 years. Of course, the development of the computer is at the core of 
development of that technology. Lloyd (2000) traces this development in detail and 
provides a striking example to illustrate the scale of progress. In 1970, when the first 
man landed on the moon, the world was in awe at the power and ability of computers. In 
2000, a typical family car possesses many times the computing power of the Apollo 
spaceship and a desktop PC has more processing power than the whole stack of 
computers used in Mission Control. At the current rate of progress, in which the 
processing power of computers is estimated to double every eighteen months (the so- 
called 'Moore's Law'), fifth generation computers, defined by their human-like 
intelligence, may not be as far around the comer as one might think. 
The major development of the last decade has been the birth of the internet and the 
creation of cyberspace. This development began against the backdrop of the space race 
in the 1960s, driven by America's desire to be able to maintain communications 
between the military and the government in the event of a nuclear attack. Once 
established, however, the internet was, for many years, used mainly by the academic 
community as a means for transferring information. It wasn't until 1992, when the 
world wide web was founded, that the file transfer facilities of the internet became more 
widely available and more user-friendly. 
Once the world wide web had appeared, it soon caught on. Indeed, cyberspace 
developed quickly when compared with other communication technologies. Figure I 
illustrates how quickly the world wide web reached widespread usage in comparison to 
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the telephone, the radio and the personal computer. But, as with all technologies, 
widespread usage does not necessarily entail globalisation. Indeed, Lloyd (2000) 
demonstrates that only 4.5% of the world's population use the internet and it is only a 
feature of the developed world. For those living in the developed world, the internet is 
becoming a part of everyday life but to what extent do these innovations changes the 
picture of crime, at both a global and local level? 
Figure 1: The rapid development of modern technologies. 
Time taken to reach 50 million subscribers 
Telephone 74 years 
Radio 38 years 
Personal Computer 16 years 
World Wide Web 4 years 
Source of data: Lloyd (2000) 
The challenges of the information age are mostly associated with the protection of 
privacy. In particular, the protection of Intellectual Property rights and concerns about 
media ownership and the role of competition policy are dominant themes. The ultimate 
irony is that the data processing techniques which are a growing attraction, actually 
threaten the rights and freedoms of individuals whose data is being processed. The 
current tangle of statutory responses relating to privacy illustrates the complexity of the 
control of information. We are forced to ask whether statutory responses to the misuse 
of information impose regulations on those who process the data and give rights to 
those who constitute its subject matter? Undoubtedly, this is a growing concern for 
individuals and policy makers alike, as stated in the European Commission Draft Green 
Paper on Information Security: 
'Individual, corporate and national wealth expresses itself increasingly in the form of 
information. The growth and performance of an estimate 2/3 of the economy relies 
upon manufacturing or services heavily dependent on information technology, 
telecommunications and broadcasting, and therefore depends critically on the accuracy, 
security and trustworthiness of information. This is of as great importance and interest 
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for individuals as for commerce, industry and public administrations. Correspondingly, 
the protection of information in all its aspects, here referred to as Information Security, 
has become a central policy issue and a major concern world-wide' (cited in Lloyd 
2001, p. xxxix). 
It has, of course, been suggested that the internet offers greater opportunities for crime. 
For example, the increasing use of virtual cash will possibly result in crime 
concentrating more on the electronic realm where different detection methods may be 
necessary. Of particular concern is the suggestion that organised crime might become 
the dominant threat to society in the 21 st Century: 
'When coupled with the greater access directly to information (and the information 
itself potentially more dangerous), the threat is of an empowered small agent capable of 
creating crime and havoc of a level previously limited to organised or career criminals' 
(Foresight 2000a, p. 5). 
However, the reality of this threat should be kept in perspective. Findlay (1999) 
examines what he calls the 'mythology' of organised crime, criticising the glorification 
of criminal groups such as the Mafia and the treatment of them as mystical bodies of 
power. He argues that public officials create super-criminals, thus deflecting the need to 
explain the state's failure to control organised criminals. Moreover, it has been 
suggested that, as more and more people become familiar with technology, those 
without knowledge may turn to more expressive (and violent) crime. 
Thomas and Loader (2000) identify three emergent types of cyber-criminal in the global 
context. Firstly, 'hackers' and 'phreaks' are motivated by curiosity and rarely intend to 
cause damage or gain financially. Information merchants, in contrast, trade in the 
commercial sale of information in the form of more serious crimes such as espionage, 
sabotage, the sale and theft of identifying information, computer/network break-ins and 
large scale software privacy. The third type of criminal is the terrorist or extremist. 
These latter criminals are motivated by illegal political or social activism. 
Wall (200 1) suggests that the internet impacts on criminal activity in three ways. 
Firstly, it acts as a vehicle for communications which sustain existing patterns of 
harmful activity (for example, stalking). Secondly, the internet has created a trans- 
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national environment which provides new opportunities for harmful activities which are 
already the subject of law (e. g. fraud). Thirdly, he argues that the nature of the virtual 
environment has engendered new forms of harmful activity (e. g. the unauthorised 
appropriation of music products). Cutting across these three levels of impact are four 
broad areas of harmful activity: cyber trespass (hacking), cyber deception/theft (credit 
card fraud, misuse of cyber cash - both forcing us to reconsider the concepts of property 
and theft), cyber pornography and cyber violence (cyber stalking and hate speech). 
2.3 What can we predict? The significance of value. 
Having considered the characteristics of the modem environment of crime, and having 
identified the drivers of change in the nature of crime, we can take the next step and 
actually make some predictions about the future of crime. In particular we can predict 
significant changes in value. Value, here, is used in two senses of the word. Firstly, in 
the context of value systems, the concept of socially acceptable behaviour is likely to be 
reshaped. Secondly, particularly in the context of acquisitive crime, value is significant 
because it is inextricably linked to criminal motivation, and the objects of crime are 
characteristically of value to the criminal. 
We have already considered the possible impact of changing lifestyles on the 
community. With more people living in single person households and, as new 
technologies allow individuals more independence over their lives, we may see a 
decline of traditional forms of organisation. Foresight suggest that, '[cIrime will be 
more likely as the social pressures which currently limit anti-social behaviour become 
eroded' (Foresight 2000a, p. 4). All of these changes point towards a changing set of 
value systems, at both levels of society and of the individual. 
However, history tells us that a change in values is a natural feature of development in 
society over time. What seems to be different is the fact that these changes are 
accompanied by changes in technology. Wilkins alerts us to the relationship between 
the two: 
'The impact of technology on crime will be as significant as changing values. Value 
systems emphasize the human actors in the situation, event or act which is defined as 
criminal; technology tends to emphasise the circumstances surrounding the event and 
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the techniques available to those who commit crimes, as well as those who attempt to 
prevent them' (Wilkins 1973, p. 2 1). 
Technology then, as well as being one of the driving forces for changes in society's 
values, is also likely to have an effect on the nature of the criminal act itself. In 
particular, since acquisitive crime follows what has value (does it have value to the 
criminal or does it have a value on the stolen goods market? ) it is likely that property 
theft will continue but might change. The miniaturisation of goods, for example, might 
lead to an increase in property theft. Similarly, computers are becoming more portable 
and personal devices and as they become smaller and more advanced they are likely to 
become more commonplace. 
Grabosky et al. (2001) discuss how techniques of theft are evolving with technological 
advances in e-commerce. Historically, they note, theft has been carried out using 
simple and direct techniques. Using the example of electronic transfer of funds, 
however, they show how the object of theft has shifted from physical cash to the 
'instructions' which move records of funds electronically. They conclude that the 
future is likely to see an extension of opportunities in both the public and private 
sectors. 
Clarke (1999) suggests that hardware is likely to lose value. As hardware increasingly 
becomes a mere access point, serving as a portal through which services are provided 
via an electronic signal, it is likely to become less attractive to the criminal. Already, 
we are seeing evidence of this trend. Hardware is becoming cheaper and even free as a 
way of attracting customers. For example, On Digital recently marketed their television 
services by providing a free set-top digital decoder for each new customer. As the 
hardware loses value, the service which it enables becomes the valuable commodity. 
Clarke argues that as this transition occurs, the hardware which is popular with thieves 
will become unattractive because the value will shift to the service. Moreover, as better 
security features make physical goods less attractive and harder to steal, it may be that 
the, component parts take on value themselves. Such a trend is evident in the mobile 
phone sector, in which a growing problem is the cloning of phones and SIM cards. 
In order to predict what items might have value in the future, we need to consider the 
essential features of products which are attractive to criminals. Clarke (1999) 
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summarises these features using the acronyms CRAVED and EVADED (these are 
summarised in Figure 2). 1 do not intend to dwell on these features for the purposes of 
this discussion. The point I wish to make is that technological advances are having a 
significant impact on the nature of crime and criminal motivations. The key to 
unlocking the future of crime is value and, if we unpack that concept of value, it allows 
us to make a prediction for changes in crime. 
Figure 2: Clarke's CRAVED and EVADED goods 
Features of 'Hot Products' 
CRAVED EVADED 
Concealable Enduring 
Removable Valuable 
Available Available 
Valuable Distributable 
Enjoyable Easy to use 
Disposable Desirable 
Consumer electronics, 
drugs, hardware. 
Electronic services 
Foresight predict rises in violence and disorder, fraud, personation and extortion, and 
theft targeting electronic services, and more crime committed by those outside national 
jurisdictions (2000b). We have seen, earlier in this chapter, how the growing 
importance of information is posing new challenges to law and law enforcement and it 
is in this area that we may see the most significant changes in criminal activity over the 
next few years. In the next section, I consider the increasing value of information and 
identity and describe how the misuse of information is becoming a growing public 
concem. 
2.3.1 The value of information and identity 
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I have argued so far that information will increasingly have value and will be the target 
for crime. Because so much of the information being exposed is likely to be personal 
information, it becomes inextricably linked to issues relating to identity. Ironically, as 
ways of proving identity increase, so will the need to prove it. There is a growing 
awareness of the need for self protection, particularly evident in technological 
developments such as internet identities, digital signatures, smart cards, DNA databases, 
computer based recognition (Brin 1998, Garfinkel 2001). As this awareness becomes 
more widespread, individuals are likely to become concerned about individual rights 
and privacy issues. In this final section of the chapter, I consider the extent to which we 
attach value to identifying information, discussing the importance of control. 
23.1.1 What is identity? 
Identity is a concept which can be interpreted in a variety of ways. Both individuals and 
corporate bodies can have legal identities, for example. A gay or lesbian individual 
might have a very strong sense of sexual identity. Personal identity is a mosaic of 
personal information from many different sources - physical, genetic, personality 
characteristics, achievements, possessions and lifestyle. In the context of crime, and for 
the purposes of this discussion, it is personal identifying information which is the target 
for criminals: this is the aspect of 'identity' which is of interest. 
According to a recent study conducted by the Cabinet Office (2002), personal 
information can be classified into three categories: attributed, biometric and 
biographical identity (summarised in Figure 3). Each type is different in terms of the 
time and method of acquisition and the ability to change or alter that information. 
A person is identified for the first time at birth, in two ways. Firstly, the complex 
biometric features which make each individual biologically unique are the earliest and 
most permanent features of identity in a person's life. Secondly, the birth is registered 
by the parents and the birth certificate is provided, detailing the child's name and the 
time and place of birth. This is the start of what Jones and Levi (200 1) call 'attributed 
identity'; a person does not choose this information and this part of a person's identity 
cannot be changed. 
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As life progresses and one interacts with other parties, different pieces of personal 
information are accumulated. For example, one might gain qualifications which lead to 
employment or one may get married and get a mortgage. Inforination about these life 
events forms part of a person's 'biographical identity' (Jones and Levi 200 1, p. 3). 
Biographical information is different from attributed information in that one has the 
choice whether to acquire it in the first place. 
Figure 3: The acquisition of biometric, attributed and biographical identity. 
Biometric identity Attributed identity Biographical identity 
9 Fingerprints 
0 Iris/retina 
* DNA profile 
9 Facial/dental structure 
o Name 
o Parents' names 
9 Age 
0 Place of birth 
" Education history 
" Qualifications 
" Employment 
" Financial 
commitments 
Birth b- Death p- 
23.1.2 How can identifying information be misused? 
In the context of crime, the misuse of identifying information is characterised by crimes 
involving impersonation. Identifying information is a tool which has been used by 
criminals throughout history. Indeed, the misappropriation of personal information is 
by no means a unique feature of the Digital Age. Common examples are spies, peeping 
toms, eavesdroppers and pirateS23 (Grabosky et al. 2001). 
So, the misuse of information is historically entrenched in the realm of crime. 
However, crimes of impersonation are undergoing a reinvention under the guise of 
'identity theft/fraud' which is being tagged as a new form of crime. Garfinkel (200 1) 
discusses how identity theft is not a fundamentally new kind of crime but argues that, 
due to a growing corporate willingness to extend credit, more people are vulnerable to 
having their identity or reputation exploited without their knowledge. Although not new 
23 Pirates would hoist the flags of other ships in order to pose as an ally vessel. 
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in its core nature, then, it is perhaps fair to accept that identity theft has new features 
which are linked with changes in modem society. 
The motivations for the adoption of a second identity are consistent throughout history 
and include social control, commercial exploitation, voyeurism, political protest, 
stalking or harassment and simple mistake (Grabosky et al. 200 1). Impersonators either 
wish to conceal their original identity and avoid identification or seek to benefit 
financially from their disguise (either financial gain through fraud or avoiding financial 
liability). Thus, there are two distinct types of identity theft: 
1. Taking a fictitious identity (false identity). 
2. Borrowing someone else's identity ('hijacked' identity). 
According to the Cabinet Office study (2002), the methods of assuming an identity 
depend on the type of information which is used as a tool for impersonation. The study 
suggests that fraud using attributed information Is the greatest cause for concern. In the 
case of attributed information, the information can be acquired in three different ways. 
Firstly, a false application can be used to acquire genuine government documents, such 
as a passport or birth certificate. Secondly, genuine documents may be stolen. Thirdly, 
government documents may be forged. Biographical information is harder to acquire 
since it requires the criminal to actually 'live as the victim' for a period of time, 
appearing on public and private databases. Although difficult to achieve, it is possible 
with time and careful planning. In contrast, biometric information, in theory at least, is 
less vulnerable to ingenuity. For the criminal wishing to target this level of information, 
it is easier to tamper with the central system which holds the data than it is to forge 
biometric features. 
2.3.1.3 Why is identifying information important to us? 
We have seen how a wide array of information is collected throughout an individual's 
life and that all of these different pieces of personal information serve different 
purposes. I In terms of value, personal infon-nation can have intrinsic value and/or 
exchange value and that value can be attached to information by ourselves and by other 
people. The question which is rarely raised is why this value varies between 
individuals. As Grabosky et al. (2001) argue, people's definitions of privacy differ, as 
do their expectations. 
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Intrinsic value can be social or sentimental. Social value is all about status and stigma. 
Information which has social value can effect the way members of society perceive us 
and, indeed, how we perceive ourselves. Information about your education, for 
example, might have social value. Someone with a weak education record (with poor 
school attendance and no qualifications perhaps) may be viewed negatively by other 
members of society. In contrast, someone with a doctorate in criminology may be 
perceived to be more deserving of a much higher status in society. Sentimental value is 
attached to information which you see as relating to yourself. For example your middle 
name might be a family name - this might not seem important to an outsider but you 
might deem it to be an important part of your own identity. 
Most personal information has commercial value to some extent in the sense that it can 
be exchanged: 
'That personal information has value is not only implicit in the fact that many 
commercial institutions actively collect it. Increasingly, companies are willing to pay 
individual customers or subscribers , in cash or services, 
for personal information. And 
those who can obtain the information without paying for it will do so. ' (Grabosky et al. 
200 1, p. 164) 
Information, then, can be exchanged for goods and services or it can be exchanged for 
more information. So, for example, to get an internet service with AOL, one needs to 
provide credit card details. Similarly, to get a credit card, one must supply proof of 
address and proof of income and a sound credit history. The result is that, as life 
progresses, an individual accumulates different pieces of information using information 
s/he already has. These different pieces of information have different levels of 
exchange value. A passport, for example, will open the doors to more facilities than a 
membership card for the local video shop. 
In this way, a person's life can be mapped by the information s/he collects. This data 
has been described by Jones and Levi (200 1) as 'persuasive' data. Examples of 
persuasive data include electoral roll entries, mortgage accounts, credit and financial 
facilities/associations, insurance policies and claims, marriage certificate, previous 
addresses, telephone numbers, employment inforination, court judgements, email 
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addresses, passwords and payment facilities (debit/credit, etc. ) - the list goes on. 
Perhaps one of the most important features of persuasive data is creditworthiness. 
Garfinkel (200 1) notes that, although no one is entitled to credit, we live in a society 
where credit is needed in order to buy a house or car or get a good education. Thus, he 
argues, to deny a person credit is to deny him/her the privileges of being a member of 
society. 
23.1.4 The importance of control 
The value attached personal information, however great, inevitably leads to the question 
of control. The privacy debate is fuelled by the issue of control, in particular by the 
questions of who owns personal information and whether that ownership implies 
exclusive control. Garfinkel (2001) argues that identifying information has become a 
valuable property right which is increasingly being seized by businesses. Thus, he 
contends, the issues of control of information are thrust into the forefront of the privacy 
debate: 
'Whether you call this freedom the right to digital self-determination, the right to 
informational autonomy, or simply the right to privacy, the shape of your future will be 
determined in large part by how we understand, and ultimately how we control or 
regulate, the threat to this freedom that we face today' (Garfinkel 200 1, p. 12). 
The extent to which privacy is perceived to be a concern for an individual depends on 
the value attached to the information. For some, sitting at the extreme of the human 
rights spectrum, all personal information should fall under the control of the individual 
in the name of democracy. For others, who do not perceive the threat to autonomy to be 
great, it is more acceptable to have their personal information transferred since they 
adopt the 'nothing to hide' approach. Garfinkel (200 1) argues that attitudes are changing 
as databases become a normal feature of modem life: 
'Thirty years ago, the idea of a centralised computer tracking one's every purchase 
seemed like part of an Orwellian nightmare ... Who could have imagined that the 
day 
would come when millions of people would not only wish to have their purchases 
tracked but would complain when transactions were missed? Yet that is one of the most 
intriguing results of so-called loyalty programs ... they have created massive 
databanks 
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that paint a detailed electronic mosaic of consumer behaviour, and they have done so 
with the willing participation of the monitored. ' (Garfinkel 2001, p. 15) 
The control of personal information is a complex issue and the web of developments in 
law and policy relating to data and confidentiality is beyond the scope of this thesis. It 
is important, however, to recognise that information can only be transferred or 
exchanged with consent. There are, of course, different degrees of consent, and consent 
can be explicit or implicit. Information which is held in the public domain, for example, 
is accessible to other people. We do not have to give explicit consent for other people to 
access it because consent is implied 24 . 
In contrast, the transfer of information not in the public domain requires express consent 
and it is this information that we tend to place in the trust of Parties/institutions: 
'It can be seen that as the individual ages, there is a distinct shift in the currency of the 
of the identification evidence from the public sector to the commercial sector ... Non- 
consensual availability of cross sector life event evidence is only legitimate through 
legal exceptions and orders. This separation of life event evidence supports the 
individual's right to privacy, and leaves the choices surrounding disclosure entirely 
within their gift' (Jones and Levi 2001 p. 3). 
Examples of information which cannot be shared without consent are medical records 
and financial records (there are, of course, situations where this need for consent can be 
24 Consent may be implied by custom or by the law. If I go to a party and ask the host the name of one of 
the other guests, he will probably give me that information. He does not go and ask that person for his 
consent to pass on this information - this consent is implied because it is generally accepted by custom 
that this information can be passed on freely. If you did not want people to know this information, you 
would not give it; if you wanted to restrict the use of the information, you would make that explicit (so in 
this scenario the guest would tell the host not to tell anyone his name). But suppose I ask the host to tell 
me the guest's mother's maiden name. Most people know that mother's maiden name is a piece of 
information which is often used as a security measure. It is not customary to share this information freely 
with other individuals and so it would be unreasonable to assume there was implied consent to share that 
information. The law permits access to certain types of information. Anyone can go to the electoral roll 
and find out your name and where you live. They would not have to come and ask your consent - the law 
ensures that we have the right to do this. We give consent to this information being made available by 
agreeing to abide by the law which requires all residents to register on the electoral roll. If you did not 
wish to obey this rule, you could go and live in another country. 
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overruled). It is these pieces of information which we think we have control of and, 
25 thus, when we lose it we feel violated 
The impact of this kind of violation should not be underestimated (Sutherland 2000). It 
is argued that to lose control of one's personal information is potentially damaging to 
quality of life. Grabosky et al. (2001) allude to a deep psychological harm: 
'The loss of one's private life is often accompanied by a decline in spontaneity, 
creativity, and a diminished sense of self (p. 176). 
Conclusion 
Wilkins, it seems, was correct to predict the increasing value of information in the 2l't 
Century: 
'In terms of the future, the most serious crimes are going to be those relating to 
information, rather than to tangible things, and to the collective responsibility 
crimes ... Its going to 
be extremely difficult to handle the idea of theft of information, 
when you can't even see the information' (Wilkins 1973, p. 28) 
Identity theft is indeed emerging as a new crime problem, at least in the eyes of policy 
makers. The extent of the problem is not clear, mainly because we only have 
information about frauds which have been detected. Moreover, since there is no actual 
offence of identity fraud, there has been, up until now, little interest in finding out about 
it. 
In a recent report, the Cabinet Office study made the first attempt at estimating the 
extent of the problem in the UK (Cabinet Office 2002). It estimates the cost of identity 
fraud to be in excess of f 1.3 billion per annum. Presented against a back drop of the 
total cost of all fraud, estimated by National Economic Research Associates (NERA) to 
25 Garfinkel (2001) gives a good example of this kind of violation. In 1982, the medical records of a US 
representative named Nydia Velazquez were leaked to the press in an attempt to destroy her candidacy for 
the US House of Representatives. In the previous year, Velazquez has attempted to commit suicide. In 
her testimony (discussed at length by Cavoukian and Tapscott 1995), she described how she felt 
powerless, violated and let down by the justice system. 
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be in excess of f 13.8 billion per annum, identity fraud is heralded to be a new wave of 
organised crime and, thus, of increasing concern to the state. 
Although new to public (and political) debate in the UK, identity fraud has been cited as 
a fast growing crime elsewhere around the world. It is suggested that it is currently the 
fastest growing crime in the USA, a significant development since it wasn't even 
recognised as a form of fraud until the 1990s (Brin 1998). In response, the US, together 
with other countries (including Australia), has codified the offence of identity theft in a 
bid to stamp on its development. The UK, hot on their heels, is now entering a process 
of consultation for the development of a new criminal offence of identity theft. 
The interesting thing which distinguishes the British approach to identity fraud are the 
fears which drive the political debate. In America and Canada, identity theft is 
perceived to be a problem because it threatens economic stability. Put simply, the term 
'identity theft' has become a surrogate for all frauds committed using credit cards and 
social security numbers. In contrast, the debate in the UK (and also the rest of Europe) 
is fuelled by the growing problems of illegal immigration and organised drug 
trafficking. Identity theft is, in effect, being presented as a problem of passport control. 
However, for the individual who becomes a victim if identity theft, the implications are 
more far reaching than the current political stance. All the while the Home Office 
continues to edge public concern towards the threats of immigration and organised 
crime, the individual victims of information thefts and frauds are being ignored. 
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I The case for studying the victims of fraud 
Introduction 
One of the major themes of this thesis is the idea that victimisation surveys need to be 
forward looking if they are expected to build (and continue to build) an accurate picture 
of crime and the fear of crime. Having accepted the challenge to work on the 
development of a concept of crime (chapter one), and having recognised the probability 
of a marked rise in fraud offences in the foreseeable future (chapter two), I explain in 
this chapter that I intend to work within the paradigm of fraud. 
The starting point for this chapter is, at first glance, a fundamental stumbling block - 
fraud offences are traditionally excluded from victimisation surveys. I suggest that this 
exclusion has evolved directly from the assumption that all financial crimes are 
necessarily white collar crimes. Since there are well-establi shed and sound arguments 
for omitting the victims of white collar crimes from surveys, all fraudulent offences are 
automatically overlooked. 
However, I argue that offences of fraud are not necessarily white collar crimes and can 
offer a sturdy defence to the arguments for exclusion. This argument is developed in 
three stages. First, I consider the meaning of the term 'white collar crime', beginning 
with the work of Sutherland in 1949. As it transpires, arriving at a clear definition of 
white collar crime proves to be far from easy. I suggest that for the purposes of this 
thesis, the main focus should be on identifying what distinguishes white collar crimes 
from street crimes. In particular, what makes fraudulent behaviour different from 
criminal behaviour at the street level? 
This takes us to the second stage of the argument - defining the nature of fraud. In order 
to do this, I trace the historical development of the legal concept of fraud in English 
law. Beginning in the 15 th Century with the early law of larceny, we see how the simple 
law of theft was forced to evolve to encompass fraudulent or deceptive behaviour, a 
change that was driven by momentous changes in society and commerce. In particular, 
as trade relationships developed into global ventures, the law had to develop to protect 
those who had previously conducted their business practices on trust. In effect, the 
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criminal law was drafted to bridge the gaps left by inadequacies in the civil law, and 
fraudulent behaviour became progressively more frequently labelled as criminal. 
By the time we reach the 21 st Century, the law of theft had undergone so many 
piecemeal developments that it was arguably inadequate to deal with modem day 
developments in society, technology and commerce. Moreover, there is much 
uncertainty surrounding the relationship between theft and fraud, and there have been 
vociferous calls for major reform of the law. It seems that we have not come far in 
more than five centuries. We are left with a concept of fraud which is merely a species 
of theft and has no clear definition in legal terms. 
What we do have is a notion of what constitutes fraudulent behaviour and it is this 
which is takes us into the next part of the discussion. The element which characterises 
fraudulent behaviour is 'deception' and it is this which makes fraud different from other 
crimes. Deception, of course, is also an element which characterises most white collar 
crimes and so it seems, at first glance, logical to accept that fraud is a white collar 
crime. However, moving on to the third and final stage of this argument, I argue that 
some fraudulent offences do not simply fit the white collar mould and straddle the 
(already blurred) boundaries between white collar and street crimes. The victims of 
these offences may be worthy subjects of subjects of survey-based criminological 
research and I suggest that the implications of victimisation of such offences should not 
be underestimated. 
At the end of chapter one, I stated that the major aim of this thesis was to test the 
feasibility of introducing financial crime to the British Crime Survey. I conclude this 
chapter by selecting plastic card fraud as the "crash test dummy", primarily due to the 
robust defence it provides to the well- established reasons for exclusion. We then move 
on, in chapter four, to examine the crime itself in more detail. 
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3.1 The exclusion of fraud victims from victimisation surveys 
The term 'white collar crime' is often used as a synonym for fraud. It is possible that 
when most people think about white collar crime, they tend to think of large scale 
financial crimes, committed by the charming and powerful - those with high social 
standing. The victim is often perceived as a vulnerable upstanding citizen who is just 
'not so worldly wise'. These images are, of course, perpetuated by the media but we 
have to look beyond these stereotypes to get a true picture of what fraud is all about. 
Levi (1993) notes that most frauds which end up in court are committed by blue-collar 
criminals, '[i]n Great Britain, frauds largely involve checks and credit cards, 
embezzling, and businesses obtaining money or goods under false pretences' (Levi 
1993, p. 71). Moreover, the victims are most likely to be financial services or 
institutions - private victims are certainly in the minority for these crimes. Indeed, 
family and friends are in a better position than strangers to defraud private citizens (for 
a good discussion of these points see Levi and Pithouse 1992). 
However, since it has long been assumed that fraud is a white collar crime, its victims 
have been treated accordingly. As a result, the victims of fraud have been somewhat 
overlooked by criminologists, dismissed in particular by those conducting victimisation 
surveys. In this section I will challenge the assumption that fraud is necessarily a white 
collar crime and suggest that the two should be separated conceptually. 
3.1.1 Is fraud a white collar crime? 
In order to answer the question 'is fraud a white collar crimeT we need to consider two 
additional questions. Firstly what is white collar crime and, secondly, what is fraud? 
Only then can we give a meaningful answer to the question. 
3.1. LI What is white collar crime? 
The concept of white collar crime was introduced in 1949 by Edwin Sutherland. 
In an 
infamous speech to American Sociological Association, he launched an attack on 
his 
peers - academic social scientists whose work, in 
his view, was biased since it focused 
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exclusively on the crimes of the disadvantaged. He proposed that an explanation of 
crime needs to encompass features of both street crime and white collar crime, which he 
defined as 'a crime committed by a person of high social status in the course of his 
occupation'. Six decades later we use the term to describe a wide variety of actions and 
omissions, ranging from false advertising and environmental violations to large scale 
fraud and major corruption in governments. 
White collar crime has indeed evolved into a significant limb of criminological study, 
on both sides of the Atlantic. But, as Coleman (1992) illustrates, this evolution has 
occurred in waves. When Sutherland and his colleagues began to work on white collar 
crime, they opened a Pandora's box of theoretical and conceptual conundrums. The 
flagship of their work was the theory of differential association (an explanation for 
criminal behaviour which applied, they claimed, to all types of crime). However, it 
proved to be something of a false start for the study of white collar crime, and a period 
of latency characterised the field between 1964 and 1975 (Geis 1992). Fortunately, the 
political climate during the 1960s prompted a renewed interest in the mid- 1970s. A 
surge for power by blacks, the threat of the Vietnam War and Watergate, all reinforced 
public, political and academic attention onto abuse of power. 
This time the study of white collar crime developed with growing maturity and 
increased vigour. As those interested in the topic increased in number, so too did the 
number of theoretical and philosophical perspectives on the broader concept. Indeed, 
since Sutherland introduced the concept, the original boundaries of his definition have 
been challenged on a number of grounds. Sutherland's vision was a type of crime which 
was different from street crime in terms of both its perpetrators and the nature of the 
criminal act. Curiously, it is this very vision which has created a minefield of 
conceptual overlaps. 
The debate about definition has centred around the dilemma of whether the 
characteristics of the perpetrator or the characteristics of the crime should form the 
nucleus of the concept (Shapiro 1990). On the one hand there are those who deem the 
status of the perpetrator to be the primary concern. On the other, some commentators 
have favoured an offence-based approach and see little reason for emphasising the 
privileged position of the perpetrator, focusing instead on the formal characteristics of 
the crime. Geis (1992) says that this division emerges from the distinction between 
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sociological and legal approaches to white collar crime. Sociologists (who he says 
dominate the academic community in this field) argue that whitecollar crime is 
identifiable by the fact that it is committed by people with reasonably high standing in 
the course of their business, professional or political work. In comparison, legal 
commentators argue that offences which are embraced by the term 'white collar crime' 
are committed by people who might be located anywhere on the status hierarchy. 
It can be difficult to skirt these issues without becoming embroiled in conceptual 
dredging. It is tempting to avoid definitional jousting altogether by adopting the 'we 
can all recognize it when we see it, so why bother overmuch with attempting to pinpoint 
precise parameters? ' approach (Geis 1992, p. 32). It is essential not to lose sight of the 
fundamental question - what distinguishes white collar crimes from street crimeS26 9 
Shover and Wright attempt to encapsulate the nature of the crime in a nutshell: 
'[W]hereas street crime typically is committed by confronting victims or entering their 
homes or businesses, most white collar crimes are committed using guile, deceit, or 
misrepresentation to create and exploit for illicit advantage the appearance of a routine 
legitimate transaction' (Shover and Wright 2001 p. xi). 
According to this approach, the defining feature of white collar crime is deception. The 
criminal activity (illegitimate gain) is dressed up as a routine legitimate transaction and 
the white collar criminal must build up the trust of the victim in order to carry out the 
deception. Shapiro suggests that this violation of trust is crucial to the understanding of 
white collar crime. She argues that all types of fiduciary relationship are open to some 
kind of abuse, be it misrepresentation, deception, omission, fabrication or falsification 
of information by those in positions of trust. She concludes, '[I]t is time to integrate the 
"white collar" offenders into mainstream scholarship by looking beyond the 
perpetrators' wardrobe and social characteristics and explaining the modus operandi of 
their misdeeds and the ways in which they establish and exploit trust' (Shapiro 1990, p. 
365). Within such a relationship of trust, the criminal can use the methods and 
techniques used for legitimate business on a day-to-day basis as the tools for 
26 Shapiro (1990) reminds us that It is this very distinction which prompted Sutherland's original concept 
defining crimes by the characteristics of their perpetrators results in "an unfortunate mixing of 
definition 
and explanation" (Braithwaite 1985 p. 3) that precludes the possibility of exploring empirically the 
relationships between social class and crime - the very reason 
Sutherland coined the phrase' (Shapiro 
1990, p. 347, citation in original). 
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committing the crime. Sparks (1979) argues that this is what distinguishes white collar 
crimes from street crimes. 
3.1.1.2 What isftaud? 
'Contrary to popular belief there is in English law no criminal offence of fraud... [t]he 
law does, however, recognise a concept of criminal fraud, a broad notion - broader, 
indeed, than the layman's - of what it means to defraud someone' (Arlidge et al. 1996, 
P. I). 
It is surprising, perhaps, that there is no criminal offence of fraud in English law. The 
law does, however, recognise a concept of fraud that has emerged from five centuries of 
construction of the law of theft. In this section I trace the history of the concept of fraud, 
beginning with its roots in the early law of larceny and culminating in an assessment of 
the modem notion of 'fraudulent behaviour'. 
The early law of larceny. 
The criminal offence of theft did not form part of English law until the 15 th Century. 
England was, at that time, experiencing significant societal change. Medieval England, 
isolated and localised, entered an age of manufacture, international trade and global 
commerce. Trade and industry (in particular the textile industry) expanded rapidly and, 
as exports increased, so did the carrying trade. It soon became clear that the law (both 
civil and criminal) was unable to protect individuals from new scenarios and 
relationships which began to evolve as commercial dealings developed. 
Now, in terms of the law of theft, or larceny as it was known, the development of the 
carrying trade, both nationally and internationally, was significant27 . The actus reus of 
27 Foreign merchants frequented English ports and soon became unpopular among native merchants who 
resented the competition and, importantly, the preferential treatment they were given by the Crown and 
the law. These foreigners were often exposed to forceful resistance and violent attacks and rioting were 
common. Transportation was hazardous and foreign merchants were often given royal covenants of safe 
conduct in an attempt to reassure them of safe passage. Indeed, foreign merchants held a favourable legal 
position. According to common law, a person who came legally into possession of property and 
later 
converted it did not commit a criminal offence ('the owner should have protected himself 
by selecting a 
trustworthy person' Hall 1952 p. 3 1). A foreign merchant, however, would not be in a position to make a 
judgement as to the trustworthiness of a stranger and so the common law was hard to apply. The civil law 
shows similar developments at the time, civil 
liability of the carrier was extremely strict. 
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larceny in the early law was threefold: the defendant must have seized a thing without 
the consent of the owner and carried it away. It was essential to show both the taking 
and the carrying away for a successful conviction. Larceny, then, was treated as an 
offence against possession 28 and trespass was necessary before the felony was proven. 
For this reason, most servants and bailees (i. e. those operating in the carrying trade) 
avoided prosecution since the property was usually handed to them voluntarily and they 
were considered to be 'in possession'. 
The Carrier's case in 1473 marked the first move to develop the inadequate law of 
larceny. In this case, the defendant was hired to carry bales (probably containing wool 
or cloth) to Southampton. He failed to deliver the goods to Southampton and instead 
took them elsewhere, broke the bales and took the contents. He was charged with the 
felony of larceny. The case was important because it sparked a debate about the 
requirements for larceny in a new context - theft by a bailee. Recall that common law 
laid down the rule that a bailee could not be guilty of larceny since he is in possession 
of the property. However, it was obvious in this case that the law did not extend far 
enough to cover what was clearly dishonest behaviour. So, it was argued that the 
breaking of the bales tenninated the bailment and thus the elements of larceny were 
fulfilled. 
Without dwelling on the technicalities, the importance of this case is clear. The law as it 
stood was unable to fill the gaps opened by the developments in commerce. A civil 
action (for breach of trust) in situations where a servant or bailee 'stole' the goods he 
was delivering was inappropriate since it was not likely to result in a satisfactory 
restitution for the plaintiff. Remedies available under the criminal law were also 
limited, '[i]n the absence of any other even remotely relevant sanction in the criminal 
law, the only choice was - guilty of larceny or not guilty of any offence' (Hall 1952, p. 
32). This choice was of real significance since the offence of larceny was seen as very 
serious and the punishable by death. 
Howeverý the Carrier's case left a legacy of confusion and uncertainty in the law. It was 
subsequently cited by many judges in cases where bailment occurred. This was not an 
indication that the decision was sound or based on good principles; rather it allowed 
28 English law has always considered 'ownership' to mean the person who has the best right to possess 
something. 
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judges to bring clear cases of dishonest behaviour within the inadequate scope of the 
criminal law. Problems emerged when the facts of a case did not fit with the 
requirements under the Carrier's case decision. It wasn't until 1857 that the situation 
was finally cleared up with the introduction of a statute (20 and 21 Vict, c. 54, which 
later became s. I Larceny Act 1916) which made it a felonious theft where a bailee 
dishonesty converted goods. 
The early law offraud. 
'The Latin wordfraudulenta had a wide meaning in Roman Law and covered dishonest 
dealing of many subtle kinds involving deceit and trickery; but in the days when our 
common law crimes were first defined, the economic relations of men were simple and 
the main need of society was for legal protection against crime of physical force rather 
than against deceit' (Turner 1962, p. 253). 
The development of the law of fraud was considerably slower than that of the law of 
theft in the 15 tb_ 17 th Centuries. The early law of cheating covered only limited 
situations where a fraud had been committed on the general public by the use of false 
weights and measures which normal prudence could not guard against. In 1541 the 
statute of 33 Hen VIII c. I expanded the law on cheating, diluting the requirement for a 
general application to the public at large but retaining the requirement that the defendant 
must use an 'objective device' (e. g., a seal or letter). 
The law did not change significantly over the next 200 years. The eighteenth century 
saw further advances in the law of fraud but it was soon to converge with the growing 
number of laws of larceny. 
The MhCentury and the convergence offraud and larceny 
I 
... practically the entire modem 
law of theft has been a product of the 18 Ih century' (Hall 
1952, p. 54). 
18 th Century England bore witness to major changes in trade, finance and social 
structure (Olsen 1999). The transition from an agricultural economy to a manufacturing 
economy had led to the rise of cities. The population became increasingly more mobile 
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and less localised. Trade became increasingly impersonal but business relationships 
received little regulation. 
Changes in business relationships naturally led to the reform of financial institutions 
and procedures. There was a significant development of banking facilities following the 
establishment of the Bank of England in 1694. In 1759 the bank promoted the use of 
paper money, issuing E 10 notes (previously only larger notes had being issued and 
ordinary traders had been forced to carry large amounts of coinage) and at the end of the 
century, payment by cheque was introduced. One of the most striking developments at 
this time was the rise of credit facilities; indeed there was a fundamental shift from cash 
on delivery to credit transactions (Roberts 2002, Hay 1975). 
The 18 th Century saw considerable development of both the laws of larceny and fraud 
and, in the second half of the century, the two began to converge. The impersonal nature 
of business opened the doors to both commercial and non-commercial frauds. Issues of 
trust were paramount and this is reflected in developments of the law. The introduction 
of the new offences of receiving stolen property, larceny by trick, obtaining goods by 
false pretences and embezzlement marked a major move to develop the concepts of 
larceny and fraud in line with the social and economic changes being experienced at the 
time. 
Social attitudes towards theft and fraud were changing, especially amongst the rising 
'mercantile class' who were becoming increasingly powerful (Hay 1975, McLynn 1991), 
and the courts struggled to interpret inadequate laws to cover new business 
relationships. Hay observes the rapid growth of legislation relating to property in the 
18thCentury and debates whether this trend was a reaction simply to changes in trade 
and commerce or to the wider implications of life in a changing modem society. He 
focuses in particular on the use of the death penalty and how it represented an official 
'policy of terror', 
'Death had long been a punishment for theft in England and several of the most 
important statutes were passed in Tudor times. But the gentry and merchants and peers 
who sat in parliament in the eighteenth century set new standards of legislative industry, 
as they passed act after act to keep the capital sanction up to date, to protect every 
conceivable kind of property from theft or malicious damage' (Hay 1975, p. 22). 
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The second half of the century saw considerable legislative activity, most notably the 
introduction of statutes relating to the offences of obtaining by false pretences and 
embezzlement (Hall 1952). These are arguably the two major offences of fraudulent 
behaviour which remain under English law today. 
Hall (1952) describes how the offence of obtaining by false pretences had something of 
a false start. The Carrier's case had allowed judges to bring clear cases of dishonest 
behaviour within the (inadequate) scope of the criminal law. Problems soon emerged 
when the facts of the case did not fit with the requirements that the property and the 
rights ofpossession had to be interfered with, i. e. in cases where fraudulent behaviour 
of some kind induced the owner to hand over the property voluntarily. It was generally 
held that such cases fell within the civil law. Fraudulent behaviour fell with in the 
realm of the criminal law of cheating but, as we have seen, the 'cheat' in cases needed to 
be effected by 'a false token or device of a tangible character' and one which normal 
prudence would guard against. So, in cases where a person was induced by deceit into 
parting with his own property, the criminal law did provide a remedy but as commercial 
activity in the eighteenth century expanded, the common law rules proved to be too 
narrow. In 1757,30 Geo. 11 closed the gap, making 'obtaining property by false 
pretences' a criminal offence. 
However, it was at least 25 years before this statute started to be used to its full effect. 
In the meantime, another dimension was added to the law of larceny by the courts, 
creating a new category of 'larceny by trick'. Larceny by trick was established by Pear's 
case in 1779. The defendant had hired a horse with the intention of selling it and 
keeping the proceeds. It was held that if a man intends to misappropriate property and 
'induces' the owner to pass possession to him and then he makes away with it, the 
offence is larceny. The rule in Pear's case eventually came to be accepted as an 
arbitrary decision 29but at the time it was commonly applied to cases of confidence 
tricks 30. The result was that distinction between larceny by trick and simple fraud 
29 It is significant that Pear's case involved the theft of a horse. Great value was attached to horses and 
cattle and often specific legislation was passed to provide greater protection. It is likely that it was more 
favourable to create a new category of larceny rather than use the existing statutory provisions for 
obtaining by false pretences since larceny carried a much severer punishment than the fraud offence. 
30 Examples are ring dropping and purse dropping where the fraudster would select a victim, pretend to 
have found a purse/ring and agree to share the finding reward with the victim. The fraudster would 
75 
(obtaining property by false pretences) became confused. A departure was finally made 
in the case of Rex v. Young et al. 31 in 1789 when the courts made a decisive move 
towards applying 30 Geo. 11 to fraud cases. 
Embezzlement had an easierjourney into the statute books. The case of R v. Bazeley in 
1799 prompted parliament to enact 39 Geo. 111 c. 85 which was the first general 
embezzlement statute 32 . It only applied to servants and clerks at that time but 
developments through the I 9th Century extended the scope of embezzlement in both 
public and private spheres. 
Traditionally, then, larceny was an offence solely against possession of property. We 
have seen how the development in common law of larceny by trick (Pear's case) and the 
introduction of statutory provisions for embezzlement and obtaining by false pretences 
stretched the concept to its limits. In the I 9th Century, moves were made to repeal much 
of the 18th Century capital code. The Larceny Act 1803 abolished the death penalty for 
larceny and under the Larceny Act 1827 the offence itself was divided into two 
categories - petty larceny and grand larceny (Philips 1977). The distinction was made 
explicit in the Larceny Act 1916 (which simply codified the common law, rather than 
adding anything new) which renamed the two categories 'simple larceny' and 
'aggravated larceny'. A larceny was aggravated if it occurred in a certain place (on a 
ship, dock, wharf, wreck or in a dwelling house), if the theft was from a person (robbery 
with and without force), if the offender was a clerk or servant or if the objects stolen 
were of a certain type (cattle, textiles, animals or letters). 
The modern law offraud and theft 
By the mid-20th Century the law of theft was so piecemeal and problematic that calls 
were made for radical reform. The law: 
volunteer to take charge of the purse/ring as long as the victim left a watch or some other valuable item as 
security. The purse/ring would of course be fake and the fraudster would abscond with the security. 
31 In this case, the defendants had told a man that a race was to take place and took his bet. The race was 
fictional and they kept the money. 
" We have seen how the Carrier's case marked the first step to making servants liable for larceny. 
However, this only covered cases where the servant had been entrusted with property by his master. It 
is master by at ird did not cover situations where the servant was given possession of propertyfor 
hi hi 
party. This was a significant problem out of the domestic sphere; if a shop cashier took money 
for an 
item and did not put it into the till, it was technically not a 
felony. 
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'... by that time had about twenty distinct forms in which the basic offence was modified 
by reference to the relationship between the victim and the defendant, the method by 
which the property was obtained, the nature of the property or the presence of various 
aggravating circumstances' (Law Commission 1999, p. 26). 
In 1959, the Criminal Law Revision Committee was appointed, '... to consider, with a 
view to providing a simpler and more effective system of law, what alterations in the 
criminal law are desirable with reference to larceny and kindred offences and to such 
other acts involving fraud or dishonesty as, in the opinion of the committee, could 
conveniently be dealt with in legislation giving effect to the committee's 
recommendations on the law of larceny' (Criminal Law Revision Committee 1966, p. 
5). 
The Committee's report resulted in the Theft Act of 1968 (hereafter the 1968 Act) which 
replaced the old laws of larceny. The 1968 Act created a new basic offence of theft. 
Section I (I) of the Theft Act 1968 says a person is guilty of theft if he dishonestly 
appropriates property belonging to another with the intention ofpermanently depriving 
the other of it. All five elements must be present and each has undergone intense 
scrutiny in the courts (discussion is not appropriate here but the interested reader is 
referred to Jefferson 2001). 
Thus the law of fraud remained entwined in the law of theft. The major change made by 
the 1968 Act was the introduction of the concept of 'dishonesty'. It replaced the term 
'fraudulently and without a claim of right made in good faith' which had been written 
into the 1916 Act. It was felt that the meaning of 'fraudulently' was difficult for the jury 
to interpret and 'dishonesty' would be an easier concept to understand; only a partial 
definition of dishonesty was given to allow for wide interpretation. This, of course, has 
meant that in the years following the 1968 Act, the concept of dishonesty has undergone 
considerable expansion and prompted much debate in the courts and academic circles. 
Of particular concern has been the role of the jury in dishonesty cases. The cases of 
Feely and Ghosh place responsibility for the judgement on the jury and the judge cannot 
direct them as to what conduct is dishonest. Previously the judge had been able to guide 
the jury as to what constituted a 'fraudulent' act. 
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Offences which are 'fraudulent' became a species of theft under the 1968 Act and are 
commonly referred to as the 'deception offences'. The deception offences are 
specifically defined by the Theft Act 1968 and expanded in the Theft Act 1978 
(obtaining property by deception 33 , obtaining a money transfer by deception 
34 
, obtaining 
a pecuniary advantage by deception 35 , procuring the execution of a valuable security 
36 
obtaining services by deception 37 and evasion of liability 38). One element is common to 
all, namely the benefit must be obtained by dishonest deception. The deception offences 
are considered more serious than ordinary theft and carry higher sentences. 
The concept of deception is much broader than its predecessor 'false pretences'. The 
word deception is often used synonymously with the term fraud but deception alone 
does not constitute fraud. The deception must cause the victim to suffer some kind of 
loss or alter his/her conduct in some way (the deception should induce the victim to act 
to his own detriment and to the deceiver's profit). A deception can be fraudulent even if 
there is no intention of leaving the victim financially worse off in the long run. It is 
enough to induce him/her to take a risk. 
The majority of fraud offences are prosecuted under the Theft Acts 1968 and 1978, 
usually under obtaining by deception or evasion of liability by deception. However, 
further provisions have been made under separate pieces of legislation, covering a wide 
range of conduct from company or investment fraud through to social security, for 
example: 
o Conspiracy to defraud (Criminal Justice Act 1987) 
" Company fraud (almost 150 offences under the Companies Act 1985) 
" Corruption (Prevention of Corruption Acts 1906 and 1916) 
" Investment fraud (misleading prospective investors, market manipulation and 
insider dealing) (Financial Services Act 1986 and Criminal Justice Act 1993) 
33 
s. 15 Theft Act 1968 
34 
s. 15(a) Theft (Amendment) Act 1996 
35 
s. 16 Theft Act 1968 
36 
s. 20(2) Theft Act 1968 
37 
s. I Theft Act 1978 
38 
s. 2(l) Theft Act 1978 
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Frauds on creditors (Insolvency Act 1986) 
Frauds on the public (Tax fraud under the Customs and Excise Management Act 
1979 and Value Added Tax Act 1994, Social Security fraud under the Social 
Security Administration Act 1992 and fraud against the European Community 
under the Social Security Administration Act 1992). 
e Computer fraud (unauthorised access to or modification of computer 
information under the Computer Misuse Act 1990). 
The needfor reform 
The major problem with the law of theft at the present time is that it is outdated. When 
the 1968 Act was designed, few would have contemplated the advances in technology 
which have occurred in the last 30 years. What we are left with today is a series of 
controversial decisions (made ad hoc, as the courts have encountered each new 
problem), often resulting in a scattering of statutory provisions. As a result the law is 
both uncertain and piecemeal. Moreover, as the use of technology becomes more 
widespread, it is likely that the inadequacy of the law will be further exposed. The Law 
Commission cites this as a potentially serious problem because the European 
Convention on Human Rights requires that criminal offences should be defined with 
reasonable precision. 
Future problems are likely to emerge from increased use of the internet, but Wasik 
argues that the use of the computer will not significantly alter the law relating to fraud: 
,... in most computer fraud offences the object of the offence is to acquire a tangible 
benefit, generally money, and the computer is being used as a tool to perpetrate or 
conceal the fraud. In general the criminal law is addressed to, and defined in terms of, 
the objective of the dishonest conduct rather than the fraudster's precise modus 
operandi, so that computer manipulation ought, in principle, to be irrelevant to liability' 
(Wasik 1991, p. 104). 
However, some commentators have already warned that the law needs to be responsive 
to changes in the use of electronic payment, and developments in intellectual property. 
For example, in cases of internet shopping/purchases, it has been noted that it is difficult 
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to show that a human mind has been deceived 39 . Similarly, if we 
look at the internet as a 
delivery mechanism for services, for example getting legal advice online or receiving an 
electronic journal, further problems emerge. Usually, if an individual purchases one of 
these services, the purchaser is given an access code or password which allows them to 
access the service. As the law stands, the fraudulent use of the access details after the 
initial legitimate purchase is not an offence. How the law will deal with these situations 
remains to be seen. 
The highly controversial case of Preddy (1996) prompted the most recent calls for major 
reform of the law of theft and fraud. In Preddy, the House of Lords held that a credit 
balance gained from a mortgage fraud did not constitute 'property belonging to another' 
and therefore the act could not be regarded as theft40. Indeed, the concept of'property' 
has given the courts much to chew on in financial situations where overdrafts have been 
abused or cheques have been misused and the situation is likely to become more 
complex with the increased use of the electronic purse in both business and consumer 
relationships. 
Similarly, as more value is attached to knowledge and information (see chapter two) the 
question of whether information constitutes property is likely to fuel much debate. 
Information sits on the boundaries of the concept of property. Information not in the 
public domain does not only warrant special protection by the law but also takes the 
form of 'property'. In contrast, according to the case Oxford v. Moss, information 
which is not given this protection (i. e. in the public domain) is not property. This may 
have implications where personal infori-nation (name, address, credit card details) is 
increasingly used on the internet, either via purchases, bill payments or internet 
banking, and it is unclear what level of protection the law might offer. 
39 Deceiving a machine in order to obtain property is theft, so putting a false coin into a vending machine 
amounts to the same as breaking into it. The situation is different for obtaining a service (not property) 
which requires a deception. Various attempts have been made to fill this loophole with specific statutory 
sections (parking meters, telecoms, VAT). If you buy a theatre ticket online (a service, not property), 
for 
example, and give false credit card details, it is arguable that it is the machine that you 
have deceived, not 
a human mind. It seems likely that the courts will be forced to deal with this 
loophole before long. It is a 
particularly important issue because it is possible that E-money may 
be treated like credit/debit cards 
under the law. 
40The defendant had obtained a chose in action, an asset that had been created for him and had never 
belonged to anyone else. Unsurprisingly this was an unpopular decision and prompted the 
implementation of the Theft (Amendment) Act 1996. 
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In 1998, on the back of controversy created by the Preddy decision, the Law 
Commission were asked by the Home Secretary to: 
4 
... examine the law of fraud, and [consider] whether it: is readily comprehensible to 
juries; is adequate for effective prosecution; is fair to potential defendants; meets the 
need of developing technology including electronic means of transfer; and to make 
recommendation to improve the law in these respects with all due expedition. In 
making these recommendations to consider whether a general offence of fraud would 
improve the criminal law' (Law Commission 1999, p. 1). 41 
Whether we will see a major overhaul in the law of theft and fraud in the near future 
remains to be seen. For now, we are left with a legal concept which is merely a species 
of theft and has no clear definition in legal terms. Arlidge et al. suggest that '[t]he factor 
that lends this protean concept some semblance of unity is not so much what is actually 
done, as the legal and moral character of what is done, the element of disregard for the 
rights of others and for ordinary standards of conduct' (Arlidge et al. 1996, p. 2). This, 
of course, echoes Shover and Wright's conception of the nature of white collar crime, 
focusing on the distinguishing element of'... guile, deceit, or misrepresentation... ' 
(Shover and Wright 2001 p. xi). 
3.1.1.3 Is fraud a White collar crime? 
There is no easy answer to this question since many different kinds of conduct 
constitute fraud. Fraud can be on a large scale, involving large corporate entities or 
world financial markets but it can also occur on a smaller scale, be it an individual 
evading income tax or claiming social security benefits to which s/he is not entitled. 
Can, then, all frauds be classified as white collar offences? 
In cases of serious frauds 
42 
, it 
is probable that they are white collar crimes but we may 
arrive at this classification via different routes. One might argue that serious frauds are 
1 To date a consultation report has been published but responses are not published at the time of writing. 
42 Some frauds fall under thejurisdiction of the Serious Fraud Office. The Davie Report (1994) 
recommended consideration of the following 
factors: 
Cases where the sum involved is at least fI million. 
Cases which are likely to give rise to national publicity and widespread public concern. 
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committed by executives or high level officials who take advantage of their high status 
and thus should be labelled as white collar. Alternatively, those adopting an offence 
based approach may attach the label simply by virtue of the nature, seriousness or scale 
of the offence. 
However, there are fraudulent offences which cannot be deemed as white collar with 
such ease. Offences of fraud on the public (tax evasion, benefit fraud, etc. ) or where the 
victims are individuals (personal frauds) could just as easily be committed by blue- 
collar or collarless individuals and those acting outside of an occupational role. Thus, 
using an offender-based approach, many frauds are excluded from the realm of white 
collar crime. Such offences, however, are clearly different to mugging and burglary and 
their street level counterparts. 
In this sense, then, these street level frauds straddle the boundary between white collar 
and street crime. Although they are just as likely to be committed by the common-or- 
garden street criminal, they share the important distinguishing characteristic of white 
collar crimes - an element of deception. However, in the case of personal frauds, where 
the victims are individuals, there is an additional feature which sets them apart from 
white collar crimes. Unlike frauds against the public, large financial corporations or 
governments, the victims of personal fraud are identifiable and the hann is 
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quantifiable .I move on now to illustrate that the victims of these offences may 
be the 
worthy subjects of survey based research. 
3.2 Studying the victims of personal fraud 
We have seen in chapter one that victimisation surveys, on the whole, neglect to 
measure reactions to any of the white collar crimes, including fraud, for two main 
reasons. The first is that white collar crimes are said to be victimless. Even where 
individual victims (as opposed to companies, institutions or the public at large) are 
Cases where the investigation and prosecution of the case is likely to require highly speclalised 
knowledge. 
Cases involving a significant international dimension. 
Cases where legal, accountancy and investigative skills need to be brought together. 
" Examples include credit or loans scams, false billing, dodgy promotions, deceptive acquisition of credit 
card numbers and charity scams (Titus 200 1). 
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identifiable, most are unaware that they have actually been victimised. The second 
reason for exclusion is that white collar victimisation is unlikely to have a serious 
impact on the victim (compared to street crimes). In this, the final section of this 
chapter, I illustrate that personal frauds are capable of mounting a sound defence to 
these arguments. 
We do not know a great deal about the victims of white collar crime. We do not know 
how many white collar offences are committed and we do not know the true 
implications for the victims. Indeed, in comparison to the vast number of studies of 
street crime victims, research into the victims of white collar crimes is in its infancy. 
Moreover, much of the research (academic and otherwise) originates from the United 
States and so we know even less about the extent and nature of white collar crimes this 
side of the Atlantic. 
Research does seem to suggest that white collar crime is more widespread that one 
might think. Titus (200 1), writing about the study of fraud victimisation in America, 
illustrates how the failings of official crime statistics (the Uniform Crime Reports and 
the National Crime Victimization Survey) to cover fraud victimisation has prompted a 
stream of household surveys designed to fill the gaps. He argues that these studies have 
revealed high levels of white collar victimisation (for example, Titus et al. (1995) found 
that 15% of their representative sample had been victims of personal fraud in the 
previous year). 
If white collar crime levels are as high as some suggest, it leads one to question why its 
victims do not feature in the crime agenda, '... in mainstream victim support and 
compensation movements, or in the standard debates concerning 'what should be done 
for victims' and 'what is to be done about law and order" (Levi and Pithouse 1992, p. 
230). Moore and Mills (1990) argue that victims of white collar crimes do not receive 
the same feelings of sympathy as the victims of street crimes. Sometimes they are even 
treated with suspicion and scepticism. Victims may be perceived to be 'deserving' of 
misfortune, either because they are perceived to be of high social status or simply 
because they are stupid. 
The victims of street crimes are seen to be deserving of help from the state because the 
state has failed in its responsibility to protect them; both victims and criminals tend to 
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be poor and thus the state has a responsibility to make good the victim's losses. In 
contrast, the victims of white collar crimes are not necessarily poor and the offenders 
may (but need not) be part of a business establishment; thus the state should not be 
obliged to intervene. Thus, criminals do not invoke the same amount of loathing and 
fear and victims do not invoke the same amount of compassion (Titus 2001). 
Titus (2001) discusses how victims of personal fraud, in particular, are seen to facilitate 
their own victimisation and are seen to be (at least partly) to blame for their own 
misfortune. The victim may make the initial contact with the offender, or at least takes 
steps which lead to the initial contact. Often, the victim provides information about 
himself/herself which helps the offender to carry out the scam. The victim allows the 
offender to create a scenario that, when believed, sets the stage for the fraud. In many 
cases of personal fraud, the victim gives card/bank details which provides the offender 
with access to the funds. In so doing, the victim allows the offender to convert what 
should be a business relationship into a personal relationship (thus waiving customary 
safeguards) and loses the right to public sympathy. 
Interestingly, the media portrays the retired or elderly as the prime targets of fraudsters. 
However, Titus et al. (1995) found that those aged 65 years or more were the least 
likely to victimised, in fact they concluded that victimisation could not be predicted by 
any demographic variable. They did find, however, that victims were most likely to be 
well educated, well informed, relatively affluent and not socially isolated. They suggest 
that younger, better educated people have wider interests, engage in a broader range of 
activities and have more consumer participation in the marketplace than do other 
demographic groups. Moore and Mills echo these findings: 'whereas street crimes 
disproportionately victimize the poor and marginal, white collar crime is more 
democratic in its impact. It harms not only well-heeled financial speculators but 
couples and individual citizens with few if any assets beyond a modest savings account' 
(Moore and Mills 1990, p .4 
10). The impact of that harm is likely, then, to have a range 
of effects on the victims. 
Those working in the field are keen to emphasise the potential seriousness of these 
crimes: 
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'White collar crime exacts an astronomical toll in deaths, physical health, emotional 
suffering, and fiscal costs, one that dwarfs comparable losses to street crime' (Shover 
and Wright 2001, p. 49). 
The types of harm suffered by the victims of white collar crimes range from physical 
harm (pain or even death), to psychological harm (stress or depression), through to 
financial harm (either directly to the victim or indirectly through the cost being passed 
to the citizen/customer through taxes/the price of goods). Harm can be suffered by the 
individual and by society generally. Sutherland (1949) discussed how white collar 
crime can damage the social fabric in terms of breeding distrust and lowering social 
morale. He argued that incidence of white collar crime results in a diminished faith in 
the free economy and in business leaders. This, together with a loss in confidence in 
political institutions, processes and leaders, erodes public morality. 
A great deal of research has focused on the financial and physical consequences of 
crime victimisation, but little attention has been given to the aftermath of fraud 
victimisation. Shover et al. (1994) found that feelings of anger and bitterness continued 
up to ten years after the victimisation (see also Shichor et al. 1996 who found that 
victims reported anger and emotional outrage). Some victims became depressed, 
reporting frustration at the injustice of the situation. Similarly, Titus et al. (1995) found 
the 10-20% of their sample reported health problems as a result of the victimisation and 
having had time off work. 
Moreover, Ganzini et al. (1990) note that work on the effect of crime on victims has 
tended to focus on the victims of violent crime. Victims of rape, in particular, have 
been the subjects of many studies. They suggest that the victims of white collar crime 
can be compared with victims of violent crime at several levels. In terms of statistical 
risk of victimisation, white collar victims tend to be older, more affluent and are 
relatively more likely to be female. In terms of psychiatric outcome, general anxiety 
disorder and major depressive disorder are the most common psychiatric complications 
of both types of victimisation. Also, for both types of victimisation, a previous 
history 
of psychiatric illness and the degree of victimisation are 
important variables in 
predicting the risk of psychiatric problems. Levi and Pithouse concur, arguing 
that, 
'[flor these private victims, the victimisation experience could be likened to a 
(comparatively mild) sort of rape' (Levi and Pithouse 1992 p. 233). 
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Conclusion 
This discussion suggests that the little we do know about the extent and impact of white 
collar offences beckons for more extensive criminological research into its victims. Of 
the wide range of potential subjects, it is the victims of personal frauds that seem to be 
the most suitable for survey-based study. Not only are they identifiable, but also they 
are also likely to have suffered the impact of the crime at a very personal level. Thus, 
for the purposes of introducing a financial crime to the British Crime Survey, it was 
necessary to choose one of the personal frauds for inclusion. 
Plastic card fraud was eventually chosen for two main reasons. Firstly, the defence it 
raises to the reasons for exclusion is particularly robust. In the climate of growing 
consumer awareness, not only are the victims more likely to be aware of a victimisation 
(by checking monthly statements) but we are also alerted to the implications of 
exposure to harm. In addition, bearing in mind the themes of globalisation, the 
information age and the cashless society which, if we recall from chapter two, drive this 
thesis, plastic card fraud fits the forward-looking philosophy which underpins the 
project itself. 
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4. Plastic card fraud 
Introduction 
In this chapter, I discuss how the growing use in plastic cards has been accompanied by 
an ever-increasing misuse of cards. I begin with a discussion of the current state of 
plastic card usage, focusing firstly on the historical development of the industry. Also, 
from the consumer's perspective, I ask why and how people use cards. We will see that 
there are many parties involved in the processes of application and transaction and, thus, 
there are several potential victims in an incident of card fraud. I argue that, although the 
cardholder will rarely suffer financial harm, the effects of the victimisation may be 
serious. 
Moving on, in section 4.2, to the misuse of cards, I set the scene with an overview of the 
fluctuations in fraud levels in the last decade (1992-2001). The discussion which 
follows includes a description of the different types of card fraud and the problem of 
prevention. 
In the final section, I consider the difficult issue of measurement. Much of the data 
contained in this chapter has been made available by the Association of Payment 
Clearing Services (APACS), the industry body for banks and building societies in the 
UK, and without it the story would be far less compelling. But the validity of the 
industry figures is, at best, questionable and I recommend caution with their 
interpretation. Turning to alternative sources of information, I consider the 
effectiveness and reliability of the figures presented by the Home 
Office, in particular 
the data collected by the police. I illustrate that these data are also of 
limited use. Faced 
with the problems of data relating to card fraud (problems of 
both quantity and quality), 
I conclude that data from the British Crime Survey would complement, and maybe even 
challenge, the picture of card fraud presented by existing sources. 
87 
4.1 The use of plastic cards 
Plastic cards have been in use in the UK since 1964, when the first cheque guarantee 
card was introduced by the National Provisional Bank. Credit cards followed closely in 
1966 with the introduction of the first generation of Barclaycard. Interestingly, it was 
more than twenty years before the debit card came onto the scene (in 1988). Today, the 
use of plastic payment is becoming more widespread and the UK has seen a boom in the 
number of cards issued in the last 10 years. In 1992, APACS reported that 87 million 
plastic cards (credit, debit, charge, ATM and cheque guarantee cards) had been issued 
that year; in 2000 that figure had risen to 127 million (APACS 200 1, p. 11). 
Levi observes, '[tjhe result of these developments is that per capita, the United Kingdom 
is now the world's largest user of plastic cards' (Levi 1991 p. 2). According to APACS, 
in December 1999,94% of British adults had a current/deposit bank account, 84% had a 
debit card, 56% had a credit/charge card and 27% had a retailer card. This means that 
there are 42 million cardholders in the UK and 89% of British adults hold one or more 
plastic cards (APACS 200 1, p. I I). 
As plastic card use becomes more widespread, banks and financial institutions 
enthusiastically battle for customers. This has led to a massive increase in advertising 
and incentive schemes, all pitched at drawing in customers of different types. The 
market is indeed expanding. Credit and debit card purchase volumes are expected to 
more than double in the next ten years (APACS 2001). 
The Credit Card Research Group (2001) report that there are approximately 1300 
different brands of credit card in the UK, issued by one of 33 card issuers (including the 
major banks). No longer are credit cards simply aimed at the upper classes and 
businessmen, for whom credit card ownership is something of a status symbol. The new 
focus extends to the twenty- something market and even students. Benefits have moved 
on from the old 'Air Miles' style schemes and new incentives have appeared to hook 
new customers: cash incentives, insurance for goods, fraud guarantees, reduced interest 
rates, 'points' for a plethora of goods and activities - the list 
is ever expanding. 
Barclaycard have even made a recent move to refund the shopper who finds his 
purchase cheaper elsewhere! Owning a credit card used to 
be about status. To get one 
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you needed to be worthy of credit and you had to pay a yearly fee for the privilege. 
Today a credit card, and sometimes a collection of cards, has become a normal feature 
of most wallets and purses. 
Of course, the plastic card market is not exclusive to the credit card industry. The 
consumer market is evolving. We have more methods of payment available than ever 
before and the growth of e-commerce is revolutionising the way we organise our 
finances, '[w]ith new technology and the demand for cards being served by a highly 
competitive market, the trend towards the so-called 'cashless society' shows no signs of 
abating' (Credit Card Research Group 2001 p. 4). In the 1990s, debit cards made a 
successful transition into the world of personal banking and new payment methods are 
emerging as technology develops. The 'electronic purse', for example, is a plastic card 
which is credited in a machine when a cash payment is made - rather like a top-up card 
for a mobile phone. It has been suggested that this payment method will be popular for 
those who wish to shop over the internet but who are not eligible for credit/debit cards 
(e. g. those under the age of 18). 
4.1.1 Why do people use plastic cards? 
People use different plastic cards as a method of payment for a variety of different 
reasons on a variety of occasions. The attraction of using plastic cards stems mainly 
from their convenience and flexibility. They save carrying around large amount of cash 
and avoid the problem of only being able to use cheques up to the value of the guarantee 
card. Both credit and debit cards can be used to either purchase items 
directly or to 
withdraw cash from a variety of financial institutions at home and abroad. 
However, 
some cards (credit cards and store cards, for example) can 
be used as a means for 
borrowing money. 
Generally speaking, debit cards are of no use to the consumer who wishes to 
borrow 
money. The debit card will only be accepted until the customer reaches 
the amount 
contained in the bank account. Any transactions which 
take the customer beyond their 
balance (or agreed overdraft limit) will result in penalty charges. 
Therefore, the major 
advantage of using debit cards is that of convenience. 
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Credit cards, on the other hand, can be a cost-effective way of short-term borrowing. 
The current competitive nature of the market is driving down the costs of using credit 
cards and providing a range of benefits to fit consumers of all types. In Figure 1,1 have 
developed a typology of three types of credit card user to illustrate the differences 
between their card use and account management practices. Borrowers use the credit 
facility to make larger purchases which they simply would be unable to afford otherwise 
and pay small amounts back each month. For the Finance Manger, the credit card plays 
a useful role in that individual's financial management strategy. They can be of use, for 
example, during times when a boost is needed (for example, at Christmas) and then the 
payments spread over subsequent months. Finally, the business user uses the card for 
pure convenience - using a company card is simply easier than claiming back expenses 
every month or so. As a result, the business use is not personally responsible for paying 
the account each month. 
Figure 1: A typology of credit card users 
Borrowers Finance Managers Business Users 
Type of purchase Large purchases Purchases of Business purchases 
(maybe up to card different sizes and (petrol, restaurants, 
limit) from different hotels, travel, etc. ). 
sources (telephone/in 
person/internet). 
Reasons for using Borrowing in 0 Financial o Convenience 
card order to purchase management 
something which strategies 
s/he could not 0 Convenience 
otherwise afford. 0 Protection 
(insurance for 
goods or fraud 
guarantees) 
Repayment Minimum payment Balance paid in full Balance paid 
each month (accruing most months monthly in 
full by 
interest) (extended credit in business 
others)44 
44 According to the Credit Card Research Group, each month 
between 40-50% of cardholders pay their 
balance in full. Some 75% of cardholders repay in full most months 
but take extended credit in others 
(2001, p. 2). 
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4.1.2 Applying for and using a card. 
An application for a card, and each transaction made on that card, invoke a chain of 
actions by several parties. It is important to understand how the processes of 
application and transaction work in order to establish where the risk of fraud lies. 
4.1.21 Theprocess of application 
In the case of credit cards and store cards, there are three players in the card issuing 
chain: 
1. The customer 
2. The card issuer 
3. The credit reference agency 
For debit cards, there is no need for a credit reference agency and, therefore, there are 
only two parties involved in the application process (the customer and the card issuer). 
When a customer applies for a credit/debit/store card, the issuer needs to confirm two 
things. Firstly, the applicant is who s/he says s/he is, and has provided genuine personal 
information. Secondly, the applicant must be creditworthy (or, in the case of debit 
cards, must have a bank account with appropriate funds). The legitimacy of an 
application is assessed using infonnation provided by the applicant and cross-checking 
with the customers other financial records, be they accounts with the issuer or a 
different bank. Details of income, employment, housing, marital status, age and 
financial commitments are all details commonly requested. 
Credit card and store card issuers usually consult a Credit Reference Agency (CRA) 
when assessing applications for cards. The CRA holds inforination from the electoral 
roll (names and addresses), previous or forwarding addresses, county court judgements, 
bankruptcies, account histories with other agencies and records of searches. Any 
agency (indeed any member of the public) can access information about county court 
judgements and electoral roll details as these are in the public domain. The remaining 
types of information are given only to those CRAs who provide information to the 
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database. Each individual has the right to access the information held on their own 
record, and has the right to correct any misinformation. 
4.1.2.2 The process of transaction 
There are five players in the transaction chain 
1. The customer 
2. The merchant 
3. The merchant acquirer 
4. The issuer 
5. The card scheme network. 
The customer starts the chain of transaction by making a purchase from the merchant 
(shop or service provider) using the card. The merchant is able to take the payment 
because s/he has an arrangement with the merchant acquirer (and so is able to accept, 
for example, Visa or Switch cards). The acquirer is the bank or building society that 
processes all of the transactions on behalf of the merchant, charging a fee for the 
service. The acquirer then passes on details of the transaction to whichever institution 
has issued the card; the card issuer pays the acquirer and then bills the customer for the 
purchase. The card scheme networks, such as Visa, Switch or Mastercard, are 
subscribed to by the card issuers and the issuers are entitled to display their logos. 
Most credit and debit card transactions are processed using an electronic swipe terminal 
(Electronic Point Of Sale, or EPOS machine) which is a gatekeeper in the payment 
process. The EPOS machine flags for authorisation, transactions which are above the 
floor limit (the limit which each outlet has on the amount it can accept for a single 
transaction). Authorisation can either be conducted online by the machine or by 
telephone by the sales assistant. This process allows the card to be checked for 
lost/stolen status and the payment limit (for a credit card this is the maximum credit 
limit and for a debit card this is the amount available to spend in the account). Once a 
transaction is authorised, the authorisation code is recorded on the sales voucher. 
The transaction can also occur via telephone, mail or the internet. In these situations the 
sales assistant takes down the cards details as an 
EPOS machine would if the customer 
were paying in person. Of course, there 
is no opportunity for the sales assistant to 
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inspect the card so as a security measure the address of the card holder is often taken for 
confirmation with the issuer. 
4.1.3 Identifying the victims of card fraud 
A possible argument against the inclusion of plastic fraud in a victimisation survey is 
the fact that the card issuer usually bears the cost of the fraud and therefore the card 
holder (the potential respondent) is not actually 'the victim'. It is a thorny issue, since 
there are three potential victims of plastic fraud; the card holder, the retailer and the card 
issuer. 
Who will shoulder the cost of the fraud will depend on how it occurred but, as Levi 
(2000) notes, '[e]xcept via impersonation, higher prices and crimes committed solely for 
cards, the consumer is largely insulated from these costs directly: it is the financial 
institutions and the retailers who are the primary sufferers' (Levi 2000, p. 3). 
Indeed, it has become a selling point for credit card companies (and banking services 
generally) to guarantee against fraud on the internet. This is obviously good for the 
consumer, and for encouraging e-commerce, but at the moment such a small proportion 
of plastic fraud is internet related (only accounting for 2% of total losses in 1999) that it 
does not make a huge difference. Fraud on lost and stolen cards remains the big 
problem. The general rule is that, unless you pay for some kind of protection plan, the 
cardholder is liable for any fraud conducted on a lost or stolen card up until the point 
when that card is reported as lost/stolen. 
Although the consumer is largely protected from financial loss, it is important not to 
dismiss the risk faced by the individual. Whilst it is true that the card issuer and the 
merchant bear the brunt of the financial cost of fraud 
45 
, the customer 
is exposed to 
different kinds of harm. Looking at costs in absolute terms fails to tap into the impact of 
fraud. We need to look at it in terms of the victim's means - how much of an effect will 
it have on the quality of life (Levi and Pithouse 1992)? In the case of card 
fraud, there 
are two perspectives to the impingement on quality of 
life: the first relates to the process 
45 Of course, it is arguable that the consumer ultimately 
becomes the victim since the cost is passed on in 
the form of higher prices. 
93 
of dealing with the fraud in the first place, and the second relates to the exposure to 
future (and perhaps more serious) victimisation. 
When a card holder discovers a fraudulent transaction on his/her account or statement , it 
is often the beginning of a lengthy and inconvenient process of sel f- exoneration. 
Victims are caught in a cycle of crime reporting and bureaucracy, being responsible for 
all exchanges of information with card companies and the police. Sometimes, the 
victims of card fraud are even pushed to investigate the frauds themselves. The cost to 
the victim is in tenns of time, effort and frustrating inconvenience, an inconvenience 
which seems particularly disproportionate to an innocent or responsible card user. 
In addition, and often this implication is overlooked, the victim is exposed to future 
victimisation. If a fraudster has gained access to a victim's card details, the chances are 
that many other aspects of the victim's identity have been exposed. In the time it takes 
for a statement to arrive (usually a month), an experienced fraudster can reap enough 
information to facilitate a number of fraudulent credit applications or purchases in the 
future. It may be months before the victim becomes aware of the snowballing frauds. 
As the losses escalate, the victim may be faced with damaged credit ratings and even 
legal proceedings. With every new incident discovered comes another dose of hassle 
and emotional stress. 
4.2 The misuse of plastic cards 
As the use of plastic cards has increased, so too has the problem of card fraud, '[a] s 
society's reliance on cards becomes more widespread, the losses from card fraud grow 
too' (APACS 2001 P. 5). In this section I consider the extent and nature of plastic card 
fraud, exploring the different methods of card fraud and the problems of prevention. 
The section concludes with a discussion of the problems of measurement. In this 
section, fraud loss statistics are presented in the form of graphs since they provide a 
visual representation of the trends. Full accompanying tables are omitted 
from the text 
but can be found in Appendix 1. 
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4.2.1 The growth of card fraud 
Card fraud was not seen as a serious problem in the UK until the early 1990s when 
losses of over f 165 million in 1991 prompted the major banks and building societies to 
form the Plastic Fraud Prevention Forum. The Home Office was quick to respond, 
appointing Professor Michael Levi from Cardiff University to produce an extensive 
report. In 1991 the industry presented his recommendations to the Home Secretary with 
a programme of initiatives to reduce fraud. 
Graph 1: Absolute fraud losses 1992-2001 
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Total losses were contained by 1992 and continued to fall until 1995 when the figures 
slowly started to rise again. Looking at Graph 1, we can see a rapid growth in losses in 
the last three years to more than twice the 1991 level. APACS announced a 55% 
increase in card fraud on the previous year in 2000 and a further rise of 30% in 2001. 
At the time of writing, card fraud costs the banks and financial institutions more than fI 
million per day (more than three times the annual losses of f 135 million in 1998). 
Graph 2 shows that fraud losses have fluctuated relatively consistently across card types 
since 1992, with credit cards being the major source of loss, followed 
by debit cards and 
then charge cards. Fraud on credit, debit and charge cards has increased steadily since 
1995 but, in contrast, fraud on cheque cards has been slowly decreasing since the mid- 
1990s. In terms of place of misuse, fraud has increased both at home as well as abroad 
(see Graph 3), with the majority of UK based frauds occurring during regular merchant 
transactions (as opposed to occurring at ATMs or bank counters, see 
Graph 4). The 
period between 1997-2000 has seen a marked 
increase in the number of card not present 
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transactions, where the place of misuse is unclear since the transactions occur through 
the mail, or over the internet or telephone. The implications of this rise will be 
discussed further in section 4.2.2.5. 
Graph 2 : Annual fraud losses by card type 
120 
100 
c 80 
0 
60 
40 
20 
0 
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
- Credit Cards 
-Charge Cards 
Debit Cards 
Cheque Cards 
Eurocheque Cards 
Graph 3: Annual fraud lossed by place of misuse 
160 
140 
120 
100 
80 
60 
40 
20 
0 
-UK 
- Abroad 
96 
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Graph 4: Absolute annual fraud lossed by place of misuse (UK 
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4.2.2 Types of plastic card fraud 
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Card fraud can occur at different stages of the issuer-holder relationship, either at a 
point in the process of application or at a point in the process of transaction. A fraudster 
can use any of three 'instruments' of card fraud - information on an application for a 
card (be it fabricated information or information 'borrowed' from another person, living 
or dead), the plastic card itself (be it a genuine card which has been intercepted, lost or 
stolen or a completely fake card), and card details (not using a physical card at all). 
The method of fraud a fraudster chooses depends on the instrument of fraud s/he intends 
to use (as summarised in Figure 2). A fraudster who has acquired some fake 
identification, for example, might use this to make a fraudulent application (application 
fraud). A fraudster who steals a card or acquires a lost/stolen card (fraud on a lost/stolen 
card), a fraudster who intercepts a genuine card which has been mailed to a genuine 
customer (mail non receipt), or a fraudster who acquires a fake card (counterfeit) all 
might use the card in some way to purchase goods or withdraw cash. A fraudster who 
acquires card details, perhaps from a discarded receipt, might use the details to make a 
purchase by telephone or on the internet (card not present transactions). These different 
methods of card fraud are discussed in detail below. 
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Figure 2: The instruments and methods of plastic card fraud 
Instrument 
Application details (fabricated or 
'borrowed') 
Plastic card (genuine or counterfeit) 
Card details (no physical card) 
Method 
Application Fraud 
Mail non receipt 
Counterfeit 
Lost/Stolen 
Card not present transactions 
4.22.1 Overall trends 
Graph 5 clearly illustrates the trends in card fraud loss over the last decade. All types of 
card fraud except application fraud have been increasing steadily since 1998, growth 
has been most rapid for fraud on lost and stolen and counterfeit cards and card not 
present transactions. Between 1999 and 2001, the proportions of total losses from 
lost/stolen and counterfeit cards shifted slightly. In 1999,42% of all fraud was on lost 
and stolen cards, and 27% of losses were traced to counterfeit cards. In 2001, the 
largest proportion of losses was on counterfeit cards (39%), with only 28% of the total 
losses attributed to cards which had been lost and stolen. It seems that, based on these 
figures at least, fraud using physical cards is the largest problem we are faced with at 
present and fraud using card details (on card not present transactions) is a growing 
concem. 
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Graph 5: Annual fraud losses by circurnstances of loss 
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Application fraud occurs when a person makes an application for a card using either 
fabricated details or the particulars of another person. When one applies for a 
credit/debit/store card, some personal details and some form of identification are 
requested. Name, address and evidence of employment are all details which can either 
be made up or 'borrowed' from another person's identity. It is not difficult for fraudsters 
to acquire fabricated or stolen identification papers (e. g. a driving licence). 
Graph 5 shows that application fraud losses, after a short decline between 1992 and 
1994, increased steadily between 1995 and 1998. However, application fraud dipped in 
1999/2000 and in 2001 fell to f6.6 million (down 37% on the previous year). It is 
significant that this type of fraud only forms a small percentage of total fraud losses (2% 
of the total in 2001, for example). 
In a briefing paper for the Home Office, Levi (2000) cites the creation of false identities 
as the largest growth category in applications fraud. He states that the industry suggest 
that the rise in ID fraud may be a substitute for repeat fraud using a fraudster's own 
details repeatedly (a response to improvements in identity checking across the industry). 
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4.2.2.3 Mail non receipt 
'Card productions and distribution to issuers are very secure. However, once the cards 
are prepared for sending through the postal service, potential fraud risks begin to 
multiply' (Levi et al. 1991 p. 18). 
Usually, cards are sent out in the normal first class mail. Cards may not be delivered for 
various reasons - the address may be incorrect, the point of delivery may not be secure 
(for example it may be a shared dwelling where mail is delivered for several people 
together) or someone working in the postal service may intercept the card. Whatever 
the reason, loss of card at this stage is significant because the cards have blank signature 
panels and are very easy for fraudsters to use. 
When the Levi report was written in 1991, mail non receipt fraud was a major source of 
loss coming second only to fraud on lost and stolen cards and accounting for a fifth of 
total fraud losses. Hence at that time, mail non receipt was considered to be a serious 
problem and was prioritised in terms of crime prevention. Looking at Graph 5, we can 
see that mail non-receipt losses decreased between 1992 and 1995, dropping to a low of 
E9 million in 1995. However, since 1995 the figures have started to creep up slowly. 
2001 saw a rise to almost E27 million, almost back up to the 1991 level. 
4.22.4 Counterfeit 
Card counterfeiting began in the USA in the 1970s and became such a huge problem 
that in the early 1980s Congress was forced to enact legislation in response to record 
fraud losses, and the US Secret Service was given jurisdiction for the investigation of 
credit card fraud (Newton 1995). The mid-1980s saw the development of security 
features for plastic cards (most notably the hologram) and counterfeiting in the USA 
remained at a low level until 1991 when counterfeiting in the Far East started to 
have a 
huge impact, particularly in California. 
Newton (1995) pinpoints Thailand as the origin of Far East counterfeiting. Poor quality 
reproduction cards started to emerge from 
1984 and in the space of five years evoIN, -ed 
from primitive copies which needed the co-operation of a corrupt merchant, into more 
realistic copies with encoded magnetic strips which could 
be used at EPOS terminals. 
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Curiously, '[d]espite Thailand being the logistical centre of counterfeit card distribution 
for several years, law enforcement agencies never discovered an illicit factory facility 
there' (Newton 1995 p. 9). 
Malaysia, it seems, produced better skilled counterfeiters. They quickly progressed 
from tampering with stolen cards to manufacturing complete counterfeits, but they 
mostly required merchant collusion. During the period of dominance of Malaysian 
counterfeiting, firm links were established with Hong Kong. In the early 1990s, Hong 
Kong became the centre for the most sophisticated counterfeiting, developing printing 
processes and hologram manufacture. To this day Hong Kong remains one of the major 
centres for counterfeit production. 
One of the major growth areas in plastic fraud and, indeed, the aspect which has gained 
recent attention from the press, is the process known as 'skimming' or 'cloning'. This 
occurs when a fraudster copies the information held on a card's magnetic strip. The 
magnetic strip has long been recognised as one of the weakest security features on 
plastic cards (Levi 1991 p. 9). Portable magnetic coding machines which can copy the 
encrypted details from a genuine card's magnetic strip and impose them onto a fake 
card are legitimately available from electronics suppliers. This process requires the co- 
operation of someone who handles genuine cards - the example usually given is the 
waiter in a restaurant who takes the card away to process the bill and, while he is out of 
sight, makes a copy of the card details with the machine he has hidden under the 
counter. 
That fraudsters are imaginative is undeniable. On the 15 
th September 1995, three men 
were found guilty of conspiracy to defraud clearing banks and 
building societies. This 
was the first reported case of a home-made cashpoint machine 
in the world. They had 
successfully built a cashpoint machine out of home-made parts and painted 
it to 
resemble a Halifax Building Society Automatic Teller 
Machine (ATM). The machine 
was placed in the foyer of a specially established mortgage 
broker's office in Bethnal 
Green, London, and it operated successfully there for six weeks until the scam was 
discovered by police. Customers who tried to get cash from the machine received a 
message that the machine was faulty - unbeknownst 
to them, the machine had actually 
recorded the encrypted data from the card's magnetic strip and 
the PIN. This 
information was passed to the criminals via modem and they used 
it to manufacture 
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fake cards. These cards were used by conspirators across the country to withdraw cash 
from genuine machines. The banks admitted to losing E130,000 to the fraudsters, but 
the police estimated the figure to be nearer E500,000 (Boycott 1995). 
It is this kind of scam, together with the alarming rise in losses on counterfeit cards in 
the last two years, which has prompted the establishment of a unique police unit in 
2002, the Dedicated Cheque and Plastic Card Unit. The focus of this unit, funded by 
APACS and the Home Office, will be on criminals heavily involved in counterfeiting. 
This initiative reflects the general widespread concern about counterfeiting. 
4.2.2.5 Card notpresent 
Transactions which take place via the telephone/mail/intemet are usually 'card not 
present' transactions. An order is placed and the card details are provided - there is no 
way for the merchant to examine the card and there is no requirement for a signature. 
Thus, it is easy for a fraudster to make a purchase and it is not even necessary for 
him/her to actually have the physical card. Card details can be acquired from a variety 
of sources (for example from a discarded receipt or even by reading a card over 
someone's shoulder in a queue for a cashpoint - the so-called 'shoulder- surfing') and 
used effectively in card not present transactions. 
When the Levi report was published in 1991, card not present transactions were not 
regarded as a serious problem. Losses on card not present transactions were lower than 
all other circumstances of loss. Hence, the report itself contains very little commentary 
on the problem of card not present transactions. However, Graph 5 shows a steady 
increase in losses on card not present transactions since 1995. There has been no period 
of decline and the 2001 figures are a staggering 75 times greater than the 
1992 levels. 
4.2.2.6 Fraud on lost and stolen cards 
'It would be a mistake to see the rise in fraud solely as a 
'new economy' issue: fraud on 
lost and stolen cards went up almost as much as card not present 
fraud' (Levi 2000, p. 3, 
referring to the 1999 figures). 
10" 
APACS report that in 1998 (the most recent figures available), there were 
approximately 13,000 cards reported lost or stolen each day in the UK. Of these, 
around 3% were subsequently used fraudulently. This accounted for almost half of total 
fraud losses (48%) and cost almost F-66 million (APACS, personal communication). In 
2001, total losses on lost and stolen cards are almost double the 1998 figure, but it is not 
clear whether this is a result of more cards being used or simply larger frauds being 
committed on each card. 
Although superseded by counterfeit as the largest source of card fraud in recent years, 
fraud on lost and stolen cards remains one of the major sources of loss. Graph 5 shows 
that despite a dramatic decline between 1992 and 1996 (to half the 1992 figure), losses 
on lost and stolen cards have increased steadily in the last four years. 
4.2.3 The problem of prevention 
One of the major problems with the prevention of plastic card fraud is that it is not clear 
who is, or should be, responsible (customers, retailers, banks, the police, etc. ): 
'Inevitably, there is a tension between the provision of services in a market society and 
the management of crime risks in both public and private sectors. As central media of 
exchange in global networks, credit, debit and charge cards can never avoid the risk of 
crime entirely: the primary goals of corporations are profit maximisation rather than 
maximum crime reduction. There will always be some conflicts of 
interest between the 
key private sector groups - card issuers, consumers (and 
individual crime victims), 
merchant service providers and retailers - and between individual 
firms within those 
sectors' (Levi 2000, p. 1). 
The problem, of course is twofold. Not only is it 
important to develop clear crime 
prevention strategies to prevent the crimes 
in the first place, but also it should be 
demonstrated that individual incidences of fraud are adequately investigated and, where 
appropriate, prosecuted. 
The Levi report in 1991 criticised the approach to cheque and credit 
card fraud by the 
police. One of the major criticisms was 
that there was great variability in the 
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approaches of different police forces in the recording of and dealing with incidents of 
fraud. Recommendations aimed at harmonising and improving fraud investigations 
were echoed in an ACPO Working Group report. Both reports called for regional 
Cheque and Credit Card Squads to be set up. In 1998,25 out of the 43 police forces in 
England and Wales had a designated cheque and/or credit card squad. A quarter of 
these did not deal with plastic frauds and funding was a serious problem. The fact that 
card and cheque fraud tends to occur across regions, often nationally, suggests that co- 
operation between police forces is an essential response. However, regional 
collaborations are rare, and few formal links exist between adjoining forces, largely due 
to funding restrictions. In the last couple of years, however, moves have been made to 
improve the work of the police in this area. Funding remains a problem, but as we have 
seen with the Dedicated Cheque and Plastic Card Fraud Unit in London, collaborations 
with the banking industry are easing the problem (in this case, banks and building 
societies are funding 75% of the unit, with the Home Office providing EIA million). 
The ACPO report recognised that a greater emphasis should be placed on crime 
prevention and specialist training for police officers. Recommendations that all forces 
should have a hand writing analyst have been on the whole implemented, and 
significant moves have been made to ensure that all officers understand their duties with 
regard to cheque and credit card investigations. Yet it remains the case that most 
investigations are reactive rather than proactive. More resources are clearly needed to 
improve measures aimed at prevention. Crime prevention measures do not have to be 
high tech - they can make use of more 'traditional' 
investigative methods such as 
fingerprints, CCTV and modus operandi information. 
It is fair to say, however, that the industry comes under more public criticism than the 
police in the context of card fraud prevention strategies. 
When the Levi report was 
published in 1991, the major problem the industry was 
faced with was the loss 
occurring on genuine cards which had got 
into criminal hands and significant funds 
were channelled into initiatives addressing these problems. 
Fraud on lost and stolen 
cards, mail non receipt and fraudulent applications were prioritised 
and placed high on 
the prevention agenda. Initiatives to 
identify insecure addresses, encourage customer 
collection or secure delivery, encourage on-line authorisatlon 
at terminals and 
encourage the use of floor 
limits all proved to be successful. By 1995, total losses on 
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lost and stolen cards and mail non receipt had been greatly reduced, and fraud on 
applications hovered around the 1991 level. 
A key breakthrough in preventing application fraud was made through initiatives aimed 
at encouraging the sharing of data. The competitive nature of the industry has 
hampered the development of information networks. These are crucial since the 
business depends so much on the verification of genuine application data which comes 
from a variety of sources. The Credit Industry Fraud Avoidance System (CIFAS) was 
created as 'a method of preventing fraud by allowing credit grantors to exchange details 
of fraudsters if and when the are discovered ... CIFAS thus facilitates the dissemination Y 
of information on actual and suspected fraud to all its member credit reference agencies 
and credit grantors, showing that in this respect, there is no commercial competition in 
fraud. ' (Levi et al. 199 1, p. 13, emphasis in original). It marked the first step towards a 
culture of data sharing and co-operation. 
However, this initiative is only effective against repeat offenders, although Levi et al. 
argue that'... the prevention of continued offending is as significant as the prevention of 
the initial offences' (Levi et al. 199 1, p. 14, emphasis in original). In order to prevent 
many offences it is necessary to foster collaboration with other agencies. For example, 
the Royal Mail holds important information about addresses and requests to redirect 
mail. Similarly, the Driver and Vehicle Licensing Agency can provide information 
about lost and stolen drivers' licences, often accepted as a form of identification for a 
card application. 
Mail non receipt fraud is arguably one of the easiest types of fraud to prevent and the 
prevention strategies aimed at this type of fraud were highly successful in the short term 
(up until the mid- 1990s). However, prevention in this area of card fraud has suffered as 
a result of the uncommitted approach to the problem by banks and customers alike. 
Levi et al. (199 1) discuss various approaches the card issuers can take to reduce 
fraud at 
this level. The easiest solution is to cut the mail system from the process altogether, 
making the customer come to the bank or store and collect the card, thus reducing the 
risk of loss before delivery. However, card issuers 
have been reluctant to take this 
approach in the name of customer convenience 
(customers who work do not have a 
great deal of time to spare to go to the 
bank during business hours). An alternative 
solution is to mail the card to the customer and 
follow it up with a letter confirming that 
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the card had actually been sent. The problem here is that the first class mail sometimes 
takes longer than anticipated to arrive, thus potentially causing confusion and 
inconvenience to the customer. Another solution might be to have a validation system. 
When a card is delivered, the customer must run the card through a machine at the 
bank/store to validate the card at its first use. However, this approach puts a huge cost 
burden on the issuer to provide the necessary technology in every branch. So, although 
fraud on mail non receipt is easy to prevent, prevention strategies have been hampered 
by the unwillingness of both banks and customers to compromise the convenience of 
their business relationships. It is perhaps not surprisingly that, since 1995, we have seen 
the losses on mail non receipt slowly creep back up to almost the 1992 level. 
However, while the major focus of prevention was on losses on lost and stolen cards, 
mail non receipt and fraudulent applications, fraud on counterfeit cards and card not 
present transactions had started to rise. The potential of the counterfeit problem had 
been recognised. in the Levi report, but the innovative designs of security features, such 
as biometrics and photos on cards, were not popular due to practicalities and expense. 
Similarly, card not present transactions were not seen to pose a serious threat. The 
industry focused on stopping genuine cards getting into criminal hands, rather than 
preventing the criminals from making successful transactions without using a genuine 
card and as a result the criminals adapted their methods. 
Part of the problem was an over-confidence in existing security features on cards. Levi 
(1991 p. 8) notes that preventing counterfeiting is a case of making it difficult for 
fraudsters to deceive the people processing payment at a till point or other point of sale. 
This means that features of the card should be designed in such a way that to the 
average person it is obvious if the card has been tampered with. Effective security 
features have been a major aim for card manufacturers since cards were first introduced. 
Holograms, the signature panel and the magnetic strip are all features with which most 
card users are familiar, but the effectiveness of these 
features as security measures is 
questionable. As security measures, they are all 
dependent on the point of sale staff 
actually being vigilant enough to notice any tampering or a 
failed signature match. 
Holograms were introduced in the UK in 1984 by the 
industry, at first for cheque 
guarantee cards. The use of holograms soon 
became widespread and they were adopted 
by MasterCard International and Visa International by 1986. 
Quick to adapt, fraudsters 
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in the Far East began reproducing the holographic images in the late 1980s. The quality 
of these copies was poor and it is likely that at this stage the fraudsters were reliant on 
merchant collusion. By 199 1, when Hong Kong arrived on the scene, counterfeit 
holograms were of good quality. Newton (1995) suggests that holograms on counterfeit 
cards probably'were manufactured, knowingly or unknowingly, by legitimate hologram 
manufacturers' (p. 10). 
The last four digits of a card number are usually embossed in the hologram area in order 
to prevent tampering with the numbers. Criminals usually use a heat process to alter 
embossed card details but if heat is applied to a holographic image is it damaged. 
However, criminals have moved a step ahead of the technology and have found a 
method of applying heat to holograms without damage, by simply applying a chemical 
to protect it (Newton 1995). 
The signature panel is arguably the most important security feature of a card since it is 
the only feature which allows the point of sale staff to verify the customer is indeed the 
cardholder. However, for card not present transactions, which do not allow for 
inspection of the card itself, the signature panel is rendered rather useless. 
When cards were first introduced, criminals were quick to discover that signatures could 
simply be washed off. Naturally, the industry responded and refined the design of the 
signature panel. Today, signature panels lie flush with the card (rather than appearing 
raised) and if they are tampered with the background design either rubs off (making 
obvious that the strip has been tampered with), or more elaborately for some credit 
cards, the word 'void' appears. Criminals, however are quick to adapt and use a variety 
of methods ranging from using a simple pencil eraser (slowly), to easily available 
cleaning fluids. 
The moral of the story is that, in order to develop effective crime prevention strategies, 
we need to stay one step ahead of, or at least keep up with, the methods used 
by the 
criminals themselves. Levi et al. argue, '[o]ne way of analysing 
the control problems is 
to review the ways in which cards or the 
functions of cards are successfully used by 
criminals and to suggest measures that can 
be expected to have most impact on them' 
(1998, p. 16). Surely this is the only effective approach? 
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Until a forward looking approach is adopted, we must, for the time being at least, be 
cautious of putting too much faith in prevention strategies and initiatives. The latest of 
these is the much heralded 'smart card'. The banking industry has responded to a 
massive increase in counterfeit fraud in the last few years with the roll out of smart 
chip-cards. Chip cards contain a microchip which has the ability to hold a vast amount 
of information. The main benefits of chip cards are said to be versatility and security. 
Chip cards started to appear in 1999, and it was the original intention that the UK'bank 
owned infrastructure' will be processing chip cards by 2003 at an estimated cost to the 
industry E300 million. However, from an early stage the industry was met with 
resistance from retailers who objected to the cost of the installation of new terminals. 
Now, APACS predicts that the chip and PIN system will not be in place until 2005. 
In terms of versatility, the use of chip cards opens many doors to changes in the way we 
use cards. APACS estimate that, '[i]f PINS are introduced to the retail point-of-sale 
environment, it will impact the UK's 42 million cardholders and necessitate a change in 
their behaviour at some 735,000 retail terminals' (APACS 2001, p. 7). It is suggested 
that chip readers will become part of our everyday life, appearing on our mobile phones, 
digital televisions, and personal computers (APACS 2001, p. 6). It is perhaps not too 
outrageous to suggest that the use of chip cards might revolutionise the way we make 
transactions. Of course, for some, the idea that so much information might be carried 
via these networks has raised alarm bells. The industry is assuring the customer that the 
chip will contain no more information than the magnetic strip on a normal card, 
but 
admits that it will be possible to add services such as loyalty schemes and electronic 
purses. Some commentators have gone as far as to suggest that 
biometric details, such 
as finger and iris scanning and voice recognition, could potentially 
be stored on the 
card. 
Chip cards are attractive because they are technologically sophisticated 
and, although 
not likely to be counterfeit proof, they are 
being heralded as the answer to the world- 
wide problem of organised counterfeit. 
Chip cards, it is argued, will make 
counterfeiting more difficult and thus more expensive 
for the criminal. This begs the 
question: for how long? 
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4.2.4 Intervention by the law? 
In response to these many changes in approach to the investigation and prevention of 
card fraud, there have been several calls to bring the law into line with modem 
developments. We have seen in chapter three that the law of theft has been criticised 
for being outdated and inadequate and this criticism has been particularly strong in 
relation to card fraud. 
Figure 3: Offences of card fraud 
Statute Offence 
Theft Act 1968 s. 15 Obtaining property by cheque or credit 
card fraud 
Theft Act 1968 s. 16 Obtaining pecuniary advantage by cheque 
or credit card fraud 
Criminal Justice Act 1987 s. 12 and Conspiracy to commit cheque or credit 
Common Law card fraud 
Theft Act 1978 s. 1-2 Obtaining services by cheque or credit 
card fraud 
Theft Act 1978 s. 15 Obtaining a money transfer by cheque or 
credit card fraud. 
Incidents of cheque and credit card fraud are criminal offences under the statutes 
summarised in Figure 3. In cases of fraud where a machine (an automatic machine 
which is not operated by a pennanent human operator, for example a fully automated 
computer server) is not used, a person who misuses a card to purchase goods or services 
is usually charged with obtaining goods or obtaining services by deception. This might 
be where that person is the genuine card holder (spending beyond the credit limit for 
example) or where the person is using a stolen or counterfeit card (or card details in 
telephone and mail transactions). In cases where a machine is used, the situation is less 
clear and the law is yet to be tested on the major issues. 
Problems have also occurred when it has been argued that the deception would not have 
actually influenced the person being deceived, had s/he known about 
it. So, if a 
merchant processes payment by a credit card he may not care whether the customer's 
credit limit is exceeded or not since the bank will honour the transaction regardless. 
Can, then, we say that the goods were obtained by deception? The answer 
is yes, as 
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deception can be constructive. A merchant in this situation will have been described as 
having been deceived if, had s/he known that (in the above example) the credit 11 it had in 
exceeded, s/he would not have accepted payment. Unsurprisingly, juries have had 
trouble grasping the concept. It has been suggested that we should abolish the concept 
of deception and create a new offence to cover these kinds of situations. 'Such an 
offence would properly identify the actual wrongdoing and the real victim, namely the 
bank'(Law Commission 1999, p. 104). 
The general response to these problems has been the suggestion of the creation of a new 
offence relating to the misuse of card and financial information. Professor Sir John 
Smith has suggested: 
'A person commits an offence if he intentionally causes a legal liability to pay money to 
be imposed on another, knowing that the other does not consent to his doing so and that 
he has no right to do so' (Smith 1996). 
This would involve a threefold mental element: intention, knowledge of no consent and 
knowledge of having no right to impose the duty. The problem with this is that 
intention might be too tight a requirement. It is arguable that a fraudster does not intend 
to impose the liability for the debt on another since he does not care as long as he gets 
the goods. 
The Law Commission has suggested a more specific offence relevant to payment cards 
but acknowledge that this may become dated quickly. An important question raised 
by 
the Commission is whether all unauthorised use of payment cards should be 
criminalised? If you use a cheque knowing that the money is not in 
the bank, you 
breach your contract with the bank. In the context of a continuing relationship 
(where it 
will be understood by both parties that the overdraft will 
be repaid to the bank) it is 
unlikely that the bank will take action. 
Indeed, the bank is likely to make money out of 
the situation. However, the dilemma 
is that if we exclude cases like this we are in 
danger of excluding clear cases of fraud 
by creating loopholes. It is possible to limit the 
offence to cases where the card was stolen/temporarily 
appropriated and the individual 
never had a right to use it. But that would exclude 
someone who applies for a card, runs 
up a huge bill and then absconds 
(especially where the card was obtained by deception). 
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So, the Law Commission suggests that it should be the use of the card which should be 
criminalised. It seems likely that the debate will continue for a considerable time. 
4.3 Measuring plastic card fraud 
In this final section, I consider the problem of measuring plastic card fraud. Throughout 
this chapter I have referred to industry figures provided by APACS, reporting the cost 
of fraud in terms of the amount of money lost each year. However, the use of these 
statistics comes with a serious health warning for two reasons. The first is that we do 
not know how much fraud goes unreported to the financial institutions by individual 
customers. Customers may either be unaware of a fraudulent transaction on an account 
or may be deterred from reporting the crime by the potential expense of time and effort. 
The second reason stems from the secretive nature of the industry itself. It is 
conceivable that the banks, since they are unwilling to present themselves to customers 
as a security risk, manipulate the amount of information released into the public 
domain. Unfortunately, the industry figures are the only detailed source of information 
available, '[w]e have little idea what the cost of crime control is in this area, since there 
are no industry aggregate costs, nor have the costs to the police, courts and penal system 
been calculated' (Levi 2000, p. 2). Therefore I conclude this section by discussing the 
potential value of information gathered by a national victimisation survey, in this case 
the BCS. 
4.3.1 Industry data 
Most of the data on plastic fraud are collected by card issuers and collated 
by APACS. 
There are different ways of expressing the data. In a 
briefing paper for the Home Office 
in 2000, Levi cites five ways of looking at the 
data (Levi 2000, p. 2): 
Absolute numbers of stolen cards 
2. Absolute fraud loss figures 
3. Fraud to turnover 
4. Fraud to profit 
5. Fear of fraud 
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We have already seen that APACS produce figures on annual losses on lost and stolen 
cards. However, there is little information available on the numbers of cards reported 
lost and stolen each year. Where figures are presented, stolen cards are not usually 
differentiated from lost ones. This is a significant omission. If we do not know how 
many cards are lost and how many are stolen each year it is difficult to assess which is 
the most serious source of loss and tailor prevention strategies accordingly. The 
implications of this are serious since fraud on lost and stolen cards is one of the major 
sources of loss overall. 
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Graph 6: Plastic card fraud losses as a percentage of total 
card turnover (source APACS) 
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Absolute loss figures are presented by APACS according to circumstance of loss 
(method of fraud), and place of misuse (whether at ATM, bank counter or via 
transactions in the UK or abroad). Many have argued (especially those within the 
industry itself) that it is unrealistic to look at losses in absolute terms. Taken as a 
percentage of turnover, losses are low (see Graph 6). In 200 1, losses were only 0.18% 
of the total turnover, just over half the 1992 peak of 0.33%. Arguably, 
losses to fraud 
are a mere drop in the ocean but Graph 6 clearly shows the growing trend over the 
last 
few years. 
4.3.2 Credit/cheque card fraud recorded by the police 
A potential source of information on stolen cards 
is crime statistics produced by the 
Home Office. Both the Recorded Crime Statistics (RCS) and the 
British Crime Survey 
(BCS) contain extensive data on thefts and the 
RCS contain data on fraud offences. 
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The statistics recorded by the police contain data on both the number of offences 
committed and the location of the offence. It has been argued, however, that these are 
not reliable sources of information. Levi comments, 'the fewer stolen rather than lost, 
the lower the recorded crime rate' (Levi 2000, p. 2). A major problem is that the 
counting rules are complicated and have become even more so with recent changes to 
counting and recording rules. In 1998, new counting rules were introduced and these 
had a significant effect on the methods for recording cheque and credit card fraud. The 
new rules allow the police to record an unreported offence of card/cheque fraud when it 
is discovered in a subsequent investigation. In some forces, the change in counting 
rules coincided with further changes in recording practices for cheque and credit card 
fraud offences. Thus, more reported offences have become recorded offences. 
With this in mind, we must treat the recorded crime figures from 1998-2000 carefully. 
When the transition occurred in 1998, figures were released based on both the old and 
new counting rules. Thus, any attempt to analyse trends should be made with great 
caution. In the 12 months to September 1999, recorded fraud and forgery figures 
jumped a massive 29% on the previous 12 months. It is very likely that the changes in 
recording practice considerably influenced the increase. Moving on 12 months, to the 
12 month period ending September 2000, the Home Office victoriously cite the 
4 smallest percentage increase since the counting rules were revised in 1998' (Povey et 
al. 2001 p. 4). 
In 2001 (Povey et al. 200 1), cheque and credit card figures were distinguished from the 
general fraud and forgery figures and this represented a positive move forward in the 
counting of card frauds. In the 12 months ending September 2000,49% of the total 
fraud and forgery offences were cheque and credit card frauds (reported to 
be a fall of 
1.3% on the previous 12 months). 
All things considered, the infon-nation available does not allow 
for a great deal of 
commentary. Nevertheless, the figures can reveal points of 
interest. For example, the 
numbers of recorded notifiable offences 
by police force area can point at fraud hotspots. 
For example, in the 12 months ending 
September 2000, the City of London, Dorset, 
Bedfordshire and the Metropolitan police recorded the most 
fraud and forgery offences 
as a percentage of their total recorded offences 
(14%, 11.2%, 9.2% and 9.2% 
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respectively). Cumbria (3.4%), Humberside (3.5%), Northumbria (3.8%) and North 
Wales (3.8%) recorded that least fraud and forgery cases as a percentage of their total 
recorded offences. 
In the case of stolen cards, the original theft of the card is counted in addition to any 
subsequent fraud committed using the card. As a general rule, a series of fraudulent 
transactions on one card are counted as one offencefor each identifiable owner ofgoods 
or services: crudely, one offence per victim. So, a stolen credit card used to purchase 
goods in five different shops results in five recorded offences (plus the original theft of 
the card). In contrast, five cheques from a cheque book which are used in the same 
store and reported at the same time to the police are recorded as one offence. Separate 
branches of the same shop or bank are counted as separate 'owners'. However, where a 
card is used, say, in a supermarket and also in the petrol station situated within the same 
compound, one offence is recorded because they are considered to be two parts of the 
same branch. 
The police require information about where the fraud occurred before it can be recorded 
and a crime reference number issued (the crime reference number is often requested by 
the card issuer before the customer is exonerated). For the card holder this can be very 
frustrating when the fraud has occurred via a card-not-present transaction and thus the 
'location' is not known (internet transactions have received particular press attention for 
this reason, see Ayres 2000). The new counting rules state that for card not present 
cases, the address to which the ordered goods are to be delivered is recorded as the 
location. For fraudulent applications, the address from which the application is sent is 
the location. Where the fraudster has arranged for redirection of mail to a different 
address the re-direct address is the location. If the delivery address or the address 
from 
which the application is sent is unknown (as in the case of 
internet transactions or 
mobile pay phones), then the police force which 
first became aware of the offence 
records it in that location. 
There are also reasons for not counting the crime. 
The counting rules state that, '[i]f a 
bank or credit card company is mounting a 
full investigation of a fraud with the aim of 
taking action against the offender, and the police are 
taking no action, then the police 
need not count. This however 
is likely to happen very rarely' (Home Office 2001, part 
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53A (2)). The effect of this rule is that many frauds are left uncounted and there is a 
blurred division of responsibility for the investigation of the offence. 
The RCS are, then, of limited use when we are looking at plastic card fraud. A simple 
calculation hints at the extent of the 'dark figure' which lurks in this context. Of a total 
of 5 ý221 416 recorded offences in England and Wales in the 12 months ending 
September 2000,328,306 (6.3%) were fraud and forgery offences. Only half (49%) of 
these were credit and cheque card offences (approximately 160,000 recorded 
card/cheque frauds per year which works out at approximately 440 a day). 
When we consider these figures against a backdrop of the industry figures provided by 
APACS (based on figures for 1999), every day: 
0 13,000 cards are reported lost and stolen to banks. 
* E0.5 million are lost on card fraud in total 
e fO. 2 million are lost on lost and stolen cards 
*f0.3 million are lost on frauds other than lost and stolen 
Yet, each day only 440 cheque/credit card frauds were recorded by the police. The 
Government admits that it has made no estimates of the level of under-reporting but 
recognises that it is a significant problem. It seems, however, far from being an urgent 
political priority. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, we have seen how the rapid expansion in the use of plastic cards 
has 
been accompanied by a rapid growth in the incidence of fraud offences. 
For a number 
of reasons, prevention strategies have proved to 
be ineffective and fraud levels show no 
sign of reduction in the near fature. In order to 
keep on top of the problem, it is 
necessary to collect and analyse accurate 
data on the extent, nature and effect of the 
crime itself 
We have also seen, however, that the sources of 
information upon which we currently 
rely are inadequate, in more ways 
than one. In particular, the data collected by the 
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police provide us with little information about the extent of the problem of card fraud. 
Since one of the main purposes of the British Crime Survey is to complement the police 
recorded figures, it seems entirely sensible (and desirable) to include plastic card fraud 
as a BCS crime. It has already been shown (in chapter three) that the victims of card 
fraud are potentially suitable for inclusion and so we now move on, in the chapters 
which follow, to test the feasibility of doing so. 
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5. Fear, Fraud and the British Crime Survey 
Introduction 
Central to the overall research strategy for my PhD thesis was the opportunity to 
become actively involved in design and analysis of the BCS. My role in the 
development of the 2000 BCS began in 1998, and was specifically geared to improving 
the questions relating to the fear of crime. Participation in the 2000 sweep occurred in 
two stages: a design stage and, later, the phase of secondary analysis of the data. 
At the design stage, I was first commissioned to conduct a comprehensive review of the 
recent literature on the fear of crime. In a series of meetings which followed, I 
presented a number of proposals for additions to the survey, most of which were 
discussed at length. Eventually, after piloting, 5 new questions were included in the 
final questionnaire. Several of these questions were designed to address methodological 
issues beyond the scope of this thesis and will be discussed elsewhere (in published 
articles). The primary focus, and indeed the most innovative contribution on my part, 
was the introduction of questions on plastic card fraud to the BCS. 
This chapter begins with a discussion of the aims of, and a brief description of the 
question development process. Developmental work was necessary at theoretical and 
conceptual levels before the process of operationalisation could take place. This 
discussion is followed with an overview of the hypotheses and a description of the key 
variables used in analysis. In terms of methodology, there was little room for external 
input as the BCS operates according to a well established and rigid research design 46 
which is well documented in both the Home Office and academic literature (e. g. 
Kershaw et al. 2000). Thus a description of the methodology and data collection does 
not form a major part of this chapter. However, for the reader who is not familiar with 
the research design, a detailed summary can be found in Appendix 2. 
This chapter is a short chapter and is only intended to serve as an introduction to the 
analysis contained in chapter six (and the discussion of results which follows in chapter 
seven). 
46 Although recent moves have been made to evolve the research 
design in response to a vast increase in 
sample size and a move to an annual cycle, see 
Simmons (2000). 
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5.1 Aims and objectives 
'it can be seen that theoretical casualness and empirical chaos has been the order of the 
day in studies of the fear of crime. Future work needs to avoid the same conceptual 
ambiguities and confusions if progress is to be made' (Hale 1996, p. 96). 
With a view to developing the concept of fear of crime to include fraud, the major aim 
of the research was to test the feasibility of introducing plastic card fraud questions to 
the BCS. Under particular scrutiny were the processes of conceptualisation and 
operationalisation. In addition, it was hoped that card fraud data would give a new 
dimension to the existing data sources on plastic card fraud. The aims of the research 
are summarised below: 
1. To develop 'worry about property crime' at a conceptual level. 
To conceptualise 'crime' (to include financial crime). 
To conceptualise 'worry' (beyond the 'very worried'). 
2. To test the feasibility of introducing plastic card fraud to the BCS 
To design and operationalise questions about plastic card fraud. 
To compare plastic card fraud with the other BCS crimes (in terms of worry 
and victimisation levels and demographic predictors). 
* To gather information about plastic card fraud (exploring the levels of plastic 
card fraud victimisation and worry) and evaluate the usefulness of this 
information in the study of plastic card fraud generally. 
5.2 Conceptual development and opera tionalisa tion 
In this study, there were three overlapping spheres of development - crime, plastic card 
fraud and fear/worry. In this section I discuss each in turn, highlighting the hypotheses 
which emerged from the conceptual stage, and discussing the process of 
operationalisation of each concept. 
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5.2.1 Crime: The division between property crime andpersonal crime 
In chapter one, I stated that the major question driving this thesis is what makes one 
crime differentfrom another? In the early stages on BCS question development it was 
necessary to make an attempt at answering this question. The first step in development 
of the crime concept was to identify the crimes covered by the BCS. The natural next 
step was to separate the property crimes from the personal crimes and to identify the 
distinguishing features. 
Figure 1: Distinguishing features of property and personal crimes (all BCS crimes, 
including card fraud). 
Nature of the act Intention of the 
perpetrator 
Effect on victim 
Property Crime 
Burglary Theft of (and/or To get away with Cost = money and 
Theft of vehicle damage) to victim's property unnoticed inconvenience. 
Theft from vehicle property. (avoid victim). 
Card fraud 
Personal Crime 
Mugging/robbery Offence against the To inflict Physical and/or 
Attack person. violence/terror on psychological harm. 
Rape/sexual attack victim directly. 
Being insulted 
Figure I shows how property crimes are different to personal crimes in terms of the 
nature of the act itself (what is harmed? ), the intention of the perpetrator (relating to the 
nature of the contact with the victim) and the nature of the harm (the effect of the crime 
on the victim). A victim's experience of property crime is likely to be quite different 
from an experience of personal crime, as contact with the perpetrator is not an essential 
feature, and the post-crime implications are associated with the process of replacing the 
property. In contrast, the victim of personal crime suffers personal harm that is inflicted 
by the perpetrator directly and the victim is likely to suffer physical and psychological 
effects as a result. According to this framework, card fraud, as Figure I illustrates, can 
easily be categorised as a property crime. 
Previous work has shown that property crime evokes reactions different to those 
experienced by victims of personal crime. The literature suggests that an individual's 
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attitude towards property crime and personal crime may be influenced by several 
perceptions: the perceived seriousness of the crime, the perceived likelihood of that 
crime occurring, and the perception of self-vulnerability (based on risk assessmentsý the 
type of loss which is likely to be suffered and the ability of the individual to recover 
from a victimisation, Skogan 1987, LaGrange and Ferraro 1987, Rountree 1998). 
Previous work can be drawn together using four propositions: 
I. Property crime evokes different reactions than personal crime (LaGrange and 
Ferraro 1987). 
2. Property crime is more common than personal crime. Thus people are more 
worried about becoming victims of property crime (Skogan 1987). 
3. Personal crime victimisation increases the fear of personal and property crime, 
but property crime victimisation only increases the fear of property crime 
(Rountree 1998). 
4. The most serious crimes do not necessarily generate the highest fear (LaGrange 
and Ferraro 1987). 
These findings, then, informed the development of hypotheses (discussed in section 
5.3). 
5.22 Plastic cardftaud 
At an early stage, two issues were raised by the BCS team, illustrating the reluctance to 
include fraud in victimisation surveys (discussed in chapter three). Firstly, that it was 
quite possible that victimisation levels would be too low to allow for any meaningful 
analysis. Secondly, that respondents might not show any significant level of concern 
and that, as a result, nothing would be gained by the inclusion of plastic card fraud on 
the survey. Nevertheless, the team did tentatively agree to introduce questions on 
plastic card fraud. So, this was essentially a process of testing the water but it was 
hoped that the data would allow for some substantive analysis. 
As we have seen in chapter four, there are several methods of committing (and thus 
becoming a victim of) plastic card fraud: fraud using application details, fraud using a 
plastic card (genuine or counterfeit) and fraud using card details (no physical card). In 
addition, it is important to distinguish between cases where a genuine card holder has 
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been simply mischarged during a genuine purchase and cases where a crime has 
occurred. Measures of victimisation need to differentiate each of these elements if they 
are to yield valuable data. 
Worry about plastic card fraud is likely to be influenced by a myriad of factors, 
including the many (proposed) correlates of worry about other crimes (for example, 
respondent's characteristics and lifestyle). Some additional factors relate only to plastic 
card fraud: 
How many cards the respondent has. 
What the card/s is/are used for (borrowing (credit) vs. a mere method of payment 
(debit)). 
o How often the card/s is/are used. 
" Where the card/s is/are used (restaurants, shops, internet, bill payments, cashpoints). 
" How vigilant the user is (checking statements, keeping receipts). 
" Is the card holder insured against loss/fraud? 
" Experience of card fraud (direct or indirect). 
Clearly, careful consideration of these issues was required at the stage of question 
design. However, due to space restrictions on the questionnaire, it was necessary to 
confine the plastic card fraud section to two questions only. These questions were 
placed in one of the follow-up questionnaires rather than the main questionnaire (i. e. not 
together with the other worry and victimisation screener questions). These 
victimisation questions, therefore, were not followed up by a victim form. 
A comprehensive search of the literature on plastic card fraud revealed no examples of 
survey questions used previously to measure victimisation, or fear of plastic card fraud. 
The International Crime Victim Survey (ICVS) includes a question on consumer fraud 
("has someone, when selling something to you or delivering a service cheated you in 
terms of quantity or quality of the goods1services? ") but nothing on plastic card fraud 
specifically. Thus, the questions were subjected to rigorous development and piloting. 
The first stage of question design produced the following two questions: 
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I. People can steal money from other people's debit and credit cards, either by 
overcharging them or by copying down their card details/PIN and using them to 
buy things or withdraw cash. In the last year, has someone stolen money from 
you in any of these ways? 
a) Yes -overcharged 
b) Yes - card details/PIN used 
c) No 
d) Don't use cards 
2. How much do you worry about someone overcharging you on your credit/debit 
card or using your card details/PIN to buy things or withdraw cash? 
a) Very worried 
b) Fairly worried 
c) Not very worried 
d) Not at all worried 
e) Insured against losses 
However, after initial pilotS47, these questions were rejected for two reasons. Firstly, in 
an attempt to incorporate as many of the conceptual considerations as possible into two 
questions, the questions themselves had become too complicated and in danger of being 
misinterpreted. Secondly, it was decided that, in order to make the results directly 
comparable with the other BCS crimes, the wording needed to match (as far as possible) 
more closely the wording of the existing BCS questions. 
Therefore, the following two questions were designed: 
1. As far as you know, including anything we have already talked about, since the 
first of January 1999 has anyone used your credit card or bank card, or your card 
details, such as your PIN, to buy things or withdraw cash without your 
permission? 
Yes 
No 
47 Approximately 15 pilot interviews were conducted in an informal setting on colleagues (not from a 
criminological background). Reactions to the questions were noted, focussing specifically on any 
difficulties of interpretation or answer selection. 
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2. How worried are you about someone using your credit card or bank card details, 
such as your PIN, to buy things or withdraw cash without your permission? 
a) Very worried 
b) Fairly worried 
C) Not very worried 
d) Not at all worried 
e) (N/A - don't use cards) 
Both questions were piloted as part of the formal BCS piloting exercise which occurs 
before the sweep is conducted (Hales et al. 2000). The questions piloted well and no 
further changes were necessary. The narrow scope of the questions reduced the range 
of possible hypotheses (for example, it would have been interesting to add card fraud to 
the list of 'likelihood of victimisation questions' to include risk perceptions in the final 
analysis) but the final set of hypotheses reflected the overarching aim which was, if we 
recall, to test the feasibility of introducing plastic card fraud to the survey. 
5.2 3 Wony 
Previous work on the fear of crime has too often neglected to embrace the full spectrum 
of the worry concept (Williams et al. 2000). Traditionally, although not exclusively, 
researchers have tended to focus their analysis on the 'very worried' group of 
respondents, guided by the belief that it is the 'very worried' who are our 'problem 
group'. It is often argued that concentrating on the 'very worried' gives a more 
'discriminating' measure of worry and it is this measure that much of the BCS analysis 
is based on (Kershaw et al. 2000, p. 44). 
In the BCS, the respondent has a choice of four responses (very worried, fairly worried, 
not very worried, not at all worried) for each worry question. Recently, concerns have 
been raised about the problems of using four-item Likeit scales: 
'We should now be beyond commonly used four-item Likert scales and headed toward 
better interval level measurement. The fact is that multi-point, metric-ordinal rating 
scales yield lower measurement error and provide a closer approximation of true 
response positions' (Williams et al. 2000 p. 7). 
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It would be fair to say that the structure of the BCS worry questions is set in stone, but 
this does not preclude improvement at the analysis stage. If respondents have a choice 
of four answers in a worry question it seems shortsighted only to focus on one (the very 
worried). At the conceptual level, then, it is important to decide how to work with the 
concept of worry to determine how the 'worriers' could best be identified (the 'very 
worried' or the 'very' and 'fairly' worried) and to attempt to discover when worry 
becomes a problem? Preliminary analysis of the worry data allowed for a thorough 
investigation into the nature of worry for individual crimes. 
Table 1: Percentage 'very worried' and 'not at all worried' across crime types. 
% Very Worried % Not at all worried 
Property Crime 
Burglary 19 8 
Theft of Vehicle 20 11 
Theft from Vehicle 15 12 
Card fraud 18 20 
Personal Crime 
Mugging/robbery 17 15 
Rape 19 41 
Attack 18 19 
Insulted/pestered 9 25 
Looking at the 'very worried' column of Table 1, we can see that more respondents 
(20%) are very worried about vehicle theft than any other crime type. Burglary and 
rape also attract a high number of very worried responses (19% each), and being 
insulted/pestered in public has the lowest'very worried'Ievel. Generally speaking, 
respondents are more likely to be very worried about property crime but the distinction 
is not clear, with rape in particular scoring highly. Interpretation of these figures would 
suggest that we have a problem with worry about vehicle theft, burglary and rape. 
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Table 2: Percentage worriers and non-worriers across crime types. 
% Worried % Not Worried 
Property Crime 
Burglary 57 43 
Theft of Vehicle 56 45 
Theft from Vehicle 51 49 
Card fraud 49 51 
Personal Crime 
Mugging/robbe 44 57 
Rape 32 69 
Attack 42 58 
Insulted/pestered 32 68 
Now , if we 
include the 'fairly worried' in our group of 'worriers', a quite different picture 
emerges. Looking at Table 2, we see a much more marked difference in worry levels 
between the property crimes and personal crimes, in that there are more property crime 
worriers than personal crime worriers. Worry about rape, which was positioned high on 
the 'very worried' list suddenly drops to the bottom of the scale, attracting the same 
percentage of worriers as being insulted in public. In addition, returning to Table 1, 
another perspective is gained through the consideration of the 'not at all worried' 
respondents. Looking at those who are not at all worried, and returning to our example 
of rape, we see that respondents are most likely to be not at all worried about rape. So, 
to say that worry about rape is a serious problem for our sample is not entirely true as 
41% are, in fact, not at all worried. 
Without wishing to labour this point, the choice of measure is an important one. 
Looking at the 'very worried' as the 'problem' group neglects to take into account many 
of the nuances of worry as a concept. While it may, in some circumstances, be 
appropriate to focus on a binary measure of worry - the worriers and the non-worriers - 
we can draw a lot more from the data if we look at the four levels of worry, focusing 
specifically on the 'very worried' the 'not at all worried' when necessary. 
5.24 Operational concerns 
At the operational level, there are two possible points of concern. Firstly, the possibility 
that the formation of the seven worry questions (one after the other, all phrased 
identically) might cause respondent fatigue. Secondly, and subsequently, the fact that 
the worry about plastic card fraud question is separated from the 'worry flock' may 
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mean that respondent approaches it in a different manner (whether this is a negative or 
positive issue is not important, the important point is that the response needs to be 
comparable with the other worry questions). 
The range of responses used for all crimes ('very worried', 'fairly worried', 'not very 
worried' and 'not at all worried') was analysed for all respondents. Using all eight worry 
questions, then, the total number of each of the four resPonses was counted. 
Table 3: Responses used for all eight worry questions. 
Number of times respo se used 
% 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Very 59 13 9 7 5 4 2 1 (0.4) 
Fairly 26 20 20 16 10 5 2 1 (0.2) 
Not very 20 18 16 15 13 8 5 4 1 
Not at all 46 23 11 8 5 3 2 1 1 
Looking at Table 3, we can see that the 'very worried' response was used least often and 
that respondents made more use of the middle responses (Tairly worried' and 'not very 
worried'). Of the respondents who did use the 'very worried' response, most used it only 
once (13%). Similarly, of the respondents who did use the'not at all worried' response, 
most used it once (23%). In comparison, few respondents failed to use the middle 
responses and the majority used either of the two responses once (20% and 18%), twice 
(20% and 16%) or three times (16% and 15%). 
So, those who choose one of the extreme responses are not likely to do so more than 
once or twice. Respondents are likely to use the middle responses more often. This 
suggests that most respondents are giving different answers to the different crime types, 
thus offering no indication of attempts at response consistency by respondents. This 
reinforces the suggestion above that worry should be viewed beyond the 'very worried. 
Thus, for the purposes of analysis, it was decided that worry should be interpreted in 
different ways at different stages of analysis. As a general rule, at univariate and 
bivariate stages of analysis, worry was considered to be a multi-factorial concept and 
thus it was inappropriate to focus only on the 'very worried' as the problem group. 
At the multivariate stage, since logistic regression was selected as the major analytic 
procedure, it was necessary to interpret worry as a binary variable. However, in order to 
capture all dimensions of worry, worry was recoded to focus on the 'worried' (the 'very' 
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worried plus the 'fairly' worried), the 'very worried' and the 'not at all worried' (full 
details are provided in Appendix 2). 
5.3 Key variables 
The process of selection of the key variables began with a close examination of models 
previously developed by other researchers. Rountree (1998), for example, argues that a 
good multidimensional model of fear needs to be wide ranging to include socio- 
demographics, lifestyle patterns, routine activities, target attractiveness, guardianship, 
previous victimisation and perceived incivilities. Similarly, Hough (1994), who 
conducted analysis on BCS data, included worries about non-criminal misfortunes, risk 
perceptions, feelings of safety when out alone at night, physical size and ability to 
defend oneself, and perceived levels of disorder in the neighbourhood. However, due to 
the restrictive nature of the data in this pilot study, the selection of dependent variables 
was restrained by the structure and content of the survey questionnaire. 
Two variables were selected as the key variables; the 'plastic card fraud victimisation' 
variable and the 'worry about plastic card fraud' variable. In addition, 7 variable sets 
were constructed; 5 demographic sets, a worry set and a victimisation set. 
1. Respondent Basic Demographics 
" Gender (male, female) 
" Age(16-29,30-59,60+) 
" Marital status (married (living de facto), not married) 
The variables in this set provide the respondent's demographic characteristics. Age and 
gender, of course, are particularly important since they are so often cited as significant 
correlates of fear. 
Ethnic origin was not included in the analysis. The main reasons for this decision were 
purely practical. Firstly, by the time the ethnic minority booster sample has been 
divided up to accommodate the two follow-up questionnaires, the number of 
respondents in the booster sample who actually answered the two plastic card fraud 
questions was reduced. Secondly, the ethnic minority booster sample is only used when 
one wishes to make specific statements about ethnicity. Therefore, in the context of this 
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study, it would be necessary to conduct analysis on two different samples, using only 
the core sample where ethnicity is not the focus (Hough 1994). This can cause 
confusion and, since the main aim of the study was to test feasibility rather than detect 
explanatory variables, complex analytical processes seemed unnecessary. All things 
considered, it was decided that the analysis should carried out on the core sample of the 
BCS only. 
2. Socio-economic Factors 
" Household income (under f5K, f5K under E15K, E15K under f20K, f20K+) 
" Managing on income (well and saving, getting by, in difficulty) 
" Highest qualifications achieved (secondary, further, higher) 
According to Hough (1994), the relationship between anxiety about crime and social 
class is robust and persistent. In BCS analysis, social class is usually measured using 
the Registrar General's standard classification of the head of household's socio- 
economic group which is based upon occupational standards (for example, professional 
or unskilled occupations). However, in the context of plastic card fraud, income and 
education were identified as variables of specific interest and, since both variables 
correlate with the social class variable, it was omitted from analysis. 
The variables in this set not only provide information on the respondent's education 
history but also the financial position of the household as a whole. 
3. Respondent's Health and Lifestyle 
House left unoccupied during the day (less that 3 hours, more than 3 hours) 
Drinking alcohol (rarely, often) 
Member of the household smoker (yes, no) 
General health (good, bad) 
The variables in this set provide information about the respondent's health and lifestyle. 
They give some indication of how active the respondent is. 
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4. Household Demographics 
" Tenancy (owners, renters) 
" Number of adults in household (1,2,3+) 
" Number of children in household (0,1+) 
The household demographics provide information about the respondent's home. For 
example, we can use the infori-nation to identify those who live alone, or with a family 
and the type of accommodation a respondent lives in. 
5. Area Demographics 
e Neighbourhood type (neighbours help each other, neighbours go their own way, 
mixture) 
o Area (inner city, urban, rural) 
The variables in this set provide information about the area generally and, at a smaller 
level, the respondent's own perceptions of the neighbourhood. The social environment 
in which households are located is classified in the BCS using 54 ACORN categories. 
However, the ACORN variable (in both its 54 category form and its 17 category 
breakdown) was unsuitable for the analytic procedures selected and thus the 'Area' 
variable, which is derived by combining elements of the ACORN classification with the 
BCS classification for inner cities, was the favoured measure of area type (see also 
Hough 1994). 
6. Victimisation Set 
9 Since 1/ 1 1999, have you personally been a victim of. .-.? 
* Burglary 
9 Theft of vehicle 
* Theft from vehicle 
9 Credit/debit card fraud 
Mugging (theft from the person) 
Attack (deliberate force or violence) 
9 Sexual attack 
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7. Worry Set 
How worried are you about ... 
? 
" Burglary 
" Theft of a vehicle 
" Theft from a vehicle 
" Credit/debit card fraud 
" Mugging or robbery 
" Rape 
" Attack 
" Insulted/pestered in public 
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5.4 Construction of hypotheses 
Reflecting back on the overall aims of the research, the following hypotheses were 
designed (they are expressed here in sets for ease of interpretation and will be discussed 
further in chapter seven). All hypotheses are expressed here in the null form. 
HYPOTHESES SET 1: Testing feasibility 
1.1 Inadequate numbers of respondents report being a victim of card fraud in the last 
year 
1.2 Respondents all fall into the non-worried categories. 
HYPOTHESES SET 2: Worry: comparisons across crimes 
2.1 There is no variation in worry distribution across specific crimes. 
2.2 Worry about property crime is no greater than worry about personal crime. 
HYPOTHESES SET 3: Worry: association between crimes 
3.1 Worry levels for individual crimes are not interrelated. 
3.2 Worry about property crime is not associated with worry about personal crime. 
HYPOTHESES SET 4: Demographic predictors of worry and victimisation 
4.1 Worry is not related to demographic variables. 
4.2 Victimisation is not related to demographic variables 
HYPOTHESES SET 5: Relationship between worry and victimisation across 
crimes 
5.1 Worry is not related to victimisation (all crimes). 
5.2 Personal crime victimisation does not increase worry about personal crime. 
5.3 Personal crime victimisation does not increase worry about property crime. 
5.4 Property crime victimisation does not increase worry about personal crime. 
5.5 Property crime victimisation does not increase worry about property crime. 
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6. Results 
Introduction 
This chapter contains the analysis of the BCS 2000 data. The analysis was carried out 
in a methodical way, following the structure of the hypotheses sets (see chapter five). At 
all stages of analysis, the emphasis was on making comparisons between worries about 
specific crimes. In particular, I was interested in exploring the relationships that worry 
about card fraud has with other variables and comparing these to the relationships 
exhibited by the other crimes. This approach is distinct from an attempt to find the best 
explanation, statistically at least, for worry about each crime. Indeed, this would have 
been a protracted task and to embark upon it would be to lose sight of the original aim 
of the research which was to test the potential for introducing card fraud to the survey. 
Moreover, such an approach to analysis would inevitably exceed the capability of the 
card fraud data. In short, I do not strive to explain worry about each crime individually 
through vigorous independent analysis. Rather, my approach is to conduct simple 
comparisons, treating each crime in the same way, and comparing the relationships 
across crimes. By extracting the common (and distinct) trends and themes, I can make 
recommendations for future development of questions on card fraud. 
I begin with the overarching aim of the research - testing the feasibility of using card 
fraud as a BCS crime (section 6.1). We will see that the numbers of victims and 
worriers for card fraud proved to be comparable with the other crimes, thus I conclude 
that card fraud performs well operationally as a BCS crime. In addition, I discuss the 
characteristics of the card users vs. the non card users, highlighting the different factors 
associated with card ownership. Next (in section 6.2), univariate analysis of the worry 
data for each of the eight crimes suggests that worry about card fraud has a similar 
distribution to its property crime counterparts but is more dispersed. Thus, at an early 
stage I suggest that worry about card fraud displays different properties to the other 
crimes. 
The next stage of analysis focused on the association between worries (section 6.3). 
Worry about card fraud, it seems, has a weak association with the other worries, 
suggesting that it might have unique characteristics and relationships. Indeed, moving 
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on to demographic predictors (section 6-4), those who are worried and not worried 
about card fraud are distinct in many ways from the other worriers and non-worriers. 
Of particular interest are the multivariate models which suggest that demographic 
factors are less predictive of worry about card fraud than the other crimes. 
Moving on to the victims (section 6.5), again card fraud proves to be distinct from the 
other crimes. Those who are more educated, better off and more healthy and active are 
more likely to become victims of card fraud and these features contrast with the 
characteristics of the victims of other crimes. Again, at a multivariate level, 
demographic factors are less predictive of card fraud victimisation than victimisation of 
the other crimes. 
Finally, in section 6.6,1 consider the relationship between worry and victimisation for 
each crime. Card fraud victims prove to be an interesting group, worrying significantly 
about rape but not about property crimes. In contrast, victims of vehicle crime, 
mugging and attack were significantly more worried about card fraud. 
In order to avoid an information overload in this (already long) chapter, supplementary 
information can be found in the Appendices (2-7). Methodological issues and data 
considerations are discussed in Appendix 2. Supplementary tables for the 
corresponding sections of this chapter can be found in the following appendices (all are 
clearly signposted throughout the chapter). 
6.1 Testing feasibility of introducing card fraud 
6.2 Comparing worry across crimes 
6.3 Association between worries 
6.4 Demographic predictors of worry 
6.5 Demographic predictors of victimisation 
6.6 Association between worry and victimisation 
Appendix 3 
N/A 
Appendix 4 
Appendix 5 
Appendix 6 
Appendix 7 
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6.1 Testing feasibility 
The first stage of analysis was to address the pivotal aim of the research, namely to 
evaluate the operationalisation of the card fraud questions. This first section contains 
the basic descriptive level statistics for the two card fraud questions and these initial 
results allow us to conclude that card fraud performs well as a BCS crime. Also, at the 
end of this section, I consider the characteristics of card holders, comparing them with 
their non-card using counterparts in terms of their demographic characteristics, worry 
levels and victimisation levels. 
6.1.1 Do adequate numbers of respondents report being a victim of 
card fraud? 
If we recall, the major argument against the inclusion of fraud victims in the BCS was 
that victims simply would either a) not be aware of the victimisation, or b) not consider 
it significant and fail to report the event. However, the analysis of the victimisation data 
allows us to reject the hypothesis that there are inadequate numbers of victims of card 
fraud. Table I shows that 2% of respondents had been a victim of card fraud in the last 
year, on a par with victimisation levels for theft of a vehicle and mugging/robbery. 
Victims of card fraud, it seems, are aware of their victimisation and do report the event 
to the inter-viewer. 
Table 1: Percentage victims for each crime 
% Victims (N) 
Burglary 3 (485) 
Card Fraud 2 2 (198) 
Theft of vehicle' 2 (357) 
Theft from vehicle' 9(1362) 
Mugging/robbery 2 (463) 
Violent attack 4 (734) 
Sexual attack 0.4 (78) 
'Car owners only (N==14,976) 
2 Card holders only (N=8,191) 
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6.1.2 Are respondents distributed across all worry levels or do they 
all fall into the non-worried categories? 
A further misgiving needed to be addressed at the early stages of analysis. Is card fraud 
something people actually worry about, or would inclusion in the survey be fruitless? 
Again, the results allowed for rejection of the null hypothesis. 
Table 2 shows the distribution of respondents across worry levels for card fraud. Just 
under half of respondents (49%) were worried about card fraud to some extent (very 
worried or fairly worried). Indeed, it was encouraging, and somewhat unexpected, to 
find that 'very worried' levels (used by the Home Office as an indicator of fear) for card 
fraud were comparatively high (18% of respondents were very worried about card 
fraud). The distribution and dispersion of worry about card fraud will be discussed 
further in section 6.2 when compared with the other BCS crimes. 
Table 2: Worry about card fraud 
N % 
Very worried 11451 18 
Fairly worried 21558 31 
Not very worried 2,553 31 
Not at all worried lfi33 20 
Total 8,195 
6.1.3 Who are the card users and non-card users? 
It is possible to distinguish between those who do and do not use payment cards (the 
method for doing so is discussed in Appendix 2) and it is appropriate at this point to 
discuss the characteristics of those two groups. In total, 16% of the card fraud sub- 
sample selected the 'do not use cards' option; 84%, then, were assumed to be card users 
for the purposes of analysis. 
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Generally speaking, card users are youngef", female 49and married (or living de 
facto)50 
. They are more likely to own a home 
51 in urban areaS52 and have larger 
householdS53. Card users were better off financially in terms of both household income 54 
and the ability to manage on that income 
55 
. They were also more likely to be better 
educated 
56 Finally, most card users reported being in good health and lived active 
57 lifestyles Chi square values are significant (p<0.005) for all demographic variables 
except the perception of the neighbourhood. In terms of association, card ownership is 
most strongly related to income and least strongly associated with gender and having a 
smoker in the household. 
These results suggest that card ownership is a middle-upper class characteristic but not 
exclusively so. Indeed, 38% of card users were on lower incomes and 59% had not been 
educated beyond the Further level. It is likely that the distribution across socio- 
economic levels is a reflection of the three typologies of card user as discussed in 
chapter four: those who use cards to borrow money and those who use cards for 
financial management and business users. Those on low incomes, educated to lower 
levels may be using the cards to borrow or gain credit. Those on higher incomes are 
perhaps using the card for convenience, simply as a method of payment. 
48 More than half (57%) of non card users were over the age of 60 years old whereas the majority of card 
users were less than 60 years (74%; 57% are aged 30-59 years). 
49Non card holders were slightly more likely to be female (60% compared with 53% of card holders). 
'0 63% of card users were married, compared with only 38% of non users. 
51 Three quarters of card users owned their property (78%) but less than half (44%) of non-users were 
owners. 
52 The majority of respondents generally lived in areas classed as 'urban' (67% of non card users and 62% 
of card users). Those who lived in rural areas were more likely to use cards that those who lived in the 
inner cities (9 1% of rural dwellers were card users, compared with 75% of inner city dwellers). 
53 A quarter of card users reported being the only adult in the household, compared with 50% of card 
users. Similarly, a larger proportion of non card users lived in childless households (78% compared with 
69% of card users). 
54 just less than half of card holders (48%) had a household income of more than E20K but only 8% of 
non card holders were in the same income category. Overall, 87% of non card users had a household 
income of less than f 15K (a third (33%) earned less than f5K) compared with 38% of card users. 
55 Of the card users, 61% reported to be managing well on the income (and saving) but for non users the 
majority (58%) were just getting by on that income (and not saving). 
56 Half of non card users had been educated only to Secondary level (5 1 %) and only 4% had pursued their 
education to Higher level. Card users were more likely to have experienced Higher education (41%) but 
more than a third (36%) were educated only to a Secondary level. 
57 78% of card users reported being in good health, 75% were away from the home most of the day, 61% 
reported drinking alcohol often. In comparison, non card users were more likely to report bad health 
(49% bad health) and were less active (45% were away from the home during the day and 60% rarely 
drank alcohol). 
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Low socio-economic status, inactive lifestyles and bad health all seem to be common 
characteristics of those who do not use cards but are also, of course, characteristics of 
those in old age. Since more than half of the non card users are over the age of 60 
years, it is arguable that the income and lifestyle characteristics are just as much a 
indication of the effect of age as representative of the group of non-card using 
respondents. However, when a logistic regression model is built using demographic 
variables to predict card ownership, the effect of higher socio-economic status (higher 
education and higher income) is more powerful than age, although being young is still a 
strong predictor (see Table 3). 
Table 3: Demographic predictors of card ownership 
Card users 
Most predictive Income L20K+ 
Higher education 
Income f 15 -20K 
Being aged 16-29 
Managing well on income and saving 
Being female 
Away from home 3+ hours a day 
Being aged 30-59 
Owning property 
Being married 
1+ children in household 
Living in rural area 
Income E5-15K 
Often drink alcohol 
No smoker in household 
Least predictive Living in urban areas 
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6.2 Comparing worry across crimes 
Looking at Tables 4 and 5, one can clearly see that the distribution of worry levels 
varies across crime type. Table 4 shows the percentage of respondents in each worry 
group for all specific crimes and property and personal crime generally. Table 5 shows 
distribution and dispersion data for property and personal crimes. 
6.2.1 Variation in worry distribution across specific crimes 
When each crime is taken individually, at first glance worry about card fraud seems to 
be more similar to the property crimes than the personal crimes. Looking at Graphs 1-8 
(and Table 4), one can see that the shape of the distributions for all four property crimes 
is similar. The majority of respondents occur in the middle two categories, with an 
almost equal share of respondents in each category (for example, for burglary 38% are 
fairly worried and 35% are not very worried). Worry about card is, however, 
distinguishable from the other property crimes in terms of the balance between the 
extreme categories. For card fraud there are a few more respondents who are 'not at all 
worried' than 'very worried' (for burglary and vehicle crime more respondents are 'very 
worried' and the difference in proportions is larger). 
Table 4: Percentage worried by crime type 
% Very 
worried 
% Fairly 
worried 
% Not very 
worried 
% Not at 
all worried 
All property crime 3 31 52 14 
Burglary 19 38 35 8 
Theft of car 20 36 33 11 
Theft from car 15 36 36 12 
Card fraud 18 31 31 20 
All personal crime 5 20 41 34 
Mugging 17 27 42 15 
Rape 19 13 28 41 
Attack 18 25 39 19 
Insult 9 23 44 25 
All crime 11 25 47 17 
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Graph 1: Worry about burglary 
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Graph 5: Worry about mugging 
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Graph 7: Worry about attack 
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Graph 2: Worry about card fraud 
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Graph 4: Worry about theft from 
Graph 6: Worry about rape 
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Very Fairly Not very Not at all 
worried worried worried worried 
Very Fairly Not very Not at all 
worried worried worried worried 
Ve ry Fairly Not very Not at all 
worried worried worried worried Very Fairly Not very Not at all 
worried worried worried worried 
Very Fairly Not very Not at all 
worried worried worried worried Very Fairly Not very Not at all 
worried worried worried worried 
Very Fairly Not very Not at all 
worried worried worried worried Very Fairly Not very Not at all 
worried worried worried worried 
However, when one looks more closely at the distributions and dispersion values (Table 
5), it becomes clear that worry about card fraud does not fit snugly into the property 
crime mould. Firstly, looking at the average values (mean and mode) for worry about 
card fraud compared with the other crimes, we can see that the averages for card fraud 
are closer to the personal crime averages, reflecting the lower levels of worry for those 
crimes. Indeed, the distributions for worry about burglary, theft of vehicle and theft 
from vehicle are positively skewed but card fraud, like the four personal crimes, is 
negatively skewed (but the skewness is notably smaller than for the other personal 
crimes). Furthermore, card fraud has a higher value of variance and thus, in terms of 
dispersion, is more similar to worry about rape and attack than the other property crimes 
(which are less dispersed and more clustered around the average). 
Table 5: Distribution and dispersion of worry variables. 
Skewness Kurtosis Mean Mode Variance 
(S. E. ) (S. E. ) 
All property crime -. 014 -. 469 9.7 10 7.56 
(. 030) (. 060) 
Burglary . 
069 -. 751 2.3 2 . 77 
(. 018) (. 035) 
Theft of vehicle . 086 -. 
850 2.4 2 . 85 
(. 021) (0.41) 
Theft from vehicle . 006 -. 
752 2.5 2 . 80 
(. 021) (. 041) 
Card fraud -. 024 -1.065 2.5 3 1.00 
(. 027) 
All personal crime -. 413 -. 714 10.8 12 11.10 
(. 018) (. 037) 
Mugging -. 205 -. 854 2.5 3 . 88 
(. 018) (. 035) 
Rape -. 597 -1.071 2.9 4 
1.28 
(. 018) (. 037) 
Attack -. 212 -. 960 2.6 3 . 
96 
(. 018) (. 035) 
- - Insult -. 418 -. 554 2.9 3 . 
80 
(. 018) (. 035) 
- All crime -. 327 -. 318 20.8 21 
28.10 
(. 031) (. 062)_ 
To summarise, then, at a crime specific level one can conclude that there are distinct 
differences in the distribution and dispersion of respondents across crimes. Card fraud 
has a similarly shaped distribution to its property crime counterparts but the respondents 
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are well dispersed across the four worry categories, a feature more strongly associated 
with the personal crimes (especially attack and rape). 
6.2.2 Is worry about property crime greater than worry about 
personal crime? 
When one looks at the aggregate levels of worry for property and personal crime (Table 
4) the data shows that, for property crime, respondents are more likely to be in the 
middle worry categories (Tairly' or 'not very' worried) whereas they are more likely to 
be not worried about personal crime (either 'not very' or 'not at all'). Respondents are 
more likely to select one of the extreme responses ('very' or 'not at all') for personal 
crime. This suggests that respondents, on the whole, are: 
a) Generally more not worried than worried 
b) more likely to be worried about property crime than personal crime 
c) more likely to be very worried or not at all worried about personal crime 
6.3 Association between worries 
In this section, we consider the relationships between the worry measures. First the 
bivariate relationships between each worry variable are considered (looking at chi 
square values and measures of strength of association). Next we look at the multivariate 
relationships using logistic regression. 
6.3.1 Are worry levels for individual crimes interrelated? 
Chi square tests reveal significant relationships between all individual worries (see 
Appendix 4, Table 1). Table 6 (in this section) contains the Cramer's V values for the 
relationships between each individual crime. Summing across the matrix (see Table 7), 
we see that worry about attack and mugging score the highest totals, suggesting stronger 
relationships with other worries. The total score for card fraud is notably lower than for 
the other crime types. Thus, worry about card fraud seems to have different inter-worry 
relationships than the other crimes. 
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Table 6: Cramer's V values for worry by worry 
Burglary 
Theft of 
vehicle 
. 
334 
Theft 
from 
vehicle 
. 
294 
Card 
fraud . 
248 
Mugging . 415 
Attack 
.34 
Rape . 
286 
Insult 
. 
268 
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. 
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. 
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All are significant at p<0.0001 
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Table 7: Total Association Score for each crime type. 
I Crime 
Burglary 
Theft of vehicle 
Theft fi7om vehicle 
Card fi7aud 
Property crime 
Mugging 
Attack 
Rape 
Insult 
Total association 
score 
2.189 
2.208 
2.017 
1.651 
1.939 
2.534 
2.628 
2.188 
2.107 
2.635 
6.3.2 Is worry about property crime associated with worry about 
personal crime? 
Analysis of the crosstabulations reveals that worry about personal crime is more likely 
to affect worry about property crime than the other way round. So, those who are 
worried about personal crime are more likely to be worried about property crime (71 % 
of worried about personal crime are also worried about property crime) than those who 
are worried about property crime are to be worried about personal crime (44% of those 
worried about property crime are also worried about personal crime). 
In terms of strength of association, worries about the personal crimes are more strongly 
associated with each other than worries about the property crimes are inter-associated. 
Generally speaking, the relationships between personal crimes (shown in green in Table 
6) are stronger than relationships between property crimes (shown in blue). The 
strength of relationships between property andpersonal crimes (shown in yellow) are 
more varied; for example, worry about mugging and attack are more strongly related to 
worry about burglary than the other property crimes and worry about rape is more 
weakly related to worry about property crime than the other personal crimes are. 
So, bivariate analysis suggests that worry about personal crime is a stronger predictor of 
worry about property crime than worry about property crime is a predictor of worry 
about personal crime. However it is clear that the picture is more complicated than that; 
rape, card fraud, mugging and burglary all seem to have different relationships with 
other worries which need exploring. This can be done by using logistic regression 
techniques. 
Tables 8 and 9 show the logistic regression models for worry about each crime (full 
results are provided in Appendix 4). The independent variables are listed in order of 
predictive power (most predictive at the top) and the variables which failed to make a 
statistically significant contribution to the logistic regression model are shown in shaded 
cells (p<0.005). 
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Table 8: Worry about Property Crime Models (logistic regression) 
Burglary Card Fraud Theft of vehicle Theft from 
vehicle 
Mugging Theft from vehicle Theft from vehicle Theft of vehicle 
Theft of vehicle Burglary Mugging Burglary 
Theft from vehicle Insult Burglary Card fraud 
Card fraud Theft of vehicle Insult Insult 
Attack Mugging Card fraud 
Insult 
Rape Rape Rape Rape 
Attack Attack Attack 
Mugging 
Table 9: Worry about Personal Crime Models (logistic regression) 
Rape Attack Mugging Insult 
Attack Rape Attack Attack 
Mugging Mugging Burglary Mugging 
Insult Insult Rape Rape 
Burglary Theft of vehicle Card fraud 
Insult Theft of vehicle 
Card fraud Burglary 
Theft from vehicle 
Theft from vehicle Theft from vehicle Theft from vehicle 
Theft of vehicle Theft of vehicle 
Card fraud Card fraud 
Burglary 
The logistic regression models give us an idea of the complex inter-worry relationships. 
Worry about property crime is not necessarily a significant predictor of worry about 
personal crime (for example, worry about property crime is not a significant predictor of 
worry about rape but worries about all property crimes except theft from a vehicle are 
predictors of worry about mugging). Similarly, worry about personal crime may not 
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necessarily be a significant predictor of worry about property crime (worry about rape is 
not a significant predictor of worry about any of the property crimes). 
6.4 Demographic predictors of worry 
6.4.1 Bivariate relationships 
6.4.1.1 Respondent characteristics 
Generally speaking, the respondent characteristics were significantly related to worry 
across crime types. Gender was more strongly related to worry about personal crimes 
than property crimes, and had a stronger association with worry about rape than for 
other crimes. On the whole, women were slightly more worried than men about all 
crimes but to a greater extent for the personal crimes than about property crime. Age 
was inversely associated with worry about all crimes except mugging; generally 
speaking the young were more worried but for mugging those in the older age group 
(60+) had higher worry levels. Age was most strongly associated with worry about rape 
and attack. The relationships between worry and marital status varied according to 
crime type. For the property crimes, those who were married (or living defacto) were 
more worried; for personal crimes, those who were married were less worried. Marital 
status was most strongly associated with worry about card fraud. 
6.4.1.2 Household characteristics 
Worry about all crimes was significantly related to all household characteristics but 
association was slightly weaker for worry about property crimes than for worry about 
personal crimes. Type of tenancy was more strongly related to worry about personal 
crimes than the property crimes proving to be particularly strongly associated with 
worry about mugging and attack. Those who lived in rented property were generally 
more worried about crime, although for card fraud it was the property owners who were 
more likely to be worried. The number of adults in the household, although 
significantly related to all worries, was not more weakly associated with worry about 
the personal crimes. In contrast, worry about the property crimes did have a stronger 
association (but still weak), the more adults living in the house, the less worried the 
respondent was likely to be. The effect of having children in the household was less 
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clear. Having children in the house was associated with higher worry levels for 
burglary and the personal crimes. 
6.4.1.3 Area characteristics 
Worry about all crimes was significantly related to area characteristics. Howeverý 
worry about card fraud had particularly weak association with area characteristics. 
Those who lived in more rural areas were generally less worried about crime, the 
association being stronger for vehicle theft and mugging. Those who perceived their 
area to be less 'neighbourly' tended to be more worried about crime although the 
associations were weak (but strongest for burglary). 
6.4.1.4 Socio-economic characteristics 
Worry about all crimes was significantly related to education, household income and 
ability to manage on that income. Worry about mugging, attack and rape were more 
strongly associated with socio-economic factors than were worries about the property 
crimes. Those who were more educated, earning higher incomes and not in financial 
difficulty are less worried about crime. However, for worry about card fraud those on 
higher incomes have greater levels of worry. Worry about card fraud is more strongly 
associated with household income than any other crime, yet its association with the 
ability to manage on that income is the weakest of the eight crimes. 
6.4.1.5 Health and lifestyle 
Generally speaking, those in poor health were more worried about crime than those in 
good health. The association was stronger for burglary and mugging and was weakest 
for rape and card fraud. Smoking and drinking habits were significantly related to worry 
about all crime, but association was not significant for card fraud. Alcohol consumption 
was more strongly associated with worry about personal crimes (those who drink more 
often are less worried) and having a smoker in the household was more strongly 
associated with attack (those living in a smoking household were more worried). More 
active respondents were generally less worried about personal crime. Those who left 
the house unoccupied for more than 3 hours a day were significantly more worried 
about vehicle crime (theft of and theft from) and card fraud. In contrast, those who left 
the house unoccupied for more than 3 hours a day were less worried about mugging. 
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6.4.1.6 Summary 
The modal 'very worried about vehicle crime' and 'very worried about card fraud' is 
female, aged 30-59 years and lives in a self-owned property in an urban area with a 
partner and no children. She is educated to Further level, is managing well on a high 
income, and has an active and healthy lifestyle. In contrast, the modal 'very worried' 
for burglary and the personal crimes is also female, aged 30-59 years and living in an 
urban area with a partner and no children, but is less educated (to Secondary level), is 
just getting by on a mid-level income and is active and healthy but rarely drinks alcohol. 
The modal 'not at all worried' about card fraud is female, aged 30-59 years, living in a 
self-owned property in an urban area with a partner and no children. She is managing 
well financially but has a mid-level income and has a low educational level 
(Secondary). The modal 'not at all worried' about burglary is male, aged 60+ years and 
lives alone. He is managing well on a mid-level income and is educated to Further 
level. For all other crimes, the modal 'not at all worried' is male, aged 30-59, living in a 
self-owned property in an urban area with a partner and no children. He is managing 
well on a high income and lives an active and healthy lifestyle. 
6.4.2 Logistic Regression Models 
A detailed description of the logistic regression results are given in Appendix 5. Tables 
10- 15 in this section show the models for worry about each individual crime using the 
demographic variables. Only significant predictors are shown in these tables and they 
are ordered by strength of association (the strongest predictor at the top). Several sets of 
models are presented in this section based on different dependent variables. The first 
set of models was constructed to predict the worried respondents (very' or Tairly'). The 
other two sets focused on the two extreme worry groups - the very worried and the not 
at all worried. 
Worry about all crimes (worried vs. not worried) (Tables 10 and 11) 
Very worried about all crimes (very worried vs. all others) (Tables 12 and 13) 
9 Not at all worried about all crimes (not at all worried vs. all others) (Tables 14 and 
15) 
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6.4.2.1 The worried vs. the not worried (Tables 10 and 11) 
The immediate observation one makes when looking at these Tables is that worry about 
card fraud model looks very different to its counterparts, in terms of both the number of 
significant predictors, and the nature of the predictors. Only being married, owning 
property, getting by on the household income and having no children in the household 
are significant predictors of being worried about card fraud. 
The following general observations can be made about the remaining three property 
crime models (burglary and the vehicle crimes). Firstly, living in an inner city or urban 
area is the strongest predictor of worry about property crimes. Respondent 
characteristics are not strong predictors, only being in the younger age group (16-29) 
appears to predict worry. Similarly, household characteriStiCS58 and health and lifestyle 
factors 59 are not, generally, significant. Socio-economic factors are strong predictors; 
having a low income and either just getting by or struggling on that income are 
significant predictors, and education to secondary or further level seem to influence 
worry. 
For the personal crimes, the models display different themes. Respondent 
characteristics are much more important, being female is the strongest predictor for all 
personal crimes and being young (16-29) is an important factor for all crimes except 
mugging (where age is not significantly associated). In addition, health and lifestyle 
factors are more consistently significant across personal crimes (as compared with 
property crime); low alcohol consumption and being in bad health are predictors of 
worry about personal crime. As for the property crimes, household characteristics are 
not important, only living in a multiple adult households has an effect on worry about 
personal crime. Living in the inner city and socio-economic factors (income and 
education) are significant predictors of worry about personal crime. 
58 Having no children in the household is associated with worry about vehicle crime and being and owner, 
rather than a renter, is likely to influence worry about burglary. 
59Having a smoker in the household was a predictor of vehicle crime and being in bad general 
health was 
a factor for worry about burglary. 
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Table 10: Demographic predictors of worry about property crime (significant 
only) 
Burglary Theft of vehicle Theft from vehicle Card Fraud 
Living in inner city Living in inner city Living in inner city Married/living de facto 
Being married Income under E5K Age 16-29 Property owner 
Income < f5K Being aged 16-29 Income under E5K Getting by on income 
Being aged 16-29 Living in urban areas Living in urban areas No children in household 
In difficulty on income Secondary education Age 30-59 
Secondary education Further education 3+ adults in household 
Being aged 30-59 Income E5K - 15K Getting by on income 
Income E5-15K In bad health Being male 
Neighbours go own way Income E 15 K- 20K Further education 
Getting by on income Getting by on income No children in household 
Owning property House unoccupied 3+ 
hours 
Smoker in household 
Living in urban areas No children in household Neighbours go own way 
In bad health Smoker in household 
Being female Rarely drinking alcohol 
Rarely drinking alcohol 
Further education 
Table 11: Demographic predictors of worry about personal crime (significant 
only) 
Mugging Attack Rape Insult 
Being female Being female Being female Being female 
Living in inner city Aged 16-29 Aged 16-29 Living in inner city 
Secondary education Living in inner city Aged 30-59 In difficulty on income 
Income < f5K Income < f5K Secondary education Aged 16-29 
3+ adults in household Secondary education Further education In bad health 
Further education Further education Living in inner city Income < f5K 
In bad health 3+ adults in household In difficulty on income Living in urban area 
Living in urban areas Getting by on income Income under f5K Getting by on income 
Income f 5K - 15K In bad health 3+ adults 
in household Further education 
Income E15K - 20K Aged 30-59 Rarely 
drinking alcohol Secondary education 
In difficulty on income in difficulty on income Getting by on income Rarely drink alcohol 
Getting by on income Income f 5K - 15K Income f 15K - 20K Income E5K - 15K 
2 adults in household Rarely drinking alcohol Income f 5K - 15K 3+ adults in household 
Neighbours go own way Income f 15K - 20K Living in urban areas Neighbours, go own way 
Rarely drink alcohol Living in urban areas Aged 30-59 
Renting property 2 adults in household 
No children in household Neighbours go own way 
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6.4.2.2 Predicting the 'very worried'(Tables 12 and 13) 
As one might expect, there are many similarities between the models for the 'worried' 
(discussed in the previous section) and the 'very worried' which we turn our focus to 
now. However, there are differences between the models which give a different 
perspective on the sorts of characteristics which are associated with worry. 
Beginning with the property crimes, there are fewer differences between the models for 
burglary than there are for the vehicle crimes and card fraud. For burglary, living in the 
inner city and being on a low income are strong predictors of being both 'worried' and 
4very worried'. The major difference between the burglary models is the rising 
importance of low educational achievement which emerges a strong predictor of being 
'very worried' about burglary and card fraud. For the vehicle crimes, the strongest 
predictors for being 'very worried' are notably different to those in the 'worried' model. 
Age (being young) becomes less important in the 'very worried' model and income 
becomes the strongest predictor. Moreover, for vehicle crime, having several adults in 
the household emerges as a strong predictor of being 'very worried'. 
For card fraud too, the model predicting the 'very worried' looks quite different from 
that predicting the 'worried'. Not only are there a few more significant predictors of the 
'very worried'but there is also an increased emphasis on the importance of socio- 
economic factors. Low education is the strongest predictor of being very worried about 
card fraud but education did not feature as a significant factor associated with worry 
generally. 'Getting by' on the household income remains important but for the 'very 
worried' we can see that being on a moderate income (f 15 -20K) is also a predictor. 
Moving on to the personal crimes, there are fewer differences between the models for 
the 'worried' and the 'very worried'. For both attack and rape, being female and young 
(16-29) remain the strongest predictors for the 'very worried, with low education 
continuing to be an important factor. Indeed, there is little difference between the two 
sets of models for attack and rape. For mugging and insult, however, the predictors in 
the two sets of models do vary. In particular, low education is the strongest predictor of 
being 'very worried' about mugging, superseding being female, which is the strongest 
predictor of being 'worried'. For insult, low income and living in households with more 
than three adults are stronger predictors of being 'very worried'. 
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Table 12-. Demographic predictors of 'very worried' about property crime 
(significant only) 
Burglary Theft of vehicle Theft from vehicle Card fraud 
Living in inner city Income <f 5K Income <f 5K Secondary education 
Secondary education Living in inner city Living in inner city Rarely drinking alcohol 
Income <f 5K Living in urban areas 3+ adults in household Living in inner city 
Being aged 16-29 Income E5-15K 2 adults in household Further education 
In difficulty on income 3+ adults in household Living in urban areas Getting by on income 
Further education 2 adults in household Aged 16-29 Income f 15-20K 
Being aged 30-59 Secondary education Income f 5-15K 
Living in urban areas Being aged 16-29 Living in rented property 
Income E5-15K Further education In bad health 
Being married Rarely drinking alcohol Further education 
Bad general health Living in rented property Smoker in household 
Being female Income f 15 -20K Being male 
Rarely drinking alcohol Getting by on income 
Getting by on income In bad health 
Neighbours go own way Smoker in household 
House unoccupied 
3+hours 
Being female 
Mixed neighbourhood 
Table 13: Demographic predictors of 'very worried' about personal crime 
(significant only) 
Mugging Attack Rape Insult 
Secondary education Being female Being female Being female 
Being female Being aged 16-29 Being aged 16-29 Income < f5K 
Living in inner city Secondary education Secondary education 3+ adults in household 
Further education Income < f5K Being aged 30-59 Living in inner city 
Income <f5K Living in inner city Further education Secondary education 
3+ adults in household Further education Living in inner city Income f5-15K 
Rarely drinks alcohol Income E5-15K Income <f 5K Being aged 16-29 
Income f 5-15K Being aged 30-29 Rarely drinking alcohol Further education 
Being aged 16-29 Rarely drinking alcohol 3+ children in household In difficulty on income 
In bad health Income E15-20K Income f 15-20K Rarely drinking alcohol 
Living in urban areas Being married Getting by on income Income fI 5-20K 
House unoccupied <3 
hours 
Getting by on income Getting by on income 
Living in urban areas Living in urban areas 
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6.4.2.3 Predicting the 'not at all worried' (Tables 14 and 15) 
The immediately noticeable difference between the models for the 'not at all worried' 
and those for the 'worried' and 'very worried' is the smaller number of significant 
predictors in the 'not at all' models. In addition, although one might expect the 
predictors of the 'not at all' to be the 'opposites' of the predictors for 'very worried' (so if 
being female is a strong predictor of being 'very worried' about rape, we might expect 
being male to be a strong predictor of being 'not at all worried'), this is not always the 
case. 
For the property crimes, being 'not at all worried' is strongly associated with respondent 
characteristics (age, gender and marital status) and the area characteristics. For 
burglary, for example, being not married, older (60+) and living in rural areas are the 
strongest predictors of being 'not at all worried'. Similarly, for theft of a vehicle, living 
in rural areas and being male are the strongest predictors and for theft from the vehicle, 
being old (60+) and living in a close-knit neighbourhood are most strongly associated 
with being 'not at all worried'. For both crimes, being at home for most of the day is 
also a predictive factor. 
Unlike the models for the 'very worried' about property crimes, income is generally not 
significantly associated with being'not at all worried'about property crime. However, 
for card fraud, having a low household income is the strongest predictor of being'not at 
all worried. Interestingly, having a household income of between E15-20K is 
associated with both being 'very worried' and 'not at all worried'. 
For the personal crimes, being not at all worried is also strongly associated with 
respondent characteristics (age and gender) and the area characteristics. Being male is 
the strongest predictor of being 'not at all worried' about personal crime and being old 
(60+) is a strong predictor of being 'not at all worried' about all personal crimes except 
mugging; for mugging, age is not at significant predictor of being 'not at all worried'. 
Living in rural areas is a strong predictor of being 'not at all worried' about mugging and 
attack, but not rape or insult. 
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Table 14: Demographic predictors of 'not at all worried' about property crime 
(significant only) 
Burglary Theft of vehicle Theft from vehicle Card fraud 
Being not married Living in rural areas Being aged 60+ Income <f 5K 
Being aged 60+ Being male Neighbours help each 
other 
Income E5-15K 
Living in rural areas House unoccupied <3 
hours 
House unoccupied <3 
hours 
Being aged 60+ 
Living in rented property Living in rented property 
Being male Smoker in household 
Neighbours help each 
other 
Income EI 5-20K 
Mixed neighbourhood House unoccupied <3 
hours 
Smoker in household Rarely drinking alcohol 
Table 15: Demographic predictors of 'not at all worried' about personal crime 
(significant only) 
Mugging Attack Rape Insult 
Being male Being male Being male Being male 
Living in rural areas Being aged 60+ Being aged 60+ Being aged 60+ 
Mixed neighbourbood Living in rural areas Being aged 30-59 Neighbours help each 
other 
Neighbours help each 
other 
Mixed neighbourhood Being not married In good health 
Being not married Neighbours help each 
other 
House unoccupied <3 
hours 
Secondary education 
Living in urban areas Being aged 30-59 Mixed neighbourhood Smoker in household 
2 adults in household Living in urban areas Higher education 
Secondary education Drink alcohol often 
Smoker in household 
6.5 Demographic predictors of victimisation 
6.5.1 Bivariate relationships 
6.5.1.1 Respondent demographics 
Respondent demographics, particularly gender and age, were more strongly associated 
with personal crimes than with property crimes. Gender was related to victimisation of 
personal crime (mugging, attack and sexual attack) and card fraud only; women were 
more likely to be victims of mugging and sexual attack, but men were significantly 
more likely to be victims of attack and card fraud. The association between gender and 
victimisation was strongest for sexual attack. Age was significantly related to 
victimisation of all crimes, and, generally speaking, likelihood of victimisation 
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decreases with age. The association between age and victimisation was stronger for 
attack and sexual attack. Marital status was significantly related to all crimes except 
vehicle crimes. For burglary and personal crime, those who are not married are more 
likely to become victims. In contrast, for card fraud, the association was reversed, 
suggesting that victims of card fraud are more likely to be married. 
6.5.1.2 Household demographics 
Household characteristics were more strongly related to victimisation of personal crimes 
than of property crimes. Type of tenancy was significantly related to victimisation of 
all crimes. Generally speaking, those in rented accommodation were more likely to be 
victimised. However, for card fraud it was those who owned their property who were 
more likely to be victimised. For all crimes, those living in homes with no children 
were the least victimised. Association between victimisation and the number of 
children in the household was not significant for card fraud and mugging, but strong and 
significant for sexual attack and attack. The number of adults in the household was 
significantly related to all crimes except card fraud. For burglary and personal crime, 
those living alone were more likely to be victimised. For vehicle crimes (theft of and 
from), the chances of victimisation increased with the number of adults in the 
household. 
6.5.1.3 Area demographics 
The relationships between area characteristics and victimisation were of varying 
significance. For example, perception of the neighbourhood was significantly related to 
victimisation of all crimes except card fraud and theft of vehicle. Those who said that 
their neighbours 'go their own way' were more likely to be victims, and the association 
was stronger for attack and sexual attack. Area type, on the other hand, was 
significantly related to all crimes except for card fraud and sexual attack. Those living 
in urban centres and inner cities were more likely to be victims of crime, and the 
association was stronger for vehicle theft and burglary. However, none of the area 
characteristics were significantly related to card fraud victimisation. 
6.5.1.4 Socio-economic characteristics 
Socio-economic characteristics had mixed relationships with victimisation. Income 
proved to be more significant than education history, and both factors were most 
stronRly associated with card fraud victimisation. Education was significantly 
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associated with victimisation of theft of a vehicle, card fraud and attack. For vehicle 
theft and attack, those who were more educated were less likely to become victims but 
for card fraud the reverse was true. The association was significantly stronger for card 
fraud. 
Income was significantly related to all crimes except theft of a vehicle and mugging. 
For burglary, attack and sexual attack, association between income and victimisation 
was negative - those with lower household incomes were more likely to be victimised. 
For theft from a vehicle and card fraud, however, it was those on higher incomes who 
were significantly more likely to become victims. Income was more strongly associated 
with victimisation of card fraud and attack. Interestingly, the ability to manage on the 
household income was positively associated with victimisation of all crimes except card 
fraud. Those who were managing better on their income were generally less likely to 
become victims of crime, but it was those who were managing well and saving who 
were most likely to become victims of card fraud. The association was stronger for 
attack and sexual attack. 
6.5.1.5 Health and lifestyle characteristics 
Health and lifestyle factors were not strongly or consistently related to victimisation. 
Good general health, regular alcohol consumption, and being away from the house 
during the day were more strongly associated with card fraud victimisation than 
victimisation of the other crimes. Indeed, the healthy and active respondents were more 
likely to become victims of card fraud. 
6.5.1.6 Summary 
The modal victim of theft from a vehicle and card fraud is male, aged 30-59 and 
married. He lives with his partner in property which they own, in an urban area. He 
lives comfortably (and managing to save) on a higher income and is educated to Further 
level. He is healthy and leads an active lifestyle. The modal victim of attack is also 
male and aged 30-59 but is not married and lives alone in rented property. He is getting 
by on a reasonably high income and is educated to Further level. He is active and 
healthy and regularly smokes and consumes alcohol. 
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The modal victim of burglary is female, aged 30-59 and not married. She shares rented 
accommodation with a friend/housemate. She is managing well on a good income and 
is educated to Secondary level only. 
The modal victim of sexual attack is also female, aged between 30-59 and not married. 
Living in rented accommodation with a child but no partner, she is getting by on a lower 
income. She is active and in good health and regularly smokes and consumes alcohol. 
6.5.2 Logistic Regression models 
As for the worry data, logistic regression was used to build models for victimisation of 
crimes, using the demographic variables as independent factors. The models are 
presented in Tables 16 and 17. Again, only significant predictors are shown in these 
tables and they are ordered by strength of association (the strongest predictor at the top). 
For the property crimes, age (being younger) was consistently one of the strongest 
predictors of victimisation. Household characteristics and area factors were also 
significantly associated with property crime victimisation. For card fraud and burglary, 
living in rented accommodation was a strong predictor of victimisation and for vehicle 
crime the number of adults in the household (3+) and the area type (inner city/urban) 
were more strongly associated. It should be noted that for card fraud, only age (being 
younger) and living in rented accommodation were significantly associated with 
victimisation. 
Income was associated with vehicle crime victimisation generally but there was an 
interesting difference between the models for theft of a vehicle and theft from a vehicle. 
For theft of a vehicle, having an income of less than F-5K was a predictor of 
victimisation. In contrast, having a high income (L20K+) was associated with having 
had something stolen from a vehicle. This may be explained by the fact that those on 
lower incomes are less able to secure their vehicles, leaving them vulnerable to theft, 
whereas those on higher incomes, although more likely to have secure vehicles, are 
more likely to have desirable possessions (mobile phones, car stereos, valuables) inside 
the car. 
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For the personal crimes, gender and education were associated with victimisation, and 
for mugging and attack health/lifestyle factors were also significant. For mugging and 
sexual attack, being female was a strong predictor of victimisation, but for attack being 
male was associated with victimisation. Being young was a strong predictor of being a 
victim of attack and sexual attack, but age was not significantly associated with 
becoming a victim of mugging. 
Table 16: Demographic predictors of property crime victimisation (significant 
only) 
Burglary Theft of vehicle Theft from vehicle Card Fraud 
In difficulty on income Age 16-29 Age 16-29 Age 16-29 
Renting property Age 30-59 Age 30-59 Age 30-59 
Age 16-29 3+ adults in household Income f20K+ Renting property 
I adult in household Income <5K Living in inner city 
Neighbours go own way Living in inner city In difficulty on income 
Smoker in household Living in urban area 3+ adults in household 
Living in urban area 
Further education 
Renting property 
House unoccupied 3+ 
hours 
Table 17: Demographic predictors of personal crime victimisation (significant 
only) 
Mugging/robbery Attack Sexual attack 
In bad health Age 16-29 Age 16-29 
Being female Age 30-59 Being female 
Higher education Not married Age 30-59 
Not married Being male Higher education 
Renting property In difficulty on income Further education 
Smoker in household I+ children in household 
Smoker in household 
In bad health 
Further education 
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6.6 Relationships between worry and victimisation 
6.6.1 Is worry related to victimisation (individual crimes)? 
For each individual crime, victims of each specific crime are significantly more likely to 
be worried about that crime. So, for example, victims of burglary are more likely to be 
'very worried' about burglary than non-victims of burglary (42% compared with 18%). 
Similarly, non-victims are more likely to be 'not at all worried, about the crime (for 
burglary 9% of non-victims and 5% of victims arenot at all worried'). In terms of 
strength of association, theft of a vehicle, card fraud and sexual attack victimisation are 
most strongly related to worry about that crime (see appendix 7). 
Table 18: Distribution and dispersion of worry for victims and non-victims of 
each crime 
Victims Non Victims 
w Wý W) (0ý w rA W1 ýn 
110 eq 
P" 0: /-ý, 0 "a: % . -0 
Burglary 1 1.9 . 79 . 72 -. 
38 2 2.3 . 76 . 56 -. 74 
(. 11) (. 22) (. 02) (. 04) 
Theft of vehicle 1 1.7 . 72 
1.03 . 29 2 
2.4 . 84 . 07 -. 
84 
(. 13) (. 26L 
_ 
(. 02L (. 04) 
Theft from 2 2.1 . 77 . 
41 -. 58 3 2.5 . 78 -. 
03 -. 73 
vehicle G (. 04) 
Card fraud 1 1.9 . 80 . 73 -. 
41 3 2.6 1.00 . 04 
1.06 
(. 17) (. 03) (. 06) 
Mugging 3 2.3 . 89 . 
11 -. 99 3 2.6 . 88 -. 
21 -. 85 
(. 11) (. 02) (. 04) 
Attack 3 2.5 . 95 -. 
05 -1.01 3 2.6 . 96 -. 
22 -. 96 
(. 09) (. 18) (. 04) 
Sexual attack 1 2.2 1.15 . 28 -1.25 
4 2.9 1.28 -. 60 -1.10 
(. 27) (. 54) (. 02) 
_ 
(. 04) 
Looking at Table 18, we can see that the victims of card fraud have similar worry 
distributions to the victims of the other property crimes - they are more clustered around 
the top end of the worry scale and more likely to be very worried. Victims of mugging 
and attack are less worried than victims of property crime, differing little from their 
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non-victim counterparts in worry levels and variance across levels. Rape victims, 
however, are considerably more worried than non-victims but, interestingly, more 
dispersed across worry levels than the victims of the other crimes. 
6.6.2 Are the victims of one crime more worried about other crimes? 
If we compare victimisation with all worries (so, for example, are victims of burglary 
more worried about mugging? ), three interesting relationships emerge which point 
towards a possible alliance between card fraud and rape/sexual attack: 
a) Card fraud victimisation is only significantly related to worry about card fraud 
itself and rape. 
b) Victimisation of sexual attack and card fraud are not significantly related to 
worry about property crimes. 
c) Worry about card fraud is significantly related to victimisation of card fraud, 
theft from vehicle, mugging and attack. 
In addition, there is a possible further relationship between the personal crimes and card 
fraud which, although not significant using the measures of association here, may prove 
to be interesting on further investigation. Card fraud victimisation, as we have seen, is 
not significantly related to worry about personal crimes (except rape). Although 
statistically insignificant, it is worth noting that the gamma values for worry about 
mugging and insult are positive, indicating a reduction in worry rather than an increase. 
Similarly, victimisation of attack and sexual attack are positively (although, again, not 
significantly) associated with worry about card fraud, indicating a decrease in worry. 
These initial findings are interesting from two perspectives. Firstly, from the card fraud 
victims' perspective, property crime victimisation is generally not significantly related 
to worry about rape, so one needs to ask why the card fraud victims are more worried 
about rape. What makes card fraud victims more worried about rape than the victims 
of, say, burglary and vehicle crime? Similarly, why are the victims of card fraud and 
sexual attack not significantly more worried about property crime generally? Secondly, 
from the perspective of the card fraud worriers - why are victims of theft from a vehicle 
and mugging specifically more worried about card fraud? And why are the victims of 
attack significantly less worried about card fraud? 
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Logistic regression was again used to construct models of worry about crimes (worried 
vs. not worried) using the demographic variables and victimisation for all crimes as 
independent variables. The results (shown in Tables 19 and 20) show that previous 
victimisation (in the last year) is a strong predictor of worry about property crime but 
has no significant effect on worry about personal crime (except for being insulted which 
is strongly associated with being a victim of sexual attack). Indeed, for all four property 
crimes, being a victim of that crime is more strongly associated with worry than any 
other factor. For attack, mugging and rape, being female, young and living in the inner 
city remain the strongest predictors of worry. 
The logistic regression models throw some light on the questions raised at the stage of 
bivariate analysis, in particular the curious relationship between card fraud victimisation 
and worry about rape. It seems that the victims of card fraud are more likely to be 
younger and many are female, and since it is those people who are most likely to be 
very worried about rape it is arguable that the relationship is simply a product of the 
effect of age and gender. If one looks at the model for worry about rape (which includes 
demographic and victimisation variables), victimisation does not feature as a significant 
predictor of worry; age and gender remain most greatly associated with worry. This 
suggests that it is, indeed, age and gender which links the card fraud victims with high 
levels of worry about rape. Therefore, based on this model at least, we cannot say that 
that it is the victimisation that is associated with worry about card fraud, independent of 
all other factors. 
The model for worry about card fraud (including victimisation) also raises an interesting 
issue. Being a victim of attack significantly reduces worry about card fraud, controlling 
for the effect of age and gender (young males are most likely to be victims of attack). 
So we cannot simply say that those who are not worried about card fraud are not 
worried simply by virtue of the fact that they are young males; similarly, we cannot say 
that non victims are more worried because they are female or older. It may be that there 
are other factors in play (not picked up in this model) but the important point is that this 
is a unique feature to the card fraud model. 
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Table 19: Predictors of worry about property crime (demographics and 
victimisation, significant only) 
Burglary Theft of vehicle Theft from vehicle Card Fraud 
Burglary victim Theft of vehicle victim Theft of vehicle victim Card fraud victim 
Married/de facto Theft from vehicle victim Theft from vehicle victim Not a victim of attack 
Income <f5K Living in inner city Income <f 5K Married/de facto 
Living in inner city Income <f5K Living in inner city Owning property 
Being aged 16-29 Married/de facto Being aged 16-29 
Being aged 30-59 Income f 15 K- 20K Being aged 30-59 
Owning property Income E5K -I 5K Living in urban area 
Income f5K- I 5K Being aged 16-29 Income f 5K- I 5K 
Secondary education Living in urban area No children in household 
Further education Secondary education Smoker in household 
No smoker in household Being female Income E15K - 20K 
Smoker in household Further education 
Rarely drinking alcohol 
Table 20: Predictors of worry about personal crime (demographic and 
victimisation) (significant only) 
Mugging Attack Rape Insult 
Being female Being female Being female Sexual attack victim 
Living in inner city Income < f5K Being aged 16-29 Being female 
Income <f5K Living in inner city Being aged 30-59 Being aged 16-29 
In difficulty on income Further education In difficulty on income Income <f5K 
Getting by on income In difficulty on income Living in inner city Living in inner city 
3+ adults in household Secondary education Secondary education Being aged 30-59 
Living in urban area Being aged 16-29 Getting by on income Being in bad health 
Further education Getting by on income Income f 5K - 15K Income f 5K -I 5K 
Income f 15K - 20K 3+ adults in household Further education Further education 
Income f 5K -I 5K Income f5K -15K Income fI 5K - 20K 
Getting by on income 
Rarely drinking alcohol Being aged 30-59 Living in urban areas 
No children in household Income fI 5K - 20K 
Secondary education Neighbours go own way 
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Conclusion 
To summarise, then, the feasibility test for the introduction of card fraud to the BCS was 
a success. Perhaps the most interesting theme to emerge from the data was the fact that 
card fraud does seem to behave differently to the other BCS crimes. Worry about card 
fraud has weak associations with the other worries and seems to have different 
relationships with the demographic variables to the other worries. Similarly, the victims 
of card fraud are quite different in terms of their demographic characteristics and their 
worries about crime to the victims of other crimes. The implications of the results 
presented in this chapter are discussed in chapter seven where we consider what the 
findings tell us about both the fear of crime and plastic card fraud itself. 
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7. Discussion and conclusions: What does plastic card fraud 
tell us about the fear of crime? 
Introduction 
In this chapter, I take a step forward and consider what plastic card fraud might actually 
tell us about the fear of crime. I begin by summarising the results presented in the 
previous chapter, emphasising in particular the findings relating to card fraud. I 
conclude that that incorporating card fraud into an understanding of worry about crime 
entails a reconsideration of the central question of this thesis: what makes one crime 
differentftom another? What has become clear is that card fraud does not behave like 
other property crimes. It is clearly different in terms of its relationships with other 
worries, experience of crime and demographic factors. This suggests that there is 
something different about card fraud: something more complex which forces us to look 
beyond the nature of the act, the contact with the perpetrator and the nature of the harm. 
In the next section I consider how the findings relating to card fraud might inform a 
broader theoretical framework for the fear of crime. I begin by considering previous 
explanatory models which have highlighted the importance of vulnerability. In the 
discussion which follows, I suggest that the key issue which is yet to be considered in 
depth is that of seriousness; what makes one crime more serious than another crime in 
the eyes of the potential victim? 
This leads me to ask what has become exposed and violated in the event of a criminal 
victimisation? I will argue that crime is essentially a violation of autonomy. Working 
from the perspective that it is an individual's autonomy which may be exposed to harm 
and thus is in need of preservation, I intend to illustrate that vulnerability can be 
understood within a broader framework of well-being. 
I conclude by returning to the question of what card fraud can tell us about the fear of 
crime. Using card fraud as an explanatory tool, I illustrate how we can move towards 
understanding fear by interpreting it within the framework of autonomy. I have shown 
that people do worry about card fraud and, in this final chapter, I attempt to provide an 
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explanation of that worry. I intend to show that the most compelling explanation is the 
suggestion that people are actually worried about having their Information 'stolen' or 
misused. I analyse the value which is attached to information and suggest that 
information may be valued intrinsically as part of an individual's self perception of 
identity. Thus, personal information is a more important element of an individual's 
autonomy and well being than one might think. 
Primarily, the anchor and focus of this thesis is the fear of crime, or more specifically 
the challenge of measurement of the phenomenon. At the end of this final chapter, on 
reflection, it might appear that the thesis is about a number of other things - white collar 
crime, fraud, technological crimes, crime surveys and even jurisprudence. The final 
conclusion is intended to pull all of the threads together and clearly state the concluding 
thesis. 
164 
7.1 Summary and discussion of major findings 
7.1.1 Testing the hypotheses 
In chapter five, I stated that card fraud was similar to the other property crimes and thus 
should be included with them in the analysis and testing of hypotheses. However, when 
one works through the sets of hypotheses, it becomes clear that it is often not 
meaningful to include card fraud with the other property crimes. 
Hypotheses Set 1: Testing feasibility 
1.1 Inadequate numbers of respondents report being a victim of crime in the 
last year. 
1.2 Respondents all fall into the non-worried categories. 
Adequate numbers of respondents reported experience of card fraud and respondents 
were distributed across all worry levels (rather than all falling into the not worried 
categories). Therefore we can reject null hypotheses 1.1 and 1.2. 
Hypotheses Set 2: Comparing worry across crimes 
2.1 There is no variation in worry distribution across specific crimes. 
2.2 Worry about property crime is no greater than worry about personal 
crime. 
Worry levels for the property crimes are distributed differently than worry levels for the 
personal crimes, for the property crimes more respondents are concentrated in the 
middle two categories (fairly and not very worried) and for the personal crimes more 
respondents are not worried (not very or not at all). Therefore we can reject the null 
hypotheses 2.1 and 2.2. However, although the distribution of respondents for worry 
about card fraud is shaped like the other property crimes, a larger proportion of 
respondents are not worried about card fraud. 
Hypotheses Set 3: Association between crimes 
3.1 Worry levels for individual crimes are not interrelated. 
3.2 Worry about property crime is not associated with worry about personal 
crime. 
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Worries are inter-related but, although significant, the association between worries is 
not very strong. Worries about personal crimes have stronger associations with other 
crimes. Therefore, we can reject the null hypotheses 3.1 and 3.2. However, worry about 
card fraud has a particularly weak association with other crimes. 
Hypotheses Set 4: Demographic predictors of worry and victimisation 
4.1 Worry is not related to demographic variables. 
4.2 Victimisation is not related to demographic variables 
Worry is related to demographic variables but these variables alone do not explain 
worry. For worry about property crimes, age, area and income are stronger predictors; 
for the personal crimes, age and area are also important factors but gender is stronger. 
Therefore we can reject the null hypothesis 4.1. However, for worry about card fraud, 
demographic factors, although related to worry, were not as predictive of worry as for 
the other crimes. The model for worry about card fraud was unique in terms of size and 
content. 
Experience of crime was also found to be related to demographic factors, although, 
again, victimisation cannot be explained by demographic variables alone. For the 
property crimes, age and the household characteristics were stronger predictors of 
victimisation. For the personal crimes, age, gender and education were more important 
factors. Again, card fraud was distinguishable from the other crimes. For card fraud 
only being younger and living in rented property were significant predictors of 
victimisation. 
Hypotheses set 5: The relationship between worry and victimisation 
5.1 Worry is not related to victimisation (all crimes). 
5.2 Personal crime victimisation does not increase worry about personal crime. 
5.3 Personal crime victimisation does not increase worry about property crime. 
5.4 Property crime victimisation does not increase worry about personal crime. 
5.5 Property crime victimisation does not increase worry about property crime. 
For individual crimes, worry was related to victimisation of that crime. Thus, we can 
reject null hypotheses 5.1. 
Victims of personal crime are significantly more worried about personal crime than 
non-victims (so, we can also reject null hypothesis 5.2). However, personal crime 
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victimisation is not necessarily related to worry about property crime; victims of 
mugging and attack are more worried about property crimes, but the victims of sexual 
attack are not significantly more worried. Similarly, the victims of property crime are 
significantly more worried about mugging and attack but not about rape and being 
insulted. Thus we cannot reject the null hypotheses 5.3 and 5.4. Finally, we can only 
reject null hypothesis 5.5 if card fraud is excluded from our generalisations; victims of 
property crimes are more worried about property crime than non-victims but the victims 
of card fraud are only significantly more worried about card fraud and rape. 
7.1.2 Discussion 
The major finding is that plastic card has performed well as a BCS crime. In short, we 
have enough victims and enough worriers to make meaningful comparisons with the 
other crimes. The data allows us to dispel earlier fears that questions on card fraud 
would tell us nothing substantial about the fear of crime. 
In chapter four, I discussed the problems surrounding the measurement of plastic card 
fraud. It became clear that the main source of data is industry administered and this was 
deemed problematic for two main reasons. Firstly, the industry focuses on a measure of 
losses in monetary terms. This fails to give us an insight into magnitude of the fraud 
problem, obscuring useful data such as the number of frauds carried out, the number of 
victims (and repeat victimisations) and the scale of the losses to individuals. Secondly, 
we are forced to rely upon the various banks and financial institutions to provide 
accurate information about those losses. In publicly admitting a vulnerability to 
fraudsters, these institutions run the real risk of losing customers. Thus, although 
industry data provides a useful picture of the plastic card market, it does not give us 
reliable information about the nature and extent of card related crime. 
The discussion also illustrates that crime based statistics, in the current form of 
Recorded Crime Statistics, serve only to muddy the waters further. A combination of 
recent changes in counting rules and the continued disparity of counting procedures 
across individual forces hinder any productive interpretation of card fraud data and 
trends. Thus, I concluded that chapter with the argument that data -from a victimisation 
survey may go some of the way towards providing an accurate picture of the extent of 
card fraud. 
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At this point, then, it is appropriate to reflect on this argument in the light of the 
findings from the 2000 BCS. The most striking finding is simply the number of card 
fraud victims. As we have seen in chapter six, 2% of respondents reported being a 
victim of card fraud in the last 12 months. That figure takes on a more significant 
meaning when one interprets it in the wider context. Firstly, if one compares that 2% 
with victimisation rates for other crimes, we see that the same proportion of the sample 
reported being a victim of vehicle theft and mugging/robbery. Both crimes feature 
highly in crime prevention priorities and this suggests that card fraud victimisation may 
be a more serious 'crime problem' than previously suspected. Consequently, that card 
fraud victimisation has been found to be so prevalent, we may reconsider the overall 
picture of the extent of card fraud. Whilst only 0.2% of total card turnover is lost to 
fraud each year, and only 3% of offences recorded by the police are cheque and credit 
card related, the fact that 2% of the BCS sample reported victimisation hints at a 
considerable 'dark figure' of card fraud. The implications of this suggestion are 
potentially far reaching. 
In addition, the data allows us to say a little about the characteristics of card holders and 
non card holders. Card ownership is generally a young-middle aged, middle-upper 
class characteristic but, importantly, is not exclusively so. Focusing on these 
characteristics we can draw parallels with the typologies of card user discussed in 
chapter four, distinguishing between those who use cards for borrowing and those who 
use them for convenience/financial management. We must be careful, however, not to 
draw too many conclusions from these findings as we have no way of distinguishing 
between those who use credit cards, debit cards or both. I suggest, therefore, that future 
questions on card fraud should incorporate detailed questions about card type 
ownership. Then, it may be possible to cross match the card user typologies with worry 
levels. 
7.1.21 Worry about cardftaud compared with other crimes 
In terms of distribution, worry levels for card fraud were very similar to worry about the 
other property crimes. Very worried levels for card fraud were surprisingly high and 
the wide dispersion of the respondents suggested an interesting and quite balanced mix 
of worriers and non worriers. The implications of this should not be overlooked. From 
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the perspective of fear of crime reduction (be it prevention or cure), it is not appropriate 
to treat card fraud like its property crime counterparts. For property crimes, the 
majority of respondents have moderate worries, sitting on the fence between worried 
and not worried, and of the remainder more are very worried. In contrast, for personal 
crimes, fewer respondents are in the middle worry categories, and more are not at all 
worried. Thus, it may be possible to develop strategies for reducing a more common 
fear of property crime and a less common (and thus quite different) fear of personal 
crime. Indeed , in the case of personal crimes, we might learn just as much about 
reducing fear from those who are not worried. To include card fraud with other 
property crimes in such an approach, focusing mainly on the worried respondents, 
would fail to take into account the relatively high proportion of the not at all worried. 
7. ]. Z2 Worry associated with other crimes 
Whilst worry about card fraud had many similarities with the other crimes at a 
descriptive level, it has been shown to have a weak association with the other worries. 
One might expect worries about different crimes to be associated with one another, for 
example it would not be unreasonable to expect those who are particularly worried 
about mugging to also be worried about attack. Indeed, the results show that the 
personal crime worries were more strongly associated with all other crimes; not only 
were personal crimes more strongly inter-related than property crimes, but they were 
also found to be stronger predictors of worry about property crime than property crime 
worriers were of personal crime worries. This suggests that those who are worried 
about personal crime are more likely to be worried about several crimes, or even crime 
generally. In contrast, those who are worried about property crime are less likely to 
have multiple worries. 
Worry about card fraud is generally not strongly associated with other worries but does 
have stronger associations with worry about mugging and attack. Of particular 
significance is the fact that worry about card fraud has the weakest total association with 
other worries. This suggests that worry about card fraud is quite independent from the 
other worries and may have different causes and correlates. Again, in order to develop 
an accurate understanding of worry or fear generally, we should adopt a crime specific 
approach, questioning why some worries are associated and why some are not. 
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7.1.2.3 Demographic predictors of worry 
The relationships between worry about card fraud and the demographic characteristics 
raise a number of important points. 
Firstly, the area characteristics were not strongly related to worry about card fraud. In 
contrast, area characteristics were strongly related to worry about other crimes (more 
strongly so for the property crimes). So, we might say that worry about crime is 
characteristic of those living in towns or cities, but card fraud gives us a quite different 
perspective. At bivariate and multivariate levels, having a high income, owning 
property and being married were strong predictors of worry about card fraud. 
Secondly, socio-economic factors seem to have an interesting effect on worry about 
card fraud. It is not simply the well off who are worried. Whilst those on higher 
incomes are more worried, those who perceive themselves to be managing well (and 
saving) on their income are less likely to be 'very worried'. It seems that those who are 
'getting by' on their income are significantly more likely to be worried. Moreover, 
having an income of between F- 15 -20K is a significant predictor of being both 'very' and 
'not at all' worried. It seems that there is a curious relationship between income and 
worry about card fraud and it would be interesting to know more about the finances of 
the worriers. Future research should explore this issue further. 
Finally, then, perhaps the most interesting finding at the multivariate stage of analysis is 
the difference between the worry models. The models for being 'worried' and 'very 
worried' about card fraud contain fewer significant factors than for the other crimes, 
suggesting that one cannot predict worry about card fraud using the traditional 
demographic factors. In chapter one I discussed the often unconvincing evidence of 
covariates of fear, and highlighted a number of controversial findings relating to many 
of the explanatory variables. The findings here add another dimension to the 
discussion, suggesting that for card fraud we may need to look beyond simple personal, 
household and area characteristics for an explanation of fear. Again, we must conclude 
that a study of fear should be crime specific. 
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7.1.2.4 Victims 
The results also tell us something about the victims of card fraud and how they compare 
with the victims of other crimes. In tenns of demographics, the victims of card fraud 
are different in several ways. 
Household and area characteristics are not significantly related to card fraud 
victimisation. More important are the respondent's personal characteristics, socio- 
economic status and health and lifestyle. In contrast to the victims of the other crimes, 
card fraud victims are more likely to be male, unmarried, well educated, well off and 
healthy and active. However, we must keep in mind the characteristics of the card 
holders themselves - we have seen that they tend to be younger, middle-upper class and 
often married females, but not exclusively so. It is significant, therefore, that the 
multivariate model for card fraud victimisation contains only two significant factors - 
being young and living in rented property, when all other variables are controlled for. 
In terins of crime prevention, it seems that card fraudsters do not discriminate against 
certain types or individuals. Accordingly, all card users are at risk of victimisation. 
Crucial, then, must be the element of exposure. Risk is likely to be increased by 
frequent or careless card use and these are the features of vulnerability, rather than, say, 
physical ability or frailty. 
The implications of this become evident when we consider the relationships between 
worry and victimisation. The victims of card fraud are considerably more worried about 
card fraud than non victims, suggesting that direct experience of the crime has a 
significant effect on the victim. Indeed, when victimisation is included in the worry 
model, it is the most significant predictor, controlling for all other variables. Why'not 
being a victim of attack' features as a strong predictor remains unclear. 
We must be careful to untangle the appearance of a relationship between card fraud and 
the personal crimes (especially rape). Of particular interest is the finding that card fraud 
victims are significantly more worried about rape (and no other crime, except card 
fraud). Looking at the other crimes, it is only the victims of personal crimes who are 
significantly more worried about rape. Generally speaking, the victims of personal 
crimes are young and female; for attack the victims are more likely to 
be male and the 
association with worry about rape is less strong. Age, of course, 
has been shown to be a 
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strong predictor of card fraud victimisation. Those who are worried about rape are 
significantly more likely to be female and young and, when victimisation of all crimes 
is entered into the worry about rape model, these factors remain strong and card fraud 
victimisation is not significant. Worry about rape, then, is associated with being young 
and female, rather than being a victim of card fraud. 
The victims of card fraud and sexual attack are the only victims who are not 
significantly more worried about property crimes. In both cases, the victims are more 
likely to be young and, generally speaking, age, although a significant predictor, is a 
less important predictor of worry about property crime than income and area 
characteristics. 
7.2 Reconsidering the fear of crime 
7.2.1 The conceptual development of worry about property crime. 
We can conclude that incorporating card fraud into an understanding of worry about 
crime involves a great deal more thought than simply adding it to the list of existing 
crimes. If we recall, in chapter five, I attempted to identify what makes one crime 
differentfrom another? The natural way to proceed, I argued, was to separate property 
crimes from personal crimes, and identify the distinguishing features. 
I discussed how property crimes are different to personal crimes in terms of the nature 
of the act itself (what is harmed? ), the intention of the perpetrator (relating to the nature 
of the contact with the victim) and the nature of the harm (the effect of the crime on the 
victim). A victim's experience of property crime is likely to be quite different from an 
experience of Personal crime; contact with the perpetrator is not an essential feature and 
the post-crime implications are associated with the process of replacing the property. In 
contrast, the victim of personal crime suffers personal harm that is inflicted by the 
perpetrator directly and is likely to suffer physical and psychological effects as a result 
of that act. According to this framework, card fraud can be categorised as a property 
crime. 
I moved on to explore the differences between fear of property crime and fear of 
personal crime. Previous work has shown that property crime evokes different reactions 
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than personal crime and I chose to focus on the following four propositions which 
formed an analytical framework: 
1. Property crime evokes different reactions than does personal crime (LaGrange 
and Ferraro 1987). 
2. Property crime is more common than personal crime. Thus people are more 
worried about becoming victims of property crime (Skogan 1987). 
3. Personal crime victimisation increases the fear of personal and property crime, 
but property crime victimisation only increases the fear of property crime 
(Rountree 1998). 
4. The most serious crimes do not necessarily generate the highest fear (LaGrange 
and Ferraro 1987). 
What has become clear is that card fraud does not behave like the other property crimes. 
It is clearly different in terms of its relationships with other worries, experience of crime 
and demographic factors. This suggests that there is something different about card 
fraud - something more complex than simply the nature of the act, the contact with the 
perpetrator and the nature of the harm. In this sense, card fraud brings a new 
perspective to the fear of crime. The interesting question which arises is: wh do some Y 
people worry about cardftaud? We have already seen (in chapter four) that individuals 
rarely suffer financial loss in the event of fraud, it is usually the retailer or the financial 
institution which bears the risk. It seems that there are two possible explanations for 
this apparent paradox: either cardholders are under the misconception that they, as 
individuals, are liable for the cost of the fraud, or they are worried about some other 
aspect of the crime, something beyond the simple loss of money. 
Card fraud, then, gives us a different dimension to the fear of crime, and this challenges 
us to think further about the complex relationships between explanatory variables and 
dimensions of fear. As we have seen in chapter one, a variety of explanatory 
frameworks have been imposed on the fear of crime in the past. The relationships 
between fear and the various demographic variables (at individual, area and societal 
levels) remain, at best, uncertain and only a few commentators have channelled their 
efforts into a developing a broader explanatory framework which allows for variance 
between individuals. In the next section I consider how the findings relating to card 
fraud might inform a broader theoretical framework. 
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7.2.2 Towards a broader theoretical framework: fear, risk and 
vulnerability 
'The task for research is now to specify more clearly the determinants of perceived risk, 
crime seriousness and sensitivity' (Hale 1996, p. 110) 
Warr (1984,1985,1987) proposes two different models of fear which he argues are 
closely related but built on two different units of analysis - crimes and individuals. In 
the first, the Multiplicative Model, fear is based on two perceptual characteristics of the 
offence (perceived seriousness and perceived risk). An offence may be viewed as both 
serious and likely. Fear, then, is a multiplicative function of the two. The second 
model, the Sensitivity Model, focuses on the individual - on perceived risk, and 
sensitivity to that risk. Sensitivity to risk, according to Warr (1984,1987), consists of 
two elements: the perceived seriousness of the offence, and vulnerability. He argues 
that sensitivity is the key to understanding why individuals from two groups will not 
display equal fear when confronted with equal levels of apparent risk. 
Figure 1: Warr's Multiplicative and Sensitivity Models (Warr 1984,1985,1987). 
MULTIPLICATIVE MODEL 
Perceived risk 
+ 
Perceived seriousness of the offence 
SENSITIVITY MODEL 
Perceived risk 
+ 
Sensitivity 
(perceived seriousness +vulnerability) 
Warr himself acknowledges the overlap between the two: 
'The reader may now see a fundamental link between the multiplicative and sensitivity 
models of fear. Under the multiplicative model, the fear associated with any offense is 
determined by the perceived risk and perceived seriousness of that offense. Under the 
sensitivity model, fear is determined by the perceived risk and the sensitivity to risk 
for 
that offense. Holding age and sex constant, however, the major determinant of 
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sensitivity to risk for any offense is the perceived seriousness of that offense. Hence the 
models can be reduced to the same variables' (Warr 1985, p. 244). 
However, he maintains that a distinction between the two is useful. Both models 
incorporate differences in fear from one crime to another, but the sensitivity model 
allows one to go a step further and analyse differences in fear between groups (e. g. men 
and women). Thus, the sensitivity model is a more general and united framework for 
analysing the fear of victimisation and the multiplicative model is useful when you 
simply want to understand why 'offence x is feared more that offence y in city z' (Warr 
1987, p. 42). Sensitivity explains the relationship between fear and risk, and so behaves 
as a variable in its own right. But he fails to make a convincing attempt to explain in 
detail what sensitivity is constructed of, and how it can be measured. It seems that 
central to the sensitivity model is the concept of vulnerability but there are few clues as 
to what that might mean. 
Indeed, the concept of vulnerability is one of those terms which has been bobbing at the 
surface of the pool of explanations for fear for many years, yet no one has really fished 
it out and had a good look. Hale posits that, '[a]ny model trying to explain fear will 
include some notion of vulnerability' (Hale 1996, p. 97). However, at a conceptual level 
vulnerability has not been convincingly developed beyond that level of a 'notion'. In 
most existing research, "vulnerability" has been measured through sex and age as proxy 
variables, with women and the elderly being deemed the most vulnerable groups. A 
few studies have also addressed more specifically the respondent's ability to flee or 
resist in the case of an attack and this ability has been used as an indicator of 
vulnerability (Killias 1991). 
Undoubtedly, it is Killias who has ventured furthest in the development of an analytical 
framework of vulnerability. He argues that vulnerability is a product of three factors; 
exposure to non-negligible risk, the seriousness of the consequences of victimisation, 
and the perceived ability to control or protect oneself (Killias 1990). Each of these 
dimensions is related to a combination of physical, social and situational factors. Killias' 
model shares the two essential features of Warr's Sensitivity Model (how 
likely a 
victimisation is and how bad/serious it would be). However, Killiasthird 
factor, 
control, is the important distinction. 
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Unfortunately, the weakness in Killias' model is that it fails to unpack the relationship 
between control and vulnerability. He chooses to focus on measures of an individual's 
ability to escape or resist a physical attack, identifying a person's size (weight and 
height), health status, household and area characteristics, self confidence and likely 
vulnerability in the case of a hypothetical attack as key variables. Control is assumed to 
be the ability to protect oneself from physical harm; it assumes that it is only the threat 
of physical harm which makes a person feel vulnerable. If vulnerability is, as Killias 
himself argues, the key to understanding disproportionate fear levels among different 
groups, to exclude property crime from the analytic framework of vulnerability is a 
nonsense. For example, it may be appropriate to focus on physical harm in the context 
of explaining women's disproportionate fear of rape but not in the context of explaining 
men's higher fear of vehicle theft. Control in the first of these contexts may be 
construed as being the ability to run away or fight back in the event of a physical attack. 
But in the second, the ability to control victimisation, may rest more heavily on the 
means to insure and secure the vehicle. It would be wrong to assume that vulnerability 
amounted to the same thing in both circumstances. 
Figure 2: Killias' model of vulnerability. 
Key factors 
Physical 
Social 
Situational 
E::: ý 
7.2.3 The emergence of a new model 
Dimensions of threat 
Exposure to risk 
+ 
Seriousness of consequences 
+ 
Loss of control of risk and/or 
outcome 
Warr, then, produces a well structured model of fear, but it is incomplete in that it fails 
to define what is meant by vulnerability. Killias' attempt to fill the gap, whilst 
commendable, ultimately falls short because he does not consider exactly what 
it is we 
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wish to control. An attempt was made in this study to develop a new model of fear 
incorporating the strengths of the models by: 
a) using the crime specific approach of Warr's Sensitivity Model 
b) using Killias' concept of vulnerability, expanding on the idea of control. 
Figure 3: Emergent model of fear 
7 37- 
THE OFFENCE THE INDIVIDUAL 
Perceived risk (likelihood) Ability to control risk 
Perceived seriousness Ability to control seriousness 
llý" 
The model shown in Figure 3 illustrates how the two models fit together to form a 
broader framework based on vulnerability. Elements from both models are clearly 
identifiable but are combined to forrn a model which is both offence specific, and 
focused on the individual's ability to control. An individual's vulnerability consists of 
two separate (but inextricably linked) elements - the perception of both him/herself, and 
of the offence. Both perceptions are based on two further elements - risk and 
seriousness. Risk can be understood in this context to simply mean the perceived 
likelihood of the offence occurring. What becomes clear is that, when stripped down to 
the nuts and bolts, our problem lies in the fact that the meaning of 'seriousness' is 
unclear. 
Pursuit of this idea of 'seriousness' eventually leads us back to the question of what 
makes one crime differentfrom another? In order to provide an answer, we must 
consider the following question: In the event of a criminal victimisation, what has 
become exposed and violated? In this section I will argue that crime is essentially a 
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violation of autonomy. Working from the perspective that it is an individual's autonomy 
which may be exposed to harm and thus is in need of preservation, I intend to illustrate 
that vulnerability can be understood within a broader framework of well-being. 
Much of the work which has been done on the concept of autonomy has been in the 
field of philosophy. Thus it is necessary to begin construction of an analytical 
framework at a philosophical level and build up the framework in the context of the fear 
of crime at the next stage. At the philosophical level, I draw from the work of Alan 
Gewirth 60 . Primarily, Gewirth is concerned with the epistemological and philosophical 
debates surrounding theories of morality and ethics and I will not be providing an in 
depth analysis of his work. Indeed, I do not even strive to reach out to the boundaries of 
his extensive enterprise. Rather, I intend to focus on his conceptualisation of autonomy 
and well-being and develop these ideas in the context of fear of crime. 
Our starting point must surely be a definition of autonomy. Literally, 'autonomy' means 
being a law (nomos) unto oneself (auto), or setting one's law for oneself. For Gewirth, 
autonomy is the ability to act independently towards the achievement of self 
selected goals. Thus it is the notion of action which is central to his theory. 
Achieve 
Actions 
Facilitate 
I 
Goals I 
Figure 4: Gewirth's model of Autonomy 
60 Alan Gewirth is a Professor of Philosophy at the University of Chicago 
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7.2-3.1 The importance of goals 
Gewirth emphasises that an individual can only be said to be autonomous if s/he is able 
to act in order to attain something s/he regards as 'good v61 . Crucially, autonomous action 
must be 
a) purposeful, 
b) voluntary and 
C) valuational. 
So, each individual constructs an intricate web of goals or purposes (which apply to the 
immediate or distant future) and attaches a different level of value to each one. It 
follows, then, that different individuals have different priorities and different value 
systems. Any threat to purposiveness or freedom (a and b above), then, is a threat to an 
individual's control over his/her own autonomy, 
'[h]e not only controls his behaviour, but he wants to control it with a view to such 
attainment, so that any threat to this control is perceived as a threat to his getting what 
he regards as good' (Gewirth 1978 p. 52). 
So, it could be argued that, in the event of a criminal victimisation, it is an individual's 
autonomy that is violated. Different sorts of violation will be considered more or less 
severe, according to the value attached to the purposive action by the individual. The 
value will depend on two things: the value of the goal and the nature of the action. 
7.2.3.2 Value of the goal 
How serious a violation of autonomy is will depend upon the value attached to the 
ultimate goal or purpose of an individual's acts. According to Gewirth, goals must 
be 
worth pursuing and worth constitutes avaluing'on the part of the individual. 
So, if you 
choose to do an action, you attach value to attaining it by applying whatever criteria you 
think appropriate. These criteria may be wide-ranging, from momentarily gratifying 
reasons to more extensive and long-range social goals. Importantly, goals can 
be either 
wanting something for its own sake (intrinsic) or wanting it as a means to getting 
something else (instrumental). 
61 Even if the 'good' is merely the performance of the task 
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The achievement of goals is facilitated by conditions which Gewirth calls 'goods'. 
'Goods' in this sense are not necessarily items of tangible property but are generic 
features which characterise or facilitate autonomous action. So, for example, 
membership of my local video club is a'good'- I could not rent videos if I were not a 
member. Similarly, I want to finish my thesis as soon as possible but I cannot write 
while I am asleep, so being awake is a'good'for my goal. 
Gewirth argues that there are three types of goods which are all necessarily involved in 
all purposive action; 
1. Basic goods 
2. Nonsubtractive goods 
3. Additive goods 
Basic goods are the preconditions of purposive action and consist of those things 
necessary to maintain physical integrity, mental 'equilibrium' and a general feeling of 
confidence as to the possibility of attaining one's goals. So, basic goods could be items 
such as food, clothing and shelter or conditions such as knowing how to cook or the 
ability to communicate with other people. Non-subtractive goods are goods which you 
already have and regard as good, thus you wish to retain them (to lose them is to have 
one's level of purpose-fulfilment lowered). For example, a man who cycles to work 
everyday so as to avoid traffic congestion (and get to work quicker) is going to have his 
level of purpose fulfilment lowered if his bike is stolen. In contrast, additive goods are 
gained when one acts for a purpose and gains something which one considers to be 
good (thus one increases one's level of purpose-fulfilment). So, someone who opens a 
credit card account to help pay for Christmas presents gains an additive good. As 
Beyleveld and Brownsword (1994) note, basic goods take precedence over non- 
subtractive goods which take precedence over additive goods. 
Each of the three types is involved in the value judgements that express one's view of 
the goodness of the purpose for which one acts. Gewirth argues that when 
purposiveness is extended to the general conditions required for success 
in achieving 
one's purposes, it becomes a more extensive condition which he calls 
'well-being', 
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'Viewed from the standpoint of action, then, well-being consists in having the various 
substantive conditions and abilities ranging from life and physical integrity to self- 
esteem and education, that are required if a person is to act either at all or with general 
chances of success in achieving the purposes for which he acts. ' (Gewirth 1983, p. 15) 
So, in its basic form, autonomy is simply the ability to act independently towards the 
achievement of self selected goals. Any threat to an individual's ability to control 
his/her autonomy is likely to result in exposure to some degree. As soon as one begins 
to consider what actually happens in the event of a violation (what harm is done and 
what effect it has) one must broaden the perspective to encompass a sense of well- 
being. The seriousness of the harm and the seriousness of its consequences can only be 
assessed in the context of the value attached to the goals and actions. Some goals will 
be more essential/valuable than others and thus violation of autonomy will be deemed to 
be more serious. 
7.2.3.3 Nature of the action 
I have argued so far that different sorts of violation will be considered more or less 
serious, according to the value attached to the purposive action by the individual. We 
have seen that the value will depend on the value attached to the goal and now we move 
on to the second important factor - the nature of the action. 
Every action involves the use of both physical and psychological abilities. An action 
consists of both the physical act itself and the mental state which accompanies it. For 
example, a person walks home from work one night, taking a short cut down a back 
street. The physical act is walking from A to B along the particular route. 
Psychologically, that person feels safe walking down the back street because it is well 
lit. Now, suppose that street was not well lit and that person is afraid of the dark? The 
psychological state which accompanies the act in the latter example is quite 
different. 
Again, how serious a violation of autonomy is will depend upon the value attached to 
the ultimate goal or purpose of an individual's acts. In the example given above, the 
person may still take the short cut despite the fear of the dark, simply 
because s/he is in 
a desperate hurry to get home. The psychological state and the ultimate goal are 
inevitably linked but are distinct. 
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So, there are two elements to all action - the act itself and the state of mind which 
accompanies it. All crimes will affect the act to some degree but it is the effect on the 
psychological state which is distinguishing. The psychological state accompanying the 
act may be based on, 
a) Self preservation (feelings of safety and health) AND/OR 
b) Self fulfilment (feelings of enjoyment/satisfaction) 
Personal crime is more likely to have a greater effect on the first of these states (self 
preservation) and property crime us more likely to have a greater effect on the second 
(self fulfilment). Some examples may help to illustrate this argument. When viewed as 
a violation of autonomy, car theft violates the ability to drive to work every day. The 
act of driving to work is more likely to be accompanied by a strong sense of self- 
fulfilment than self preservation (the car is not essential to your survival and safety). In 
contrast, a mugging is more likely to violate the act at a level of self-preservation (the 
act of simply walking along is probably not likely to be of great fulfilment). 
It is not, however, safe to assume that violation of self-preservation will necessarily be 
more serious than violation of self- fulfilment. Perhaps, however, those crimes which 
effect action at both the self-preservation and the self-fulfilment level will be regarded 
as more serious. This, of course takes us back to the value attached to goal. 
7.23.4 The seriousness of crimes within theframework of autonomy 
The model developed in Figure 3 incorporated the major components of the models of 
Killias and Warr but left open two important questions with regard to the meaning of 
'seriousness'. In terms of the perceived seriousness of the offence, we need to what 
actually happens (what is han-ned) and what effect that event has. 
Seriousness, I suggest, can be interpreted within a framework of autonomy. To 
summarise, looking at Figure 5, crime is a violation of autonomy and, because 
autonomous action is necessarily value laden, a violation of autonomy impinges on an 
individual's well-being. I am suggesting, then, that the fear of crime should be 
examined in the broader context of general well-being. This of course is by no means 
an original suggestion. Several authors have suggested that the fear of crime cannot 
be 
understood unless it is projected onto a broader framework of 'well-being' or'quality of 
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life'. Garofalo and Laub (1978), for example, link the fear of crime to the broader 
concept of quality of life. Quality of life, they argue, may be objective (relating to 
economic and social indicators) and subjective (relating to individual happiness, 
satisfaction and personal well being). 
The perceived seriousness of the offence is determined by the value attached to the goal 
and good by each individual and the nature of the action which is being violated. 
Therefore, by placing crime in the framework of autonomy we should not ask whether it 
is the property or the person which has been violated or harmed - it is the autonomy 
which has been violated. Instead, we must look at the action which is being violated 
and classify the offence according to the nature of that action. 
Figure 5: Autonomy and well-being 
This approach moves us away from the traditional division between property and 
personal crime, but that need not necessarily be a bad thing. It is an age-old problem 
that,, when one attempts to pigeon-hole specific crimes into the property/personal 
categories, grey areas emerge. This is a particular problem in cases such as theft with 
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an additional element (for example violence). Mugging/robbery, for example, is usually 
referred to as a personal crime but has a clear element of property crime (theft) to it. 
Similarly, it is not easy to class burglary as simply a property crime since it may have 
some distinct personal elements to it (victims of burglary often report feelings of being 
personally violated especially when they have been in the house at the time of the 
burglary). Thus, some subtle but important factors may be lost when one abides by the 
classical division. 
7.2.3.5 Summary 
Fundamentally, my ultimate argument in this thesis is that the concept of 'seriousness' is 
the key to answering the question of what makes one crime differentfrom another? 
But, this is only one step to understanding the wider issue of vulnerability. In order to 
move towards a concept of vulnerability, it is necessary to consider how the perceived 
seriousness of an offence relates to risk and control. 
To summarise the discussion so far, I have argued that an individual's vulnerability 
consists of two separate (but inextricably linked) elements - the perception of 
him/herself and the perception of the offence (see Figure 6). Both perceptions are based 
on two further elements - risk and seriousness. The perception of the offence is based 
on the perceived nature of the offence (how likely it is and how serious it would be if it 
happened). The individual's perception of him/herself is based upon his/her ability to 
control both the risk and the seriousness of the offence. 
Moreover, I have suggested that, in order to interpret the perceived seriousness of an 
offence, it is helpful to consider seriousness within a framework of autonomy. An 
individual's perception of seriousness can be determined, at a theoretical level, by 
asking the following questions: 
What is being exposed to violation/harm? 
9 Autonomy: Identify goods, actions and goals. 
2. What effect will the violation/harm have? 
How important is the goal? 
Level of violation: Value of goods? 
Nature of action? 
In terms of the individual's perceived ability to control both the risk and seriousness, we 
need to know both how the individual rates his/her ability to control and 
how important 
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it is to that individual to maintain control over the 'thing' which is likely to be harmed. It 
is not enough to simply ask the individual how s/he rates the ability to resist or protect 
him/herself against the crime. This naturally refers us back to the value attached to 
autonomy and draws us within the boundaries of the concept of well-being. 
Inevitably, the three 'pillars' of seriousness, control and risk are likely to form a 
complex web. An example helps to illustrate how the elements may be inter-linked. If 
we place vehicle theft within a framework of autonomy, the seriousness of the theft (the 
violation) can be interpreted by looking at the nature and the effect of the violation. Let 
us assume that, for one individual, the goal is to be able to move from A to B. The 
action is driving the car and the psychological state relating to the action is probably self 
fulfilment (but there could be an element of self preservation if, for example, the 
individual could not get out to buy food without the car as transport). If the car is stolen, 
the effect of the crime is to prevent the achievement of the goal (via the removal of the 
good - the car). The effect the crime has on the well being of the individual depends on 
the value attached to the goal and good. 
However, high value does not necessarily entail high vulnerability. In order to maintain 
control over the risk of having the car stolen the individual may have security devices 
which are intended to protect the car from theft. In addition, in order to maintain 
control over the seriousness of the offence, the individual may have the car insured. So, 
in the event of a theft, the insurance policy may allow for a quick replacement and the 
individual retains the ability to pursue the overarching goal. Whether or not that 
individual is worried about car theft may depend on how that individual processes the 
individual elements of his/her vulnerability. 
It is not my intention here to explore the ideas of control and risk in much depth, to do 
so would draw us away from the point of the discussion. Instead, I wish to conclude 
this part of the discussion by relating back to the issue of the measurement of fear and 
its correlates. The catalyst for exploring the possibility of developing a broader 
theoretical framework of fear was the conclusion (based on the analysis of the BCS 
data) that worry about card fraud is different to other worries in terms of its 
distribution 
and correlates. I have suggested that in order to understand these 
differences, it is 
necessary to unpack the complex nature of the perception of vulnerability. 
In the 
context of this thesis, which is focused on the question of what makes one crime 
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differentftom another? I have developed the concept of 'seriousness' within a 
framework of autonomy. Seriousness, I conclude, is the key to understanding crime 
specific attitudes and, taken together with the perceptions of risk and control, may go 
some of the way to explaining disparity in fears at an individual level. 
This leaves open an important question: when a respondent is asked how worried s/he 
is about a crime, does s/he undertake an instinctive mental calculation of vulnerability 
by weighing up the perceptions of seriousness, risk and control? Or does s/he simply 
answer the question from one perspective, either risk ('it will not happen to me, so I am 
not at all worried'), seriousness ('it would not have a serious impact on my well being, 
so I am not at all worried') or control ('I can protect myself from it, so I am not at all 
worried'). In short, are the survey questions eliciting a complex form of fear or simply 
just different views of the same cathedral? 
Figure 6: Framework of vulnerability 
Perception of the Offence Perception of the Individual 
Risk Control of risk 
Seriousness Control of seriousness 
7.3 Towards an explanation of worry about card fraud: 
placing card fraud within the concept of autonomy 
In the first part of this chapter, I concluded that card fraud gives us a different 
dimension to the fear of crime, and this in turn challenges us to think further about the 
complex relationships between explanatory variables and dimensions of fear. Worry 
about card fraud is an interesting case for two reasons. Firstly, card fraud has 
been 
shown to have different patterns of worry than other crimes. The second reason relates 
to the apparent irrationality of worry about card fraud itself. We 
have already seen, in 
chapter four, that individual card holders rarely 
lose money in the event of a fraudulent 
transaction occurring. If banks and financial institutions absorb the cost of 
fraud, why 
should the card holder be worried at all? The answer to this question could 
be 
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answered, at least in part, by interpreting the potential victimisatIon within the 
framework of autonomy. 
Ultimately, the most intriguing question to arise from the research is why do some 
people worry so much about card fraud? Indeed, I have alluded to the fact that the 
discovery of high worry levels for card fraud were unexpected, both to myself and to the 
British Crime Survey team. I have suggested three possible answers to that question 
and I would like to pursue those further now. 
Firstly, I have perhaps peeled back the lid of a can of worms by suggesting that the 
worry levels for all crimes are inevitably a product of measurement. By exploring the 
concept of vulnerability I have been led to question whether different respondents 
interpret the word 'worry' from different perspectives of seriousness, risk and control. 
Thus, for example, those who say they are not at all worried about card fraud may 
perceive themselves to be at low risk of victimisation. Alternatively, a very worried 
card user may be particularly concerned about the seriousness of a victimisation, 
perhaps in terms of the potential long ten-n affects on his/her credit rating. It is, of 
course, arguable that this spotlight on methodological shortcomings is neither strikingly 
original nor helpful but it must, in my opinion, at least be raised as a potential line of 
enquiry. The benefit of doing so is to emphasise the importance of a vigorous 
interrogation of the study of the fear of crime, a phenomenon which is in danger of 
becoming stale at levels of conceptualisation and operationalisation. 
Ultimately, it does not matter in the short term whether respondents are interpreting 
worry in different ways. The aim of this project was to makes comparisons across 
crimes and, since worries for all crimes were measured in the same way, we can 
reasonably deduce that different crimes evoke different reactions. Card fraud is, it 
seems, perceived to be a serious threat, concern or problem to a significant number of 
people, in the same way that burglary or mugging is perceived as such. This must edge 
us towards a search for possible explanations. 
One explanation, and the second answer that I have offered to the question of why 
people might worry about card fraud, is that a 
large proportion of card users (i. e. the 
worriers) are under the impression that they, as 
individuals, will be liable for all costs 
following a fraudulent transaction. We have seen that, 
in actual fact, it is the card issuer 
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or the retailer who is most likely to absorb the cost of frauds. Indeed, many card 
companies are happy to publish this fact, recently transforming it into a fraud guarantee 
to actively recruit new customers. Therefore, it seems unlikely, although admittedly not 
impossible, that a large number of card users are misinterpreting their risk of personal 
financial loss. 
This leads me to consider the realistic possibility that card fraud victimisation is 
perceived to carry more serious implications for the victim than simply the loss of hard 
cash. I have suggested that an incident of card fraud actually represents the individual's 
loss of control over his/her personal information and it is this which fuels worry. This is 
the third and, for me, the most convincing explanation for worry about card fraud. 
7.3.1 Identity and the value of personal information 
In this final section I intend to argue that, when an individual attaches value to personal 
information, that information becomes part of that individual's identity. Information, I 
suggest, may be 'valuable' in two ways; intrinsically and instrumentally. 
In terms of instrumental value, I suggest that, since information facilitates certain 
autonomous actions, it can be seen as a necessary element of an individual's autonomy. 
Thus, it is important for the individual to retain control of that information and maintain 
personal privacy. Loss of control of information, via criminal misuse of that 
information, is viewed in this sense as impinging on the individual's ability to act 
autonomously (i. e. an action-based approach to harm). 
Personal information, I go on to argue, may also have intrinsic value. Using Goffman's 
analysis of 'self', I illustrate that being a victim of information theft may more deeply 
effect an individual's well-being than one might expect. By losing control of one's 
personal information, one may lose control of one's 'identity' in many social contexts. 
The value of information may, then, go beyond the simple instrumental 
level and may 
contribute to an individual's sense of identity within society (i. e. an 
identity-based 
approach to harm). 
Essentially, whether information has instrumental value, intrinsic value or 
both kinds of 
value, it becomes inextricably linked with the concept of identity. 
Autonomy and 
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perceptions of 'self can be shown to be essential elements of an individual's identity. 
In this sense, criminal acquisition of information does, in effect, become 'identity theft'. 
I conclude by reconsidering the term 'identity theft' and suggest that we need to develop 
more fully the concept and its potential implications. 
7.3.1.1 Instrumental value: Privacy and autonomy 
If we interpret card fraud within the context of autonomy, we find that a fraudulent 
transaction occurring on a card holder's account is a violation of that individual's 
autonomy, in the fon-n of the exclusive use of that account and the information which 
controls that account. The card holder may or may not eventually suffer the loss of 
money, but all victims will suffer the violation of exclusive use of the account. The 
effect of such a violation will depend on the value attached to the goal (to operate one's 
personal financial identity) and the importance of that value will vary between 
individuals. 
The ability to control the flow of one's personal information, arguably the central tenet 
of the concept of privacy, may be understood as a necessary good for autonomous 
action. It is well documented that the desire for privacy is deeply rooted in natural 
(human and animal) instincts. Westin (1967) describes in some depth the role privacy 
plays in both the animal kingdom and function of primitive societies, suggesting that the 
need for privacy results in social non-ns which are evident in most societies. For 
Westin, the individual's ability to control the flow of information about him/herself is 
the key to understanding social structure in all societies, 
'The point is that kinship rules and interaction norms present individuals with a need to 
restrict the flow of information about themselves to others and to adjust these 
regulations constantly in contacts with others. This need is fundamental to individual 
behaviour with intimates, casual acquaintances, and authorities' (Westin 1967, p. 14). 
Privacy, then, is an essential component of individual autonomy, at least in a democratic 
society (Alldridge and Brants 2001, Roberts 2001). In addition, 
it is multi- functional. 
For Roberts (2001), the main function of privacy is to provide the emotional, cognitive 
and moral space in which an individual can 
determine his/her own goals and 
commitments without being exposed to the risk of violation or victimisation. 
Roberts 
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explains that once one accepts that privacy is the basis of autonomy, one begins to 
understand why many individuals are uneasy about electronic databases, CCTV and spy 
satellites 
7.3.1.2 Intrinsic value: Perceptions of 'self' 
At one level, then, an individual may wish to protect his/her personal information for 
practical and functional reasons which relate to autonomous action. Theft of one's 
passport, for example, is undesirable since it might prevent the ability to travel freely. 
Similarly, fraudulent transactions on one's credit card may harm one's credit rating. 
However, if personal information is regarded as part of an individual's perception of 
4 self , violation of the control of that information may be understood as being of far 
greater significance to the victim. 
The potential significance of this type of victimisation can be illustrated through the 
analysis of 'self provided by Goffman (1971,1990,199 1). It is not necessary to 
present Goffman's work in great deal here but a summary of his work on personal 
identity illustrates how the misuse of personal information may be of substantial harm 
to an individual's well being. 
Central to Goffman's theory is the concept of 'self which he explains is the personal 
identity which emerges out of social interaction. One adopts a 'self depending on the 
social role required by each individual social situation and by doing so one assumes a 
4 moral career' (Goffman 1991). According to Goffman (1990), moral careers may be 
adversely affected by stigma, characteristics which we see as 'defects' which we have 
relative to others. Thus, we develop different ways of conveying social information to 
hide our stigma in social interactions. He argues that, as part of the process of social 
interaction, an individual wishes to exercise information control about his/her personal 
identity. Social information is conveyed with identifiers or symbols and we, as 
individuals, are classified by 'identity pegs'which include our biographical and financial 
details (Goffman 1971). 
Although this is almost an inexcusably crude summary of Goffman's complex 
theoretical perspective, it serves to illustrate the potential implications of criminal 
misuse of an individual's personal information. 
By understanding the value of personal 
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infori-nation within a context of social interaction, we appreciate the wider reaching 
effect of what might initially be viewed as simply a 'one-off loss' for the victim. The 
perpetrator in this kind of crime takes over the 'identity pegs' of the victim, leaving the 
victim less able to control his/her identifiers in social situations. Thus, a victim may 
feel vulnerable or, in more extreme cases of 'identity theft', powerless in the course of 
his/her everyday life. Moreover, victimisation of this type of crime may carry with it a 
distinct kind of stigma. The fact that one has been a victim of information theft may 
suggest that one is more stupid, negligent or weaker than one's peers. Indeed, this type 
of reaction would echo the findings of previous studies on the victims of fraud (Levi 
and Pithouse 1992). 
7.3.1.3 Reconsidering 'identity theft"? 
Essentially, I am suggesting here that, regardless of what kind of value we attach to 
information, accepting that information actually has value inevitably leads us to 
consider the concept of identity. The concept of identity has a long academic and 
political history and I do not intend to review the extensive literature at this stage of the 
thesis. Rather, I wish to simply suggest that the theft of information may be construed 
as 'identity theft' but we should exercise great caution in using the term. 
We have already seen how identity theft (or identity fraud) is being hailed as a new 
crime problem and is creeping its way up the political agenda. Moreover, the term itself 
is being used to envelope a multitude of criminal activities from credit card fraud, 
through to passport forgery, illegal immigration and drug trafficking. The costs of such 
crimes are commonly presented as financial or inconvenient. 
There is, however, an important distinction to be made between the act of theft or fraud 
by the criminal and the effect on the victim. The perpetrator of this kind of crime is 
simply using information, raw data, in the course of his/her criminal activities. By 
assuming control of information which does not 'belong' to him/her, s/he takes 
advantage of the pure instrumental value of the information. In contrast, the victim who 
loses control of the information attaches both instrumental and intrinsic value to that 
information and this impacts on the victim's identity. In short, the criminal act is 
simply the 'theft of identifying information' but the victim suffers 'theft of 
identity'. 
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This distinction, although subtle, is important. If we are to understand the implications 
of information related crimes we must think carefully about both the motivations and 
effects. Similarly, if we are to understand the 'fear' of such crimes, we must consider 
the potential seriousness of the offences from the perspective of the well-being of the 
individual. Such a perspective of well-being, I would argue, must include an 
understanding of an individual's perception of autonomy and identity. 
It is necessary to take a step back and ask whether the discussions contained in this 
thesis tell us anything new about crime or the fear of crime. It is not my intention to 
claim that crimes involving information and identity are new. On the contrary, I have 
demonstrated in previous chapters that criminals have been misusing identity as a tool 
throughout history. In this sense, then, there is nothing new or exciting about the 
misuse of card details and personal identifying information. However, I would strongly 
argue that the issues introduced in this thesis do culminate in a solid agenda for future 
research which places information related crimes firmly in the centre of modem 
criminology. 
The issues of privacy, autonomy and the misuse of identity are being pushed to the 
forefront of sociological, political and legal debates by the evolving features of the 
modem society. Thus, it seems appropriate for discussions relating to future changes in 
society to infiltrate criminological thinking. Inevitably, we must turn to history in order 
to gain an appreciation of changes in the modem world. Indeed, Pelser (200 1) argues 
that discussions about crime and privacy cannot even take place without turning to 
history. What becomes clear is that societal development brings with it uncertainty and 
a blurring of boundaries, 
6 ... we 
live in confused and confusing times, perhaps about values in general, certainly 
about the value of privacy' (Roberts 2001, p. 50). 
What places a sense of urgency on the current debate is the increasing speed at which 
these boundaries are becoming blurred. Urbanisation, the increased anonymity and 
mobility of every day life and new instruments of data surveillance are all features of 
globalisation which can be seen to be working against the individual and against the 
achievement of privacy. Thus the significance of privacy issues in the context of crime 
and crime control are more significant now than they 
have ever been. Developments in 
192 
technology are challenging the relationship between privacy and the criminal law. 
There is an ongoing debate of surveillance policing versus suspects' rights taking place 
against a back drop of increasingly proactive policing (manifesting in its current form in 
the recent strikes at drug trafficking and organised crime). Finally, claims of an all- 
encompassing right to personal autonomy are becoming more commonplace and, 
perhaps, are being argued more vociferously. 
In short, the threat of card fraud victimisation represents a shift in the nature of crime. 
The value of identity and information is certainly not a new realisation to 'the criminal', 
it has simply become a more accessible tool in the modem world. For the potential 
victim, then, the control of personal information is fast becoming a concern. Not only is 
there an increase in the amount of information available, but there is also an increase in 
the number of uses, and importantly misuses, for that information. In an increasing 
public awareness of the potential for harm, a fear of these kind of crimes is likely to 
evolve with greater speed. Thus, it is necessary to ensure that future work on the fear of 
crime pursues some of the lines of enquiry raised in this thesis. 
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Conclusion 
As stated earlier, the aim of this final chapter is to draw a final concise thesis from the 
discussion which has taken place up until this point. 
The research agenda was clearly set in chapter one. My aim was to reconsider the 
concept of 'crime' in order to understand more fully the fear of crime with a view to 
improving the measurement of the phenomenon. This led me to ask the central 
question: what makes one crime different from another? The literature hinted at the 
division between personal and property crime and that was identified as a suitable 
starting point. 
Having paused to place the debate in the context of a forward looking approach to the 
study of fear of crime, what became clear was a divide between the traditionally 
accepted range of crimes studied by fear of crime researchers and the emergent nature 
of crimes of the future. It seemed that certain crimes which have traditionally been 
excluded from survey based measurement of the fear of crime were likely to be some of 
the largest crime problems in the coming years. Of particular concern was the exclusion 
of fraudulent and financial offences from the victimisation survey. 
This led me to consider whether the exclusion of financial crimes actually matters and, 
thus, question the usefulness of pursuing this line of development. The answer was 
'yes' for two reasons. Firstly, it became apparent that the pigeon-holing of all frauds as 
white collar crimes is fundamentally flawed at theoretical and practical levels. Indeed, 
it was demonstrated that the victims of personal frauds are subjects worthy of and 
appropriate for study. Secondly, having selected the challenge to focus on the victims 
of plastic card fraud, the rapid increase in victimisation levels in recent years soon 
became obvious, reinforcing the sense of urgency for a modem perspective on attitudes 
towards crime. 
The introduction of card fraud to the BCS has, of course, been the empirical focus of 
this study. Card fraud has been shown to perform well as a BCS crime and has told us 
something about the fear of crime. Having identified that the problem with current 
fear 
of crime research is the failure to consider the effects of individual crimes, it 
becomes 
clear that the important question is what makes crimes 
different. Including card fraud 
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has shown that it goes beyond the simple property and personal crime division. Thus 
we must consider fear within a broader interpretive framework and I have suggested 
that should be autonomy and well being. The key to unlocking the relationship between 
fear and vulnerability is the concept of seriousness. 
I have shown that people do worry about card fraud and, in this final chapter, I have 
initiated a search for an explanation of that worry. I have shown that the most 
compelling explanation is the suggestion that people are actually worried about having 
their infori-nation 'stolen' or misused. I have argued that this is not necessarily a new 
phenomenon, rather that in today's society more value is attached to identity and thus is 
a more important element of an individual's autonomy and well being. 
To claim a reinvention of the fear of crime here would be overstating the thesis. My 
contribution to the debate, albeit a small one, is simply one of steering direction: in 
order to move towards an understanding of the fear of crime, one must look to the future 
of crime itself. 
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Appendix 1: Card Fraud Losses (Additional Tables) 
This section contains additional tables for chapter 4. 
Table ALI: Annual Fraud Losses by card type (; E millions) (Source: AIPACS) 
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Credit cards 76.7 57.6 43.5 38.3 43.7 60.4 68.8 100.9 
Charge Cards 16.2 13.9 11.6 10.0 14.2 16.6 16.1 23.6 
Debit cards 43.9 35.8 23.9 20.0 25.4 33.9 39.6 54.9 
Cheque cards 75.6 20.6 16.4 13.8 12.8 10.4 10.0 9.1 
ATM cards 0.3 
Eurocheque cards 2.6 1.9 1.4 1.2 1.0 0.7 0.5 0.4 
Total 165.0 129.8 96.8 83.3 97.1 122.0 135.0 189.4 
* Figures not available 
Table AI. 2: Absolute annual fraud losses (Imillions) by place of misuse (UK 
transactions) (Source: APACS) 
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
ATM 3.4 2.5 3.2 3.5 4.4 8.2 9.7 12.3 
Cash withdrawal at 
bank counter 
8.6 6.9 5.0 4.8 3.9 4.3 4.7 6.5 
Card not present 
transactions 
1.0 1.3 2.2 4.3 6.0 8.2 11.0 22.5 
Other merchant 
transactions 
130.2 95.8 65.5 49.5 57.3 72.2 74.8 93.5 
Table A1.3: Absolute annual fraud losses (Emillions) by place of misuse (Source: 
APACS) 
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
UK transactions 143.2 106.4 75.9 62.1 71.6 92.9 100.1 134.8 
Transactions 
abroad 
21.8 23.4 21.0 21.2 25.4 29.2 34.9 54.6 
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Table A1.4: Plastic card fraud losses as a percentage of total card turnover 
(Source APACS) 
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
% of 0.29 0.20 0.13 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.09 0.12 0.16 0.18 
total card 
turnover 
Table AI. 5: Absolute annual fraud losses (imillions) by circumstances of loss 
(Source: APACS) 
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Lost/stolen 123.2 98.5 71.1 60.1 60.0 66.2 65.8 80.1 101.9 114.0 
Mail non- 
rec eipt 
29.6 18.2 12.6 9.1 10.0 12.5 12.0 14.7 17.7 26.7 
Counterfeit 8.4 9.9 9.6 7.7 13.3 20.3 26.8 50.6 107.1 160.3 
Application 
fraud 
1.4 0.9 0.7 1.5 6.7 11.9 14.5 11.4 10.5 6.6 
Card not 
present 
1.3 1.6 2.5 4.6 6.5 10.0 13.6 29.5 72.9 
I 
95.7 
Total 165.0 129.8 96.8 83.3 97.1 122.0 135.0 
_189.4 
317.0 411.4 
211 
Appendix 2: BCS Methodology and Statistical Analysis 
A2.1 BCS methodology 
This section relies heavily on the information contained within the Technical Report for 
the 2000 BCS (Hales et al. 2000). Details are summarised as far as is possible but the 
interested reader is referred to the Technical Report for further discussion. 
A2.1 .1 Sampling 
Size and structure 
The 2000 sweep of the BCS had a larger sample size than its predecessors; the target 
sample size was 20,000 core interviews plus a booster sample of 4,000 black and Asian 
adults (the ethnic minority booster sample). Thus, the issued core sample was 28,992 
(making allowances for 'unproductive outcomes') and the issued ethnic booster sample 
was 14,925 (this was a comparatively large sample because it contained a reserve 
sample in case the method for estimating the 'yield' of postcode areas based on the dated 
1991 census data was flawed). 
The core sample of 28,992, then, was drawn from 906 sample points. The sample 
points were located across the 43 Police Force Areas (PFA) in England and Wales, 
ensuring a maximum of 300 achieved core interviews per PFA. Each PFA was 
classified as either 'small' or 'large'. 
AZI. 1.2 Selection ofpostcode sectors 
The sample size for the 'small' PFAs (17 of the 43) needed to be increased so as to 
ensure a minimum of 300 achieved interviews. In each of these PFAs, 14 postcode 
sectors were selected from a list which had been sorted to classify sectors according to 
population density and socio-economic group of the head of households. In total, 4 of 
the 17 PFAs achieved a sample below the target number of 300 (achieving samples of 
282,297,299 and 299). 
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Postcode sectors in the 'large' PFAs were sorted in the same way as for the 'small' PFAs. 
A fixed sampling interval was used to extract the remainder of the 906 sampling points, 
thus the reduction in sample size was distributed proportionately across all of the large 
PFAs. 
AZI. 1.3 Selection of addresses and respondents 
In each of the 906 sample points, a quarter of each of the 14 postcode sector was 
selected at ransom. A set of 32 addresses (Small User Delivery Points, i. e. addresses 
which receive less than 20 letters a day so as to exclude businesses) were drawn from 
each quarter sector using a random starting point and then a fixed interval of 128 
addresses. 
For multi-household addresses, a single household was selected using random selection. 
One adult (aged 16 years or over) per household was selected for interview using a Kish 
grid. No substitution was allowed. 
A2.1.1.4 The ethnic minority booster sample (EMB) 
The core sample provides a small number of black and Asian respondents (265 and 405 
respectively in 2000). The EMB sample was drawn from two types of area in 2000; 
'focused enumeration in core sample points' and 'high density ethnic minority areas'. 
Two thirds of the sample (66.3%) was obtained from high density ethnic minority areas; 
33.7% were obtained from focused enumeration in core sample postcode areas. 
The high density ethnic minority sample points were selected by constructing a set of 
postcode areas in which the percentage of ethnic minority households was 19% or 
greater and sorting them according to PFA and percentage of head of households in 
certain occupational groups. Sectors were then selected using a random start point and 
a fixed interval. Sectors were divided into 4 and one from each was selected at random. 
Then, from each quarter sector, a set of 75 addresses was selected (again using a 
random start point and fixed interval). 
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Focused enumeration has the advantage of requiring less additional work to the core 
sample than sampling from high density ethnic minority areas. At interview points in 
the core sample, the interviewer asked each respondent if there was a black or Asian 
person living in the two dwellings adjacent to his/her dwelling on either side. If the 
respondent was unable to give information on his/her neighbours' ethnic origin, the 
interviewer approached the addresses on either side to try and establish a contact. 
A2.1.1.5 Final sample size 
The final issued core sample size was 28,914 addresses. Of these, 9% (2,623) were 
ineligible for interview (empty, demolished, untraceable or not a private household). Of 
the 26,291 valid addresses, 19,457 interviews were returned by interviewers as 
'productive' interviews; 19,411 interviews were finally used for analysis by the British 
Crime Survey analysts (a response rate of 74%). 
A2.1.1.6 Weighting 
Because the BCS is intended to give a representative cross section of households in 
England and Wales and the adults living in them, the data is weighted according to the 
type of analysis being carried out. There are three types of weight: weight a, weight b 
and weight i. 
Weight a: Used for individual based analysis - when you want to make a statement 
a-bout the characteristics, attitudes or experiences of adults in the sample. 
Weight a= individual weight * inner city weight * dwelling unit 
weight 
Weight b: Used for household based analysis - when you ant to make a statement 
about the characteristics or experiences of households in the sample. 
Weight b= inner city weight * dwelling unit weight 
Weight i: Used for incident based analysis when you want to look at the nature of 
specific offences or you want to compare different types of offence. 
Weight i= weight a (or weight b) * series weight. 
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Weighting is usually used for bivariate analysis but not multivariate analysis (Budd 
1999). However, the decision was taken at an early stage of analysis not to weight the 
data for any of the statistical procedures carried out on the data. This was mainly for 
reasons of consistency but also convenience. The use of three different weights makes 
analysis complicated and results can be confusing to present (percentages are given on 
weighted data but raw n's are given on unweighted data to avoid unmanageably large 
numbers). In addition, bivariate analysis allows us to determine which variables to 
include in the mulitivariate modelling, thus removing all weights allows the whole 
process of analysis, at bivariate and multivariate levels, to be consistent. The major 
drawback of this decision is that we cannot make statements which are representative of 
the population of England and Wales as a whole'. Therefore all results and discussion 
must be digested with this in mind. However, the variables used in the construction of 
weights are included in analysis. 
A2.1.2 The interview process 
The interviews were organised and carried out by a survey company (National Centre 
for Social Research in 2000) using a system called Computer Aided Personal 
Interviewing (CAPI) in the respondent's home. Interviews took place between January 
and July, the majority being completed by the end of May (96%). 
A2.1.2.1 The structure of the interview 
There are six parts to the BCS questionnaire: 
1. Main questionnaire (all respondents) 
2. Victim forms (victims only - maximum 6 per person) 
3. One of two follow up questionnaires (split sample - Follow up A or Follow up 
B) 
4. Fires in the Home (all respondents) 
5. Demographic questionnaire (all respondents) 
6. Self completion questionnaires (all respondents under 60 years old - domestic 
violence and drugs) 
' This problem raises issues of comparability with other BCS analysis (and publications) and it is 
acknowledged that the bivariate results would probably need to be recalculated for publication. The 
Home Office would, of course, be consulted in any event. 
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For the purposes of this research, analysis was conducted on data contained mostly in 
the main questionnaire and the demographic questionnaire. The main questionnaire 
contains introductory questions and victimisation screener questions. The introductory 
questions focus on the characteristics of the respondent's household and the area in 
which s/he lives. The victimisation screener questions focus on the respondent's 
personal experience of crime since I" January 1999, ensuring that all incidents 
(however minor) are included and counted only once. The screener questions cover 
'household experience' (e. g. damage to a car or vandalism of the house) and 'personal 
experience' (e. g. respondent was personally a victim of robbery). Incidents which were 
identified by the screener questions are followed up in detail using a victim form. The 
demographic questionnaire contained questions on the respondent's own characteristics 
and lifestyle, including occupation and health. The card fraud questions were included 
in the Follow up A questionnaire. 
A2.2 Statistical analysis and methodological chokes. 
A2.2.1 The Samples 
A2.2.1.1 The main sample and ethnic minority booster sample 
The analysis which follows is carried out on the main sample of the BCS which does 
not include the ethnic minority booster sample. The booster sample is only used when 
making specific statements about ethnicity and thus is set aside for the analysis here. 
Ethnicity is not included as a variable in the main analysis for this reason. 
A2.2.1.2 The sub-samples 
Car Owners 
All analysis of questions relating to vehicle crime is based on vehicle owners only. The 
BCS contains a question about household vehicle ownership which allows us to identify 
the vehicle owners. 
IF- 
Duuse movers 
When identifying the victims of burglary, the BCS separates off those who have moved 
home in the last year from those who have not moved. Those who have 
216 
moved are asked about burglary victimisation in their last home and their new home 
across the one year period (since I't January 1999). For the purposes of my analysis 
(which does not use victim form information) both house movers and non movers are 
counted together as a single group and classed simply as victims or non-victims 
(regardless of how many times and location). 
Card users 
Card holders need to be distinguished from non-card holders in the same way that car 
owners are identified for the questions about vehicle crime. However, whereas existing 
BCS questions allow us to identify the car owners, credit/debit card users are not 
identified by a filtering question. The worry question does contain a fifth response 
option - N/A - Don't use cards'. Although it is not an ideal measure, since we are 
relying on the respondent to choose the option rather than just select one of the others, it 
gives us some indication of who does or does not use cards. 
A2.2.2 The selection of statistical tests 
AZZZI Bivariate analysis 
At all stages of analysis, the emphasis was on making comparisons between worries 
about specific crimes. In particular, I was interested in exploring the relationships that 
worry about card fraud has with other variables and comparing these to the relationships 
displayed by the other crimes. This approach is distinct from an attempt to find the best 
explanation (statistically at least) for worry about each crime. Indeed, this would have 
been a massive task and to embark upon it would be to lose sight of the original aim of 
the research which was to test the potential for introducing card fraud to the survey. 
Moreover, such an approach to analysis would inevitably exceed the suitability of the 
data. 
At the bivariate level, a number of statistical tests were used. Primarily, the chi square 
test was used to determine statistical significance. Since the chi square statistic does not 
tell us a great deal about the strength or the direction of the relationship, measures of 
association were also used to help to determine the nature of bivariate relationships 
(Norusis 1998). Measures of association are particularly important in the context of the 
British Crime Survey as they reflect the strength of a relationship, regardless of sample 
size. If the sample size is large, relationships which have a small association will still 
have a significant relationship. Therefore, since the chi square statistic can be 
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misleading, measure of association can be useful when we are trying to compare 
relationships (Sirkin 1999). The following measures were used in the analysis: 
Cramer's V is a chi square based measure of association which modifies the chi 
square statistic so that it is not influenced by sample size and falls in the range from 
0 to 1, where 0= no association and I= perfect association (Sirkin 1999). Chi 
square based measures are difficult to interpret and can only be used to compare the 
strength of association in different tables. However, since the aim of the analysis 
was to simply make comparisons across crimes, Cramer's V was deemed to be an 
appropriate measure of association. 
Goodman and Kiruskal's Gamma is a proportional reduction in error (PRE) 
measure designed for measuring association between two ordinal variables. PRE 
measures allow one to say how far you are able to predict the value of a dependent 
variable when the value of an independent variable is known. It can, however be 
used when one of the variables is dichotomous (Norusis 1998). Gamma was used in 
the analysis of the relationships between victimisation and worry. A positive 
gamma confirms that there are more 'like' than 'unlike' pairs and as one variable 
increases, so does the other. However, gamma is only sensitive to linear 
relationships and therefore may have restricted applications in analysis. 
AZZZ2 Multivariate techniques 
Multivariate techniques can be used to explore the associations 2 between a number of 
variables, allowing one to assess the effect of a group of variables on a dependent 
variable, once all others variables have been controlled for (Miles and ShevIin 2001). 
Logistic regression is a multivariate technique which can be used to explore the 
associations between a number of variables, allowing one to assess the effect of a group 
of variables on a dependent variable once all others variables have been controlled for. 
So, for example, we might find that income and education are both related to worry 
about crime but it may be the case that they are also related, to some extent, to each 
Note that an association does not necessarily imply a causal relationship. 
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other. Logistic regression allows us to say whether income is associated with worry in 
its own right, rather than by virtue of its association with education (Norusis 1999). 
The logistic regression tables contained in Appendices 3-6 present the exponential of 
the coefficient (ExpB) and significance levels of the coefficient. The coefficient is the 
change in the odds of the dependent variable associated with a one unit change in the 
independent variable, controlling for all other variables. 
In addition, three measures of goodness of fit and calibration are used in the analysis. 
* The Nagelkerke W is a statistic which quantifies the proportion of explained 
variation in the model. The statistic can be interpreted in terms of the 
percentage of the variation in the outcome variable explained by the regression 
model (so, a value of . 35 suggests that 35% of the variation can be explained by 
the model) (Norusis 1999). 
e The model chi square is the difference between -2LL for the model with only the 
constant and -2LL for the current model. The model chi square tests the null 
hypothesis that the coefficients for all terms in the current model, except the 
constant, are 0 (Norusis 1999). 
The Hosmer and Lemeshow goodness-of-fit is a commonly used test for model 
calibration. It tests the goodness of fit of the observed and predicted number of events 
and is particularly useful in cases where both the sample size and the number of 
covariate patterns is large (Norusis 1999). The Hosmer and Lemeshow chi square tests 
the null hypothesis that there is no difference between observed and predicted values. 
However, since the value of the chi square statistic is proportional to sample size, it 
must be interpreted with care. 
It must be stated at the outset that the regression models which are presented in Chapter 
6 are, on the whole, not strong or significant models in terms of their ability to predict 
outcomes. It is often the case in survey based research that, due to the very nature of the 
survey data, the range of independent variables is not wide enough to achieve a highly 
effective or strong model (Sirkin 1999). Previous analysts of BCS data have been more 
successful in producing strong predictive models (Hough 1995). It is, however, fair to 
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say that such analysts have been in a slightly better position regarding the number of 
variables available. Since there were only two card fraud questions and a limited 
sample, many variables which have previously been used cannot be included for card 
fraud due to missing data . For example, there are no data for perceptions of risk or 
crime prevention/avoidance strategies for card fraud. 
However, I argue that the models presented in Chapter 6 can be of value in so far as 
they allow for the comparison of predictors across crime types - if the same variables 
are used for each crime, one at least gets a sense of the difference between crimes. 
Thus, the emphasis is on using the models to compare crimes rather than to make an 
accurate calculation of risk. 
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Appendix 3: Card holders and non card holders 
List of Tables 
Table AM: Percentage card users (for demographic groupings). 
Table A3.2: Association between demographic variables and use of cards. 
Table A3.3: Demographic predictors of 'card user' (logistic regression). 
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Table A3.1: Percentage card users (for demographic groupings) 
% card holders 
Gender 
Male 86 
Female 83 
Age 
16-29 89 
30-59 91 
60+ 71 
Marital status 
Married (de facto) 90 
Not married 76 
Tenancy 
Owners 90 
Renters 69 
Number of adults 
1 74 
2 89 
3+ 90 
Number of children 
0 83 
1+ 88 
Education 
Secondary 89 
Further 92 
Higher 99 
Household income 
Under 5K 59 
5K under 15K 75 
15K under 20K 93 
20K + 97 
Managing on income 
Well and saving 91 
Getting by 77 
In difficulty 69 
Perception of neighbourhood 
Help each other 85 
Go own way 84 
Mixture 84 
Area type 
Inner city 75 
Urban 83 
Rural 91 
General health 
- Bad 71 
Good 89 
Smoker in Household 
Yes 82 
No 85 
Alcohol Consumption 
Rarely 78 
Often 89 
House unoccupied during day 
Less than 3 hours 71 
3 hours or more 90 
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Table A3.2: Association between demographic variables and use of cards 
Chi square (df) Cramer's V 
Gender 21.85 (1) 
. 05** Age 567.22 (2) 
. 24** Marital status 321.02 (1)** . 18** Tenancy 684.94 (1)** 
. 27** Number of adults 331.63 (2)** . 19** 
- 
Number of children 49.35 (1)** . 07** Education 107.86(2) ** 
. 13** Household income 1292.68 (3)** 
. 38** Managing on income 403.35 (2)** . 20** 
- 
Perception of neighbourhood 
- 
3.68(2) _ 
. 02 Area type 163.27 (2)** . 13** 
- 
General health 454.66 (1) ** _ 
. 22** Smoker in Household 21.29(1)** _ . 05** Alcohol Consumption 237.52(1)** _ . 16** House unoccupied during day 560.00(1)** . 24** 
Notes: 
i. **=p<0.005 
ii. *=p <0 . 
05 
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Table A3.3: Demographic predictors of 'card user' (logistic regression) 
Factor EXP(B) Sig. 
Gender Male(base) 1.00 
Female 1.89 
Age 16-29 2.59 
30-59 1.86 
60+ (base) 1.00 
Marital group Married/de facto 1.84 
Not married (base) 1.00 
Household Income Under 5K(base) 1.00 
5K under 15K 1.56 
15K under 20K 3.83 
20K+ 5.73 
Managing on Income Well and saving 2.11 
Getting by 1.39 
In difficulty(base) 1.00 
Area Type Inner city (base) 1.00 
Urban 1.05 
Rural 1.78 
Neighbourhood Type Help each other 1.02 
Mixture . 97 Go own way(base) 1.00 
House unoccupied during the day Less than 3 hours a 
day (base) 
1.00 
More than 3 hours a 
day 
1.88 
Smoker in household Yes(base) 1.00 
No 1.28 
Drink Alcohol Rarely (base) 1.00 
Often 1.36 
General health Bad 1.15 
Good (base) 1.00 
Tenancy Owners 1.86 
Renters (base) 1.00 
Number of adults in household 1 1.51 
2 1.13 
3+(base) 1.00 
Number of children in household O(base) 1.00 
1+ 1.81 
Education (highest qualification) Secondary (base) 1.00 
Further 1.19 
Higher 5.28 
Notes: 
i. p =<0.005 
ii. p= <0.05 
iii. Model Chi Square 
iv. Nagelkerke R2 
V. Hosmer and Lemeshow 
. 28 13.40 (ns) 
694.35 ** 
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Appendix 4- Association between worries 
List of Tables 
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Table A4.1: Chi square values for worry crosstabulations 
Burglary 
Theft of 4825.44 
vehicle 
Theft 3724.66 15904.28 
from 
vehicle 
Card 1513.82 1100.31 979.75 
fraud 
Mugging 9978.04 3952.70 2712.64 1665.60 
Attack 6875.21 3148.78 2394.73 1612.99 15872.33 
Rape 4407.37 1836.84 1168.10 1102.87 9542.79 15915.98 
Insult 4169.39 2638.63 2409.81 1091.38 7456.00 11894.08 5928.98 
"0 
; 0. -, e 0.0 
0 C1 a 
-lid 
Chi w 
Square 
Notes: 
i. All significant at p <0.005 and 9 df 
Table A4.2: Correlations between worries (Spearman's r) 
Burglary 
Theft of . 47* 
vehicle 
Theft from . 41 . 71 
vehicle 
Card fraud . 33* . 
33* . 32* 
Mugging . 55* . 
43 * . 36* . 33* 
Attack . 49* . 39* . 
34* . 34* . 70* 
Rape . 39* . 
29* . 23 * . 
27* . 59* . 
69* 
Insult . 38 . 
35* . 33* . 
29* . 51* . 
61 . 48* F 
Spearman's r 7; 
Notes: 
i. p <0.01 
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Table A4.3: Predictors of worry about burglary (logistic regression) 
Exp(B) Sig. 
Mugging 3.07 
Theft of vehicle 2.08 
Theft from vehicle 1.69 
Card Fraud 1.62 
Attack 1.48 
Insult 1.36 
Rape 1.22 
Notes: 
i. p <0.005 
ii. p <0.05 
iii. Model Chi Square 
iv. Nagelkerke R2 
V. Hosmer and Lemeshow 
1796.81 
. 34 25.20 
Table A4.4: Predictors of worry about theft of vehicle (logistic regression) 
Exp(B) si 
Theft from vehicle 17.31 
Mugging 2.08 
Burglary 2.07 
Insult 1.47 
Card Fraud 1.43 
Rape 1.30 
Attack 1.11 
Notes: 
i. p <0.005 
li. =p <0.05 
ill. Model Chi Square 3416.70 
iv. Nagelkerke R2 . 
57 
V. Hosmer and Lerneshow 25.22 
Table A4.5: Predictors of worry about theft from vehicle (logistic regression) 
Exp(B) 
Theft of vehicle 17.30 
Burglary 1.69 
Card Fraud 1.63 
Insult 1.34 
Attack 1.19 
Mugging 
Rape . 
87 
Notes: 
i. p <0.005 
ii. p <0.05 
Iii. Model Chi Square 
iv. Nagelkerke R2 
V. Hosmer and Lemeshow 
3035.67** 
. 52 15.70 
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Table A4.6: Predictors of worry about card fraud (logistic regression) 
Exp(B) Sig. 
Theft from vehicle 1.63 
Burglary 1.61 
Insult 1.46 
Theft of vehicle 1.42 
Mugging 1.27 
Attack 1.25 
Rape 1.21 
Notes: 
i. p <0.005 
ii. p <0.05 
iii. Model Chi Square 828.78** 
iv. Nagelkerke R2 . 17 
V. Hosmer and Lemeshow 19.40* 
Table A4.7: Predictors of worry about rape (logistic regression) 
Exp(B) Sig 
Attack 18.73 
Mugging 2.76 
Insult 1.54 
Theft of vehicle 1.27 
Burglary 1.22 
Card Fraud 1.20 
Theft from vehicle . 
87 
Notes: 
p <0.005 
p <0.05 
iii. Model Chi Square 
iv. Nagelkerke R2 
V. Hosmer and Lemeshow 
3170.70** 
. 
58 
32.13** 
Table A4.8: Predictors of worry about mugging (logistic regression) 
Exp(B) Sig 
Attack 7.15 
Burglary 3.11 
Rape 2.81 
Theft of vehicle 2.07 
Insult 1.84 
Card Fraud 1.30 
Theft from vehicle 1.01 
Notes: 
p <0.005 
p <0.05 
iii. Model Chi Square 
iv. Nagelkerke R' 
V. Hosmer and Lemeshow 
3397.32** 
. 58 37.07** 
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Table A4.9: Predictors of worry about attack (logistic regression) 
Exp(B) Sig. 
Rape 19.36 
Mugging 7.17 
Insult 4.23 
Burglary 1.61 
Card Fraud 1.26 
Theft from vehicle 1.23 
_ Theft of vehicle 1.18 
Notes: 
i. p <0.005 
ii. p <0.05 
iii. Model Chi Square 
iv. Nagelkerke R2 
V. Hosmer and Lemeshow 
4336.92** 
. 69 23.42** 
Table A4.10: Predictors of worry about insult (logistic regression) 
Exp(B) Sig. 
Attack 4.09 
Mugging 1.79 
Rape 1.54 
Card Fraud 1.47 
Theft of vehicle 1.45 
Burglary 1.37 
Theft from vehicle 1.36 
i. =p <0.005 
ii. p <0.05 
iii. Model Chi Square 
IV. Nagelkerke R2 
V. Hosmer and Lemeshow 
1846.35** 
. 37 28.27** 
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Appendix 5: Worry and demographics 
List of Tables 
Table A5-1: Percentage very, fairly, not very and not at all worried about 
property crime across demographic groups. 
Table A5.2: Percentage very, fairly, not very and not at all worried about 
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Table A5.3: Association between worry about crime and demographic variables. 
Table A5.4: Demographic predictors of worry about burglary (logistic 
regression). 
Table A5.5: Demographic predictors of worry about theft of vehicle (logistic 
regression). 
Table A5.6: 
Table A5.7: 
regression). 
Table A5.8: 
regression). 
Table A5.9: 
Demographic predictors of worry about theft from vehicle (logistic 
regression). 
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Table A5.16: Demographic predictors of being 'very worried' about mugging 
(logistic regression). 
Table A5.17: Demographic predictors of being 'very worried' about attack 
(logistic regression). 
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Table A5.18: Demographic predictors of being 'very worried' about insult (logistic 
regression). 
Table A5.19: Demographic predictors of being 'very worried' about rape (logistic 
regression). 
Table A5.20: Demographic predictors of being 'not at all worried' about burglary 
(logistic regression). 
Table A5.21: Demographic predictors of being 'not at all worried' about theft of vehicle 
(logistic regression). 
Table A5.22: Demographic predictors of being 'not at all worried' about theft 
from vehicle (logistic regression). 
Table A5.23: Demographic predictors of being 'not at all worried' about card 
fraud (logistic regression). 
Table A5.24: Demographic predictors of being 'not at all worried' about mugging 
(logistic regression). 
Table A5.25: Demographic predictors of being 'not at all worried' about attack 
(logistic regression). 
Table A5.26: Demographic predictors of being 'not at all worried' about rape 
(logistic regression). 
Table A5.27: Demographic predictors of being 'not at all worried' about insult 
(logistic regression). 
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Table A5.1: Percentage very worried (V), fairly worried (F), not very worried 
(NV) and not at all worried (N) about property crime across demographic groups. 
% Worried 
Burglary Theft of vehicle Theft from vehicle Card fraud 
V F N 
V 
N Vý Fý 
V 
N N V F N 
V 
N V F N 
V 
N 
Gender 
Male 15 38 37 9 18 36 33 13 16 37 35 13 16 32 32 20 
Female 22 38 33 8 22 36 33 9 15 36 38 12 19 30 30 20 
Age I 
16-29 21 37 35 8 24 38 28 11 18 39 33 10 16 30 33 21 
30-59 19 40 35 7 19 36 34 11 15 37 36 11 18 34 32 16 
60+ 19 36 34 12 19 33 35 13 14 32 38 16 18 27 27 28 
Marital Group 
Married/de facto 18 40 35 6 19 36 34 11 15 37 37 12 18 34 31 17 
Not married 20 35 35 11 21 34 32 12 16 34 36 14 17 27 32 25 
Household Income 
Under 5K 29 32 27 12 33 32 25 10 25 35 27 13 21 20 26 33 
5K under 15K 22_ 37 32 9 25 33 30 13 18 34 34 14 20 37 29 25 
15K under 20K 17 41 35 8 21 37 32 10 16 37 35 12 20 31 29 20 
20K+ 14 40 40 7 16 37 36 11 13 37 39 11 15 37 35 13 
Managing on Income 
Well and saving 18 38 38 8 17 36 36 12 13 35 39 13 16 33 32 19 
Getting by 23 38 31 8 25 35 29 11 19 38 32 12 20 28 30 22 
In difficulty 32 34 26 9 28 33 27 13 21 36 28 15 20 27 28 25 
Area Type 
Inner city 27 37 28 8 28 37 27 9 21 36 31 11 20 26 31 24 
Urban 20 38 34 8 22 36 32 11 17 37 35 11 18 31 31 20 
Rural 12 38 40 10 13 34 39 14 11 34 41 15 15 35 32 17 
Neighbourhood Type 
Help each other 17 37 37 10 18 35 35 12 14 35 37 14 18 32 31 20 
Mixture 16 36 39 9 17 35 37 11 13 36 39 13 14 30 34 22 
Go own way 22 39 32 7 23 36 30 11 17 37 34 11 19 31 31 20 
House unoccupied 
Less than 3 hours 22 35 33 10 21 32 34 13 15 33 36 16 19 27 28 26 
More than 3 hours 18 39 36 8 20 37 33 11 15 37 36 11 17 33 32 18 
Smoker in household I I I I 
Yes 22 37 32 9 24 34 30 11 19 36 33 12 20 28 1 39 23 
No 17 39 36 8 18 36 35 11 13 36 38 13 17 33 32 18 
Drink Alcohol 
Rarely 23 36 32 9 24 34 31 11 17 35 36 12 21 27 29 23 
Often 16 39 37 8 18 37 35 11 14 37 37 13 16 34 33 18 
General health 
Bad 25 37 29 9 26 35 29 11 20 36 32 13 21 28 29 22 
Good 17 38 37 8 18 36 35 11 14 36 37 12 17 32 32 19 
Tenancy ý 
1 
Owners 17 40 36 7 18 36 35 11 14 36 38 12 17 34 32 17 
Renters 25 34 31 11 29 32 28 12 22 35 31 13 19 23 29 28 
Adults 
ý 
1 20 35 34 12 20 34 34 13 15 33 37 15 17 27 31 25 
2 19 40 35 7 19 36 34 11 15 37 37 12 18 33 32 17 
3+ 19 38 35 8 23 36 30 10 18 38 33 11 18 31 30 21 
Children I I 
0 18 38 1 35 9 20 36 33 12 15 36 36 13 18 31 30 21 
1+ 21 39 35 6 20 36 34 10 15 37 37 11 18 31 33 18 
Education (highest) 
- - - - 
Secondary 20 39 34 8 20 37 32 - 10 14 38 36 12 17 31 33 20 
Further 15 39 39 8 18 37 35 11 15 37 36 12 16 35_ 33 16 
Higher 9 , 40 , 45 ,7 , 12 35 , 
41 
1 
12 
, 
It 
, 
36 
. 
42 12 12 38 36 14 
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Table A5.2: Percentage very worried (V), fairly worried (F), not very worried 
(NV) and not at all worried (N) about personal crime across demographic groups. 
% Wo rried 
Mug ging Atta ck Ra pe Insult 
V F N N V F N N V Fý N N 
I 
V Fý N N 
Gender 
Male 10 22 47 21 8 21 45 26 6 3 19 71 4 18 45 32 
Female 23 31 37 9 26 28 35 12 28 19 34 17 12 27 43 18 
Age 
16-29 18 27 41 14 23 28 37 13 26 17 25 32 10 25 44 21 
30-59 15 26 45 14 17 24 42 17 19 13 30 28 8 23 46 23 
60+ 19 28 37 16 16 24 36 24 15 10 25 51 9 22 40 30 
Marital Group 
Married/de facto 16 27 44 14 16 24 41 19 18 12 29 42 8 23 45 24 
Not married 19 27 39 15 19 26 37 19 20 14 26 40 9 24 42 26 
Household Income I I I I I I I I 
Under 5K 29 26 30 14 27 27 27 18 26 13 23 37 15 25 36 24 
5K under 15K 20 29 37 14 20 26 35 20 20 13 25 42 10 24 40 26 
15K under 20K 15 29 41 15 17 26 39 18 19 12 28 41 8 23 45 24 
20K+ 11 24 51 15 12 23 47 18 15 13 31 42 5 21 50 24 
Managing on Income 
Well and saving 13 25 46 15 14 23 44 20 15 12 29 44 6 21 47 26 
Getting by 21 29 37 13 22 27 34 17 23 14 27 37 11 25 41 23 
In difficulty 27 27 30 16 29 26 29 16 28 15 20 37 16 29 34 22 
Area Type 
Inner city 25 28 34 12 25 28 32 16 25 13 22 40 12 27 39 23 
Urban 18 28 41 14 18 26 39 18 20 13 28 40 9 24 43 24 
Rural 11 23 49 18 12 22 44 22 14 12 30 45 5 20 47 28 
Neighbourhood Type 
Help each other 16 25 43 16 16 23 40 21 18 12 29 42 8 21 44 27 
Mixture 15 26 43 17 15 24 41 20 17 13 28 42 7 23 45 25 
Go own way 19 28 41 13 
. 
19 27 38 16 20 13 26 1 
40 10 
, 
25 43 23 
House unoccupied 
I I 
Less than 3 hours 21 27 37 15 20 25 35 21 20 12 26 42 11 23 40 27 
More than 3 hours 15 26 44 15 17 25 41 18 18 13 28 41_ 8 23 45 24 
Smoker in household 
Yes 20 27 1 39 15 1 21 26 36 17 1 
22 12 26 41 10 24 42 25 
No 15 27 44 15 16 24 41 19 17 13 29 41 8 22 45 25 
Drink Alcohol 
Rarely 22 28 36 14 23 26 34 18 24 14 27 35 12 25 39 24 
Often 13 26 46 15 14 24 43 19 15 12 28 45 6 21 47 26 
General health 
Bad 24 29 33 13 22 27 32 18 21 12 24 43 13 26 38 23 
Good 11 26 45 15 16 24 42 19 18 13 29 41 7 22 46 25 
Tenancy 
Owners 14 26 45 15 15 24 42 19 16 12 29 42 7 22 46 25 
Renters 24 28 34 15 24 27 31 18 24 14 23 39 13 25 38 24 
Adults 
1 19 26 39 15 18 25 37 19 19 13 27 41 9 23 42 26 
2 16 26 43 15 17 24 41 19 18 12 28 42 8 23 45 25 
3+ 17 28 42 13 19 27 39 16 21 14 25 39 10 23 44 22 
Children I 
0 17 27 41 1 15 16 25 39 20 17 12 27 45 8 22 
44 26 
1+ IT 26 44 13 21 25 39 15 24 15 30 32 10 25 
44 22 
Education (highest) 
Secondary 18 28 41 13 20 27 38 15 23 15 29 33 9 24 
45 23 
Further 11 26 48 16 13 25 44 19 14 12 29 45 6 
22 47 25 
Higher 6 22 57 15 8 20 54 18 9 12 33 47 4 
19 53 24 
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Table A5.3: Association between worry about crime and demographic variables 
Cramer's V Burglary Theft of 
vehicle 
Theft 
vehicle 
Card 
fraud 
Mugging --jiip-e -Insult 
ondent 
Gender . 09** . 07** . 03** . 04** . 25** . 29**- 
- 
. 54** . 22** 
Age . 06** . 05** . 06** . 09** . 05** . 08** . 11** . 06** 
Marital . 09** . 04** . 04** . 11** . 06** . 05** . 05** . 04** 
Household 
Tenancy . 12** . 11** . 10** . 13** . 14** . 13** . 10** . 11** 
No. of adults . 06** . 04** . 05** . 06** . 04** . 03** . 03** . 03** 
No. of children . 06** . 02** . 04** . 04** . 04** . 07** . 12** . 05** 
Socio-economic 
Education . 09** . 07** . 04** . 07** . 12** . 12** . 12** . 07** 
Household 
income . 
09** . 08** . 06** . 12** . 11** . 10** . 06** . 08** 
Managing on 
income 
. 09** . 08** . 07** . 06** . 10** . 11** . 08** . 09** 
Area 
Areatype . 09** . 09** . 08** . 05** . 10** . 09** . 
07** . 07** 
Neighbourhood 
type . 
09** . 06** . 05** . 00** . 05** . 
05** . 03** . 05** 
Health and 
lifestyle 
General health . 11** . 08** . 
07** . 06** . 13** . 
10** . 06** . 10** 
Alcohol 
consumption 
. 10** . 08** . 
05** . 10** . 14** . 
14** . 14** . 12** 
Smoker in house . 06** . 08** . 
07** . 08** . 06** . 
07** . 06** . 05** 
House 
unoccupied at 
day 
. 07** . 05** . 
06** . 10** . 09** . 
07** . 03** . 06** 
**p<. 005 
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Table A5.4: Demographic predictors of worry about burglary (logistic 
regression) 
Exp (B) 
Gender Male 
. 
89 
Female (base) 1.00 
Age 16-29 1.43 
30-59 1.28 
60+ (base) 1.00 
Marital group Married/de facto 1.50 
Not married (base) 1.00 
Household Income Under 5K 1.44 
5K under 15K 1.22 
15K under 20K 1.09 
20K+ (base) 1.00 
Managing on Well and saving (base) 1.00 
Income Getting by 1.19 
In difficulty 1.39 
Area Type Inner city 1.52 
Urban 1.18 
Rural (base) 1.00 
Neighbourhood Help each other (base) 1.00 
Type Mixture . 
83 
Go own way 1.19 
House unoccupied <3 hours (base) 1.00 
during the day 3+ hours . 
98 
Smoker in Yes . 
98 
household No (base) 1.00 
Drink Alcohol Rarely (base) 1.00 
Often . 
89 
General health Bad 1.17 
Good (base) 1.00 
Tenancy Owners 1.19 
Renters (base) 1.00 
Number of adults I (base) 1.00 
in household 2 . 
89 
3+ . 
95 
Number of children 0 1.06 
in household - 1+ (base) 1.00 
Education (highest Secondary 1.31 
qualification) Further 1.12 
I Higher (base) 1.01 
Notes: 
i. p<0.005 
ii. p<0.05 
iii. Model Chi Square 
iv. Nagelkerke W 
V. Hosmer and Lemeshow 
321.19** 
. 
04 
11.54 (ns) 
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Table A5.5: Demographic predictors of worry about theft of vehicle (logistic 
regression) 
Exp (B) Sig. 
Gender Male 
. 
93 
Female (base) 1.00 
Age 16-29 1.34 
30-59 1.04 
60+ (base) 1.00 
Marital group Married/de facto 1.07 
Not married (base) 1.00 
Household Income Under 5K 1.42 
5K under 15K 1.18 
15K under 20K 1.15 
20K+ (base) 1.00 
Managing on Well and saving (base) 1.00 
Income Getting by 1.14 
In difficulty 1.14 
Area Type Inner city 1.83 
Urban 1.33 
Rural (base) 1.00 
Neighbourhood Help each other (base) 1.00 
Type Mixture . 93 
Go own way 1.09 
House unoccupied <3 hours (base) 1.00 
during the day 3+ hours a day 1.14 
Smoker in Yes 1.11 
household No (base) 1.00 
Drink Alcohol Rarely (base) 1.00 
Often . 
91 
General health Bad 
_1.17 Good (base) 1.00 
Tenancy Owners 1.04 
Renters (base) 1.00 
Number of adults I (base) 1.00 
in household 2 1.09 
3+ 1.19 
Number of children 0 1.12 
in household 1+ (base) 1.00 
Education (highest Secondary 1.27 
qualification) Further 1.19 
Higher (base) 1.00 
Notes: 
= p<0.005 
p<0.05 
iii. Model Chi Square 
iv. Nagelkerke R2 
V. Hosmer and Lemeshow 
247.95** 
. 
04 
3.93 (ns) 
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Table A5.6: Demographic predictors of worry about theft from vehicle (logistic 
regression) 
Exp Sig. 
Gender Male 1.18 
Female (base) 1.00 
Age 16-29 1.45 
30-59 1.25 
60+ (base) 1.00 
Marital group Married/de facto 1.08 
Not married (base) 1.00 
Household Income Under 5K 1.43 
5K under 15K 1.13 
15K under 20K 1.09 
20K+ (base) 1.00 
Managing on Well and saving (base) 1.00 
Income Getting by 1.21 
In difficulty 1.07 
Area Type Inner city 1.51 
Urban 1.33 
Rural (base) 1.00 
Neighbourhood Help each other (base) 1.00 
Type Mixture . 95 
Go own way 1.10 
House unoccupied <3 hours (base) 1.00 
during the day 3+ hours a day 1.11 
Smoker in Yes 1.11 
household No (base) 1.00 
Drink Alcohol Rarely (base) 1.00 
Often . 96 
General health Bad 1.11 
Good (base) 1.00 
Tenancy Owners 1.02 
Renters (base) 1.00 
Number of adults I (base) 1.00 
in household 2 1.13 
3+ 1.25 
Number of children 0 1.13 
in household 1+ (base) 1.00 
Education (highest Secondary 1.10 
qualification) Further 1.16 
Hig er (base) 1.00 
Notes: 
i. p<0.005 
ii. p<0.05 
iii. Model Chi Square 
iv. Nagelkerke R2 
V. Hosmer and Lemeshow 
204.65** 
. 
03 
4.5 3 (ns) 
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Table A5.7: Demographic predictors of worry about card fraud (logistic 
regression) 
Exp (B) Sig. 
Gender Male 
. 93 Female (base) 1.00 
Age 16-29 1.06 
30-59 1.10 
60+ (base) 1.00 
Marital group Married/de facto 1.35 
Not married (base) 1.00 
Household Income Under 5K . 88 
5K under 15K . 93 15K under 20K 1.02 
20K+ (base) 1.00 
Managing on Well and saving (base) 1.00 
Income Getting by 1.16 
In difficulty 1.35 
Area Type Inner city . 98 
Urban . 91 
Rural (base) 1.00 
Neighbourhood Help each other (base) 1.00 
Type Mixture . 80 
Go own way . 96 
House unoccupied <3 hours (base) 1.00 
during the day 3+ hours a day 1.08 
Smoker in Yes . 96 
household No (base) 1.00 
Drink Alcohol Rarely (base 1.00 
Often . 95 
General health Bad 1.01 
Good (base) 1.00 
Tenancy Owners 1.33 
Renters (base) 1.00 
Number of adults 1 (base) 1.00 
in household 2 . 90 
3+ . 96 
Number of children 0 1.16 
in household 1+ (base) 1.00 
Education (highest Secondary . 
94 
qualification) Further 1.06 
Higher (base) 1.00 
Notes: 
i. p<0.005 
Ii. p<0.05 
iii. Model Chi Square 63.55** 
iv. Nagelkerke R2 . 
02 
V. Hosmer and Lemeshow 14.6 3 
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Table A5.8: Demographic predictors of worry about mugging (logistic 
regression) 
Exp (B) Sig. 
Gender Male 
. 
41 
Female (base) 1.00 
Age 16-29 
. 
97 
30-59 
. 92 60+ (base) 1.00 
Marital group Married/de facto 1.10 
Not married (base) 1.00 
Household Income Under 5K 1.49 
5K under 15K 1.31 
15K under 20K 1.27 
20K+ (base) 1.00 
Managing on Well and saving (base) 1.00 
Income Getting by 1.23 
In difficulty 1.24 
Area Type Inner city 1.70 
Urban 1.32 
Rural (base) 1.00 
Neighbourhood Help each other (base) 1.00 
Type Mixture . 93 
Go own way 1.18 
House unoccupied <3 hours (base) 1.00 
during the day 3+ hours a day 1.01 
Smoker in Yes 1.02 
household No (base) 1.00 
Drink Alcohol Rarely (base) 1.00 
Often . 86 
General health Bad 1.32 
Good (base) 1.00 
Tenancy Owners . 87 
Renters (base) 1.00 
Number of adults I (base) 1.00 
in household 2 1.21 
3+ 1.37 
Number of children 0 1.13 
in household I se) 1.00 
Education (highest Secondary 1.52 
qualification) Further 1.33 
Higher (base) 1.00 
Notes: 
i. p<0.005 
ii. P<0.05 
iii. Model Chi Square 
iv. Nagelkerke R2 
V. Hosmer and Lemeshow 
998.80** 
. 12 11.25 (ns) 
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Table A5.9: Demographic predictors of worry about attack (logistic regression) 
Exp 
Gender Male 
. 34 Female (base) 1.00 
Age 16-29 1.66 
30-59 1.30 
6 ase) 1.00 
Marital group Married/de facto 1.05 
Not married (base) 1.00 
Household Income Under 5K 1.62 
5K under 15K 1.28 
15K under 20K 1.24 
20K+ (base) 1.00 
Managing on Well and saving (base) 1.00 
Income Getting by 1.31 
In difficulty 1.29 
Area Type Inner city 1.66 
Urban 1.23 
Rural (base) 1.00 
Neighbourhood Help each other (base) 1.00 
Type Mixture . 90 
Go own way 1.16 
House unoccupied <3 hours (base) 1.00 
during the day 3+ hours a day 1.06 
Smoker in Yes (base) 1.00 
household No 1.06 
Drink Alcohol Rarely (base) 1.00 
Often . 81 
General health Bad 1.30 
Good (base) 1.00 
Tenancy Owners . 95 
Renters (base) 1.00 
Number of adults I (base) 1.00 
in household 2 
-1.19 - 3+ 1.36 
Number of children 0 1.07 
in household I se) 1.00 
Education (highest Secondary 1.57 
qualification) Further 1.49 
Higher (base) 1.00 
Notes: 
i. p<0.005 
ii. p<0.05 
iii. Model Chi Square 
IV. Nagelkerke R2 
V. Hosmer and Lemeshow 
1343.65** 
. 15 6.19 (ns) 
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Table A5.10: Demographic predictors of worry about rape (logistic regression) 
Exp (B) Sig. 
Gender Male . 11 Female (base) 1.00 
Age 16-29 3.16 
30-59 1.98 
60+ (base) 1.00 
Marital group Married/de facto 1.02 
Not married (base) 1.00 
Household Income Under 5K 1.36 
5K under 15K 1.17 
15K under 20K 1.21 
20K+ (base) 1.00 
Managing on Well and saving (base) 1.00 
Income Getting by 1.26 
In difficulty 1.41 
Area Type Inner city 1.47 
Urban 1.15 
Rural (base) 1.00 
Neighbourhood Help each other (base) 1.00 
Type Mixture . 93 
Go own way 1.06 
House unoccupied <3 hours (base) 1.00 
during the day 3+ hours a day 1.10 
Smoker in Yes . 90 
household No (base) 1.00 
Drink Alcohol Rarely (base) 1.00 
Often . 78 
General health Bad 1.05 
Good (base) 1.00 
Tenancy Owners . 92 
Renters (base) 1.00 
Number of adults 1 (base) 1.00 
in household 2- 
-1.18 3+ 1.32 
Number of children 0 . 99 
in household 1+ (base) 1.00 
Education (highest Secondary 1.73 
qualification) Further 1.48 
Higher (base) 1.00 
Notes: 
1. ** - p<0.005 
ii. *= p<0.05 
iii. MQdel Chi Square 
IV. Nagelkerke R2 
V. Hosmer and Lemeshow 
2526.69** 
. 
30 
4.49 (ns) 
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Table A5.11: Demographic predictors of worry about insult (logistic regression) 
Exp (B) Sig. 
Gender Male 
. 50 Female (base) 1.00 
Age 16-29 1.31 
30-59 1.15 
60+ (base) 1.00 
Marital group Married/de facto . 10 Not married (base) 1.00 
Household Income Under 5K 1.29 
5K under 15K 1.21 
15K under 20K 1.07 
20K+ (base) 1.00 
Managing on Well and saving (base) 1.00 
Income Getting by 1.21 
In difficulty 1.46 
Area Type Inner city 1.46 
Urban 1.26 
Rural (base) 1.00 
Neighbourhood Help each other (base) 1.00 
Type Mixture 1.04 
Go own way 1.19 
House unoccupied <3 hours (base) 1.00 
during the day 3+ hours a day 1.04 
Smoker in Yes . 98 
household No (base) 1.00 
Drink Alcohol Rarely (base) 1.00 
Often . 83 
General health Bad 1.29 
Good (base) 1.00 
Tenancy Owners . 96 
Renters (base) 1.00 
Number of adults I (base) 1.00 
in household 2 1.05 
3+ 1.21 
Number of children 0 . 95 
in household 1+ (base) 1.00 
Education (highest Secondary 1.21 
qualification) _ Further 1.21 
Higher (base) 1.00 
Notes: 
i. p<0.005 
ii. p<0.05 
iii. Model Chi Square 
iv. Nagelkerke R2 
V. Hosmer and Lemeshow 
584.48** 
. 
07 
13.24 (ns) 
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Table A5.12: Demographic predictors of being 'very worried' about burglarN 
(lotyistic rei! ression) 
Exp (B) Sig. 
Gender Male (base) 1.00 
Female 1.24 
Age 16-29 1.80 
30-59 1.46 
60+ (base) 1.00 
Marital group Married/de facto 1.26 
Not married (base) 1.00 
Household Income Under 5K 1.87 
5K under 15K 1.35 
15K under 20K _ 1.06 
20K+ (base) 1.00 
Managing on Well and saving (base) 1.00 
Income Getting by 1.20 
In difficulty 1.75 
Area Type Inner city 2.07 
Urban 1.35 
Rural (base) 1.00 
Neighbourhood each other (base) 1.00 
Type Mixture . 91 
Go own way 1.16 
House unoccupied <3 hours 1.15 
during the day 3+ hours a day (base) 1.00 
Smoker in Yes 1.02 
household No (base) 1.00 
Drink Alcohol Rarely 1.21 
Often (base) 1.00 
General health Bad 1.26 
Good (base) 1.00 
Tenancy Owners (base) 1.00 
Renters . 97 
Number of adults 1 (base) 1.00 
in household 2 1.09 
3+ . 99 
Number of children 0 . 
99 
in household 1+ (base) 1.00 
Education (highest Secondary 1.99 
qualification) Further 1.65 
Higher (base) 1.00 
Notes: 
i. p<0.005 
ii. P<0.05 
iii. Model Chi Square 
iv. Nagelkerke R2 
V. Hosmer and Lemeshow 
491.16** 
. 07 6.90 (ns) 
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Table A5.13: Demographic predictors of being tvery worried' about theft of 
vehicle (logistic regression) 
Exp (B) Sig. 
Gender Male (base) 1.00 
Female 1.18 
Age 16-29 1.33 
30-59 1.13 
60+ (base) 1.00 
Marital group Married/de facto . 16 Not married (base) 1.00 
Household Income Under 5K 2.01 
5K under 15K 1.48 
15K under 20K 1.22 
20K+ (base) 1.00 
Managing on Well and saving (base) 1.00 
Income Getting by 1.20 
In difficulty 1.01 
Area Type Inner city 1.77 
Urban 1.56 
Rural (base) 1.00 
Neighbourhood Help each other . 85 
Type Mixture 1.13 
Go own way (base) 1.00 
House unoccupied <3 hours . 
91 
during the day - 3+ hours (base) 1.00 
Smoker in Yes 1.19 
household No (base) 1.00 
Drink Alcohol Rarely 1.28 
Often (base) 1.00 
General health Bad 1.20 
Good (base) 1.00 
Tenancy Owners (base) 1.00 
Renters 1.24 
Number of adults I (base) 1.00 
in household 2 1.38 
3+ 1.47 
Number of children 0 1.10 
in household 1+ (base) 1.00 
Education (highest Secondary 1.37 
qualification) Further 1.29 
Higher ftseý 1.00 
Notes: 
= p<0.005 
p<0.05 
ill. Model Chi Square 
IV. Nagelkerke R2 
V. Hosmer and Lemeshow 
363.70** 
. 
06 
8.09 (ns) 
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Table A5.14: Demographic predictors of being 'very worried' about theft froin 
vehicle (logistic regression) 
Exp (B) Significa 
nce 
Gender Male 1.13 
Female (base) _ 1.00 
Age 16-29 1.33 
30-59 1.22 
60+ (base) 1.00 
Marital group Married/de facto . 87 Not married (base) 1.00 
Household Income Under 5K 1.80 
5K under 15K 1.30 
15K under 20K 1.15 
20K+ (base) 1.00 
Managing on Well and saving (base) 1.00 
Income Getting by 1.14 
In difficulty 1.06 
Area Type Inner city 1.70 
Urban 1.35 
Rural (base) 1.00 
Neighbourhood Hel each other . 80 
Type Mixture 1.07 
Go own way (base) 1.00 
House unoccupied <3 hours . 87 
during the day 3+ hours (base) - 1.00 
Smoker in Yes 1.22 
household No (base) 1.00 
Drink Alcohol Rarely 1.11 
Often (base) 1.00 
General health Bad 1.26 
Good (base) 1.00 
Tenancy Owners (base) 1.00 
Renters 1.28 
Number of adults I (base) 1.00 
in household 2 1.38 
3+ 1.57 
Number of children 0 1.07 
in household 1+ (base) 1.00 
Education (highest Secondary 1.14 
qualification) Further 1.25 
Higher (base) 1.00 
Notes: 
i. p<0.005 
ii. p<0.05 
iii. Model Chi Square 
iv. Nagelkerke R2 
V. Hosmer and Lemeshow 
203.56** 
. 
04 
2.24 (ns) 
'145 
Table A5.15: Demographic predictors of being 'very worried' about card fraud 
(logistic regression) 
Exp (B) Sig. 
Gender Male (base) 1.00 
Female 
. 98 
Age 16-29 . 94 30-59 1.04 
60+ (base) 1.00 
Marital group Married/de facto -- 1.20 
Not married (base) 1.00 
Household Income Under 5K 1.42 
5K under 15K 1.21 
15K under 20K 1.26 
20K+ (base) 1.00 
Managing on Well and saving (base) 1.00 
Income Getting by 1.29 
In difficulty 1.28 
Area Type Inner city 1.35 
Urban 1.06 
Rural (base) 1.00 
Neighbourhood Hel each other 1.04 
Type Mixture . 72 
Go own way (base) 1.00 
House unoccupied <3 hours . 95 
during the day 3+ hours (base) 1.00 
Smoker in Yes 1.04 
household No (base) 1.00 
Drink Alcohol Rarely 1.35 
Often (base) 1.00 
General health Bad 1.02 
Good (base) 1.00 
Tenancy Owners (base) 1.00 
Renters . 93 
Number of adults I (base) 1.00 
in household 2 . 94 
3+ 1.04 
Number of children 0 1.02 
in household 1+ (base) 1.00 
Education (highest Secondary 1.37 
qualification) Further 1.29 
Higher (base) 1.00 
Notes: 
i. p<0.005 
ii. p<0.05 
iii. Model Chi Square 
iv. Nagelkerke R2 
V. Hosmer and Lemeshow 
79.42** 
. 
03 
7.76 (ns) 
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Table A5.16: Demographic predictors of being 'very worried' about mugging 
(logistic regression) 
_Exp 
(B) Sig. 
Gender Male (base) 1.00 
Female 2.17 
Age 16-29 1.35 
_ 30-59 _ 1.17 
60+ (base) _ 1.00 
Marital group Married/de facto -. 1.08 
Not married (base) 1.00 
Household Income Under 5K 1.71 
5K under 15K 1.37 
15K under 20K 1.11 
20K+ (base) 1.00 
Managing on Well and saving (base) 1.00 
Income Getting by 1.09 
In difficulty 1.10 
Area Type Inner city 2.05 
Urban 1.24 
Rural (base) 1.00 
Neighbourhood Help each other (base) 1.00 
Type Mixture . 92 
Go own way 1.10 
House unoccupied <3 hours 1.20 
during the day 3+ hours a day (base) 1.00 
Smoker in Yes 1.00 
household No (base) 1.00 
Drink Alcohol Rarely 1.44 
Often (base) 1.00 
General health Bad 1.25 
Good (base) 1.00 
Tenancy Owners (base) 1.00 
Renters 1.15 
Number of adults I (base) 1.00 
in household 2 1.18 
3+ 1.45 
Number of children 0 1.01 
in household 1+ (base) 1.00 
Education (highest Secondary 2.38 
qualification) _ Further 1.74 
Hig r (base) 1.00 
Notes: 
i. p<0.005 
ii. p<0.05 
iii. Model Chi Square 
IV. Nagelkerke R2 
V. Hosmer and Lemeshow 
647.23 
. 11 9.89 (ns) 
'147 
Table A5.17: Demographic predictors of being 'very worried' about attack 
(lo2istic re2ression) 
_Exp 
(B) Sig. 
Gender Male (base) 1.00 
Female 3.98 
Age 16-29 2.05 
30-59 1.42 
60+ (base) 1.00 
Marital group Married/de facto 1.25 
Not married (base) 1.00 
Household Income Under 5K 1.71 
5K under 15K 1.44 
15K under 20K 1.27 
20K+ (base) 1.00 
Managing on Well and saving (base) 1.00 
Income Getting by 1.22 
In difficulty 1.17 
Area Type Inner city 1.63 
Urban 1.18 
Rural (base) 1.00 
Neighbourhood Help each other . 98 
Type Mixture . 89 
Go own way (base) 1.00 
House unoccupied <3 hours . 99 
during the day 3+ hours (base) 1.00 
Smoker in Yes 1.06 
household No (base) 1.00 
Drink Alcohol Rarely 1.37 
Often (base) 1.00 
General health Bad 1.14 
Good (base) 1.00 
Tenancy e) Owners (bas 1.00 
_ . Renters 1.07 
Number of adults I (base) 1.00 
in household 2 1.09 
3+ 1.25 
Number of children 0 . 95 
in household 1+ (base) 1.00 
Education (highest Secondary 1.95 
qualification) Further 1.55 
Higher (base) 1.00 
Notes: 
i. = P<0.005 
ii. p<0.05 
iii. Model Chi Square 
iv. Nagelkerke R2 
V. Hosmer and Lemeshow 
020.47** 
. 16 16.81 
48 
Table A5.18: Demographic predictors of being 'very worried' about insult (logistic 
repression) 
Exp (B) Sig. 
Gender Male (base) 1.00 
Female 2.57 
Age 16-29 1.53 
30-59 1.25 
60+ (base) 1.00 
Marital group Married/de facto 1.28 
Not married (base) 1.00 
Household Income Under 5K 2.22 
5K under 15K 1.59 
15K under 20K 1.35 
20K+ (base) 1.00 
Managing on Well and saving (base) 1.00 
Income Getting by 1.32 
In difficulty 1.49 
Area Type Inner city 1.65 
Urban 1.29 
Rural (base) 1.00 
Neighbourhood Hel each other . 89 
Type Mixture . 79 
Go own way (base) 1.00 
House unoccupied <3 hours 1.04 
during the day - 3+ hours (base) 1.00 
Smoker in Yes . 93 
household No (base) 1.00 
Drink Alcohol Rarely 1.36 
Often (base) 1.00 
General health Bad 1.17 
Good (base) 1.00 
Tenancy Owners (base) 1.00 
Renters 1.15 
Number of adults I (base) 1.00 
in household 2 1.20 
3+ 1.86 
Number of children 0 . 86 
in household 1+ (base) 1.00 
Education (highest Secondary 1.64 
qualification) Further 1.52 
Higher (base) 1.00 1 
Notes: 
= P<0.005 
P<0.05 
Iii. Model Chi Square 400.74** 
iv. Nagelkerke R2 . 
09 
V. Hosmer and Lemeshow 17.22* 
249 
Table A5.19: Demographic predictors of being 'very worried' about rape (logistic 
repression) 
Exp (B) Sig. 
Gender Male (base) 1.00 
Female 5.26 
Age 16-29 2.56 
30-59 1.77 
60+ (base) 1.00 
Marital group Married/de facto 1.07 
Not married (base) 1.00 
Household Income Under 5K 1.40 
5K under 15K 1.18 
15K under 20K 1.25 
20K+ (base) 1.00 
Managing on Well and saving (base) 1.00 
Income Getting by 1.19 
In difficulty 1.18 
Area Type Inner city 1.57 
Urban 1.13 
Rural (base) 1.00 
Neighbourhood Hel each other . 97 
Type Mixture . 93 
Go own way (base) 1.00 
House unoccupied <3 hours . 97 
during the day - 3+ hours (base) 1.00 
Smoker in Yes 1.02 
household No (base) 1.00 
Drink Alcohol Rarely 1.39 
Often (base) 1.00 
General health Bad 1.01 
Good (base) 1.00 
Tenancy Owners (base) 1.00 
_ Renters 1.08 
Number of adults I (base) 1.00 
in household 2 1.17 
3+ 1.28 
Number of children 0 . 
90 
_in 
household 
Education (highest 
1+ (base) 
Secondary 
1.00 
2.22 
qualification) Further 1.63 
Higher (base) 1.00 
Notes: 
i. P<0.005 
Ii. p<0.05 
iii. Model Chi Square 
iv. Nagelkerke R2 
V. Hosmer and Lemeshow 
1233.23** 
. 
19 
6.63 (ns) 
-)ýo 
Table A5.20: Demographic predictors of being 'not at all worried' about burglary 
(logistic regression) 
Exp (B) Sig. 
Gender Male 1.44 
Female (base) 1.00 
Age 16-29(base) 1.00 
30-59 
. 99 60+ 1.68 
Marital group Married/de facto (base) 1.00 
Not married 1.71 
Household Income Under 5K(base) 1.00 
5K under 15K . 86 
15K under 20K . 94 
20K+ . 99 
Managing on Well and saving 1.11 
Income Getting by 1.09 
In difficulty (base) 1.00 
Area Type Inner city (base) 1.00 
Urban 1.22 
Rural 1.53 
Neighbourhood Help each other 1.40 
Type Mixture 1.32 
Go own way (base) 1.00 
House unoccupied <3 hours 1.08 
during the day 3 +hours (base) 1.00 
Smoker in Yes 1.28 
household No (base) 1.00 
Drink Alcohol Rarely 1.04 
Often (base) 1.00 
General health Bad (base) 1.00 
Good 1.15 
Tenancy Owners (base) 1.00 
Renters 1.46 
Number of adults 1 1.11 
in household 2 1.14 
3+ (base) 1.00 
Number of children 0 1.13 
in household 1+ (base) 1.00 
Education (highest Secondary 1.21 
qualification) Further 
1 
Higher (base) 
1.12 
1.00 
Notes: 
= P<0.005 
P<0.05 
iii. Model Chi Square 181.32** 
iv. Nagelkerke R2 . 
04 
V. Hosmer and Lemeshow 15.57* 
-)ýj 
Table A5.21: Demographic predictors of being 'not at all worried' about theft of 
vehicle (logistic regression) 
Exp (B) Sig. 
Gender Male 1.50 
Female (base) 1.00 
Age 16-29 (base) 1.00 
30-59 
. 89 60+ 
. 91 
Marital group Married/de facto (base) 1.00 
Not married . 98 
Household Income Under 5K(base) 1.00 
5K under 15K 1.04 
15K under 20K . 90 20K+ 1.09 
Managing on Well and saving . 94 
Income Getting by 1.02 
In difficulty (base) 1.00 
Area Type Inner city(base) 1.00 
Urban 1.29 
Rural 1.65 
Neighbourhood Help each other 1.13 
Type Mixture 1.02 
Go own way (base) 1.00 
House unoccupied <3 hours 1.34 
during the day 3 +hours (base) 1.00 
Smoker in Yes 1.06 
household No (base) 1.00 
Drink Alcohol Rarely . 91 
Often (base) 1.00 
General health Bad (base) 1.00 
Good . 95 
Tenancy Owners (base) 1.00 
Renters 1.14 
Number of adults I 1.33 
in household 2 1.08 
3+ (base) 1.00 
Number of children 0 . 95 
in household I+ (base) 1.00 
_ - Education (highest Secondary . 94 
qualification) Further . 
97 
Higher (base) 1.00 
Notes: 
= p<0.005 
p<0.05 
iii. Model Chi Square 
iv. Nagelkerke R2 
V. Hosmer and Lemeshow 
88.08** 
. 02 4.71 (ns) 
Table A5.22: Demographic predictors of being 'not at all worried' about theft 
from vehicle (logistic regression) 
Exp (B) Sig. 
Gender Male 
. 98 Female (base) 1.00 
Age 16-29 (base) 1.00 
30-59 1.05 
60+ 1.44 
Marital group Married/de facto (base) 1.00 
Not married 1.05 
Household Income Under 5K(base) 1.00 
5K under 15K 1.16 
15K under 20K 1.18 
20K+ 1.24 
Managing on Well and saving . 81 
Income Getting by . 83 
In difficulty (base) 1.00 
Area Type Inner city (base) 1.00 
Urban . 96 
Rural 1.11 
Neighbourhood Help each other 1.22 
Type Mixture 1.19 
Go own way (base) 1.00 
House unoccupied <3 hours 1.29 
juring the day 3 +hours (base) 1.00 
Smoker in Yes . 10 
household No (base) 1.00 
Drink Alcohol Rarely . 91 
Often (base) 1.00 
General health Bad (base) 1.00 
Good . 93 
Tenancy Owners (base) 1.00 
Renters 1.18 
Number of adults 1 1.25 
in household 2 1.00 
3+ (base) 1.00 
Number of children 0 1.03 
in household 1+ (base) 1.00 
Education (highest Secondary 1.01 
qualification) Further . 
98 
I 
Higher (base) 1.00 
Notes: 
= p<0.005 
p<0.05 
iii. Model Chi Square 
iv. Nagelkerke R2 
V. Hosmer and Lemeshow 
76.03** 
. 
02 
2.21 (ns) 
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Table A5.23: Demographic predictors of being 'not at all worried' about card 
fraud (logistic regression) 
Exp (B) 
Gender Male 1.09 
Female (base) 1.00 
Age 16-29 (base) 1.00 
30-59 
. 92 60+ 1.40 
Marital group Married/de facto (base) 1.00 
Not married 1.18 
Household Income Under 5K 2.11 
5K under 15K 1.55 
15K under 20K 1.35 
20K+ (base) 1.00 
Managing on Well and saving 1.20 
Income Getting by 1.04 
In difficulty (base) 1.00 
Area Type Inner city (base) 1.00 
Urban 1.03 
Rural . 87 
Neighbourhood Help each other . 95 
Type Mixture 1.09 
Go own way (base) 1.00 
House unoccupied <3 hours 1.24 
juring the day 3 +hours (base) 1.00 
Smoker in Yes 1.37 
household No (base) 1.00 
Drink Alcohol Rarely 1.17 
often (base) 1.00 
General health Bad (base) 1.00 
Good 1.11 
Tenancy owners (base) 1.00 
Renters 1.39 
Number of adults 1 . 83 
in household 2 . 84 
3+ (base) 1.00 
Number of children 0 . 
95 
in household 1+ (base) 1.00 
Education (highest 
qualification) 
onda Secondary 
Further 
I Higher (base) 
1.17 
. 97 
1.00 
Notes: 
= P<0.005 
P<0.05 
iii. Model Chi Square 
iv. Nagelkerke R2 
V. Hosmer and Lemeshow 
164.52** 
. 
05 
7.13 (ns) 
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Table A5.24: Demographic predictors of being 'not at all worried' about mugging 
(logistic regression) 
Exp (B) Sig. 
Gender Male 3.17 
Female (base) 1.00 
Age 16-29 (base) 1.00 
30-59 1.05 
60+ 1.07 
Marital group Married/de facto (base) 1.00 
Not married 1.34 
Household Income Under 5K(base) 1.00 
5K under 15K . 82 15K under 20K . 87 20K+ 
. 93 
Managing on Well and saving . 90 
Income Getting by . 79 
In difficulty (base) 1.00 
Area Type Inner city (base) 1.00 
Urban 1.27 
Rural 1.67 
Neighbourhood Help each other 1.38 
Type Mixture 1.47 
Go own way (base) 1.00 
House unoccupied <3 hours 1.09 
during the day 3+ hours (base) 1.00 
Smoker in Yes 1.15 
household No (base) 1.00 
Drink Alcohol Rarely 1.07 
Often (base) 1.00 
General health Bad (base) 1.00 
Good 1.12 
Tenancy Owners (base) 1.00 
Renters 1.10 
Number of adults 1 1.21 
in household 2 1.21 
ase) 1.00 
Number of children 0 . 99 
in household 1+ (base) 1.00 
Education (highest Secondaly 1.18 
qualification) Further 
Higher (base) 
1.11 
1.00 
Notes: 
= p<0.005 
p<0.05 
Iii. Model Chi Square 508.38** 
iv. Nagelkerke R2 . 
08 
V. Hosmer and Lemeshow 20.35* 
Table A5.25: Demographic predictors of being 'not at all worried' about attack (logisti "re rression) 
_Exp 
(B) Sig. 
Gender Male 3.06 
Female (base) 1.00 
Age 16-29 (base) 1.00 
30-59 1.29 
60+ 1.95 
Marital group Married/de fac 1.00 
Not married 1.21 
Household Income Under 5K . 99 5K under 15K . 99 15K under 20K 1.01 
20K+ (base) 1.00 
Managing on Well and saving 1.02 
Income Getting by . 82 
In difficulty (base) 1.00 
Area Type Inner city (base) 1.00 
Urban 1.27 
Rural 1.50 
Neighbourhood Help each other 1.30 
Type Mixture 1.32 
Go own way (base) 1.00 
House unoccupied <3 hours 1.07 
during the day 3+ hours (base) 1.00 
Smoker in Yes 1.02 
household No (base) 1.00 
Drink Alcohol Rarely 1.04 
often (base) 1.00 
General health Bad (base) 1.00 
Good 1.14 
Tenancy Owners (base) 1.00 
Renters 1.13 
Number of adults 1 . 99 
in household 2 1.12 
3+ (base) 1.00 
Number of children 0 . 
94 
in household 1+ (base) 1.00 
Education (highest Secondary 1.08 
qualification) Further 
I Higher 
(base)_ 
1.01 
1.00 
Notes: 
= P<0.005 
p<0.05 
iii. Model Chi Square 610.38** 
iv. Nagelkerke R2 . 
09 
V. Hosmer and Lemeshow 16.40* 
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Table A5.26: Demographic predictors of being 'not at all worried' about rape 
(logistic regression) 
_Exp 
(B) Sig. 
Gender Male 14.72 
Female (base) 1.00 
Age 16-29 (base) 1.00 
30-59 1.42 
60+ 2.84 
Marital group Married/de facto (base) 1.00 
Not married 1.25 
Household Income Under 5K . 87 5K under 15K . 93 15K under 20K . 93 20K+ (base) 1.00 
Managing on Well and saving 1.07 
Income Getting by . 86 
In difficulty (base) 1.00 
Area Type Inner city (base) 1.00 
Urban 1.00 
Rural 1.15 
Neighbourhood Help each other 1.04 
Type Mixture 1.19 
Go own way (base) 1.00 
House unoccupied <3 hours 1.21 
during the day 3 +hours (base) 1.00 
Smoker in Yes 1.11 
household No (base) 1.00 
Drink Alcohol Rarely (base) 1.00 
Often 1.13 
General health Bad (base) 1.00 
Good . 99 
Tenancy Owners (base) 1.00 
Renters . 98 
Number of adults 1 1.06 
in household 2 1.03 
3+ (base) 1.00 
Number of children 0 
1.04 
in household 1+ (base) 1.00 
Education (highest 
qualification) 
Secondary (base) 
Further 
Higher 
1.00 
. 96 
1.17 
Notes: 
= P<0.005 
P<0.05 
iii. Model Chi Square 3951.54** 
iv. Nagelkerke R2 . 
42 
V. Hosmer and Lemeshow 
59.51** 
Table A5.27: Demographic predictors of being 'not at all worried' about insult 
(logistic regression) 
Exp (B) Sig. 
Gender Male 2.32 
Female (base) 1.00 
Age 16-29 (base) 1.00 
30-59 1.06 
60+ 1.47 
Marital group Married/de facto (base). 1.00 
Not married 1.19 
Household Income Under 5K 
. 99 5K under 15K . 98 15K under 20K . 96 20K+ (base) 1.00 
Managing on Well and saving 1.18 
Income Getting by 1.00 
In difficulty (base) 1.00 
Area Type Inner city (base) 1.00 
Urban 1.00 
Rural 1.17 
Neighbourhood Help each other 1.20 
Type Mixture 1.12 
Go own way (base) 1.00 
House unoccupied <3 hours 1.10 
during the day 3+ hours (base) 1.00 
Smoker in Yes 1.12 
household No (base) 1.00 
Drink Alcohol Rarely (base) 1.00 
Often . 99 
General health Bad (base) 1.00 
Good 1.17 
Tenancy Owners (base) 1.00 
Renters 1.04 
Number of adults - 1 1.08 
in household 2 1.08 
3+ (base) 1.00 
Number of children 0 . 
94 
in household 
Education (highest 
qualification) 
1+ (base) 
Secondary (base) 
Further 
. 
Higher 
1.00 
1.14 
1.04 
1.00 
Notes: 
p<0.005 
P<0.05 
iii. Model Chi Square 432.78** 
iv. Nagelkerke R2 . 
06 
V. Hosmer and Lemeshow 29.22** 
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Table A6.1: Percent victims for each crime across demographic groups 
% Victim in last year 
tý 
M 
PO 
%* 
i. - Z 
ý* 
ý= - -0 = 
a 
a ýg ý10 7. X 
Gender Male 2 2 9 2 2 5 
.1 Female 3 3 9 2 3 3 
.7 Age 16-29 4 4 12 3 4 10 1 
30-59 3 3 10 3 2 4 
.4 60+ 2 1 5 1 2 1 1 
Marital status Married 2 - 2 9 2 2 2 .2 Not married 3 3 9 3 4 6 .7 Tenancy Owners 2 2 8 2 2 3 
.2 Renters 5 4 11 2 4 6 
.9 No. of Adults 1 4 2 8 2 3 5 .8 2 2 2 9 2 2 3 .2 
3+ 2 4 12 2 3 6 .3 
No. of Children 0 2 2 8 2 2 3 .3 
1+ 3 3 10 2 2 6 .7 
Education Sec 3 3 9 2 2 5 .4 
Further 2 3 11 3 2 5 .5 
Higher 3 2 10 3 3 4 .5 
Household Under 5K 4 3 7 1 3 5 1 
income 5K under 15K 3 _ 2 7 1 3 4 .5 
15K under 
20K 
2 2 9 2 2 4 .2 
20K+ 2 2 11 4 2 3 .2 
Managing on _ Well( 2 2 9 2 2 3 .2 
income Gett 3 3 9 2 3 4 .5 
In di 8 6 13 2 4 11 1 
Neighbourhood 
type 
Help each 
other 
2 2 8 2 
- 
2 
- 
3 
- 
.3 
- 
Go own way 3 2 9 2 
2 3 .4 
Mixture 3 3 10 2 3 5 .5 - 
Area type Inn 4 3 12 2 4 
5 .6 
Urban 3 3 10 2 -2 -4 .4 
Rural 2 2 7 3 2 2 . 
2. 
5 
General health ad 3 2 9 1 
3 4 
- . 4 
Good 2 2 9 2 2 4 . 
Smoker in 
household 
Yes 
No 
3 
2 
3 
2 
11 
8 
2 
2 
3 
2 
6 
3 
Alcohol 
consumption 
Rarely 
Often 
3 
2 
3 
2 
8 
10 
2 
2 
1 
3 
2 
2 
3 
4 .4 
House 
unoccupied 
during day 
<3 hours 
----------- - 3+ hours 
3 
3 
2 
3 
6 
10 2 3 5 .4 
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Table A6.2: Association between victimisation and demographics 
I - B l SV Cramer urg ar y Theft of 
vehicle 
Theft 
from 
vehicle 
Card 
fraud 
Mugging Attack Sexual 
Attack 
Respondent 
- - Gender . 01 01 . 01 . 02* . 04** . 04** . 05** 
Age . 05** . 05** . 10** . 07** . 05** . 16** . 05** 
Marital . 04** . 00 . 00 . 03 . 06** . 10** . 04** 
Household 
Tenancy . 08** . 04** . 04** . 02* . 05** . 09** . 05** 
No. of adults . 04** . 04** . 05** . 02 . 04** . 07** . 04** 
No. of children . 03** . 03** . 03** . 01 . 00 . 07** . 03** 
Socio-economic 
Education . 01 . 03* . 02 . 04* . 02 . 03* . 01 
Household 
income . 
04** . 01 . 06** . 09** . 
01 . 03** . 04** 
Managing on 
income . 
08** . 05** . 03** . 03* 
- 
. 03** . 09** . 
04** 
Area 
- Area type . 03** . 04** . 
05** . 02 . 03** . 
04** . 02 
Neighbourhood 
type 
. 04** . 
02 . 03** . 
00 . 02* . 
06** . 02* 
Health and 
lifestyle 
General health . 02** . 
00 . 01 . 
03** . 03** . 
01 . 01 
- * Alcohol 
tion 
. 01 . 
00 . 02* . 
03** . 01 . 
02 . 00 
consump ** ** Smoker in house . 04** . 
31 . 04** . 
01 . 04** . 
08 
** 
. 02 
01 
House 
unoccupied at 
day 
. 00 
, 
. 03** . 
06** . 04** . 
01 . 06 . 
**p<0.005 
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Table A6.3: Demographic predictors of burglary victimisation (logistic 
regression) 
(B) Sig. 
Gender Male 
Female (base) . 
82 
1.00 
Age 16-29 1.76 
30-59 1.18 
60+ (base) 1.00 
Marital group Married/de facto 1.21 
Not married (base) 1.00 
Household Income Under 5K (base) 1.00 
5K under 15K . 76 15K under 20K . 71 20K+ 
. 99 Managing on Well and saving (base) 1.00 
Income Getting by 1.12 
In difficulty 2.03 
Area Type Inner cýy (base) 1.00 
Urban 1.15 
Rural . 95 Neighbourhood Help each other (base) 1.00 
Type Nfixture 1.42 
Go own way 1.40 
House unoccupied <3 hours 1.11 
during the day 3+ hours (base) 
- -1.00 Smoker in Yes 1.32 
household No (base) 1.00 
Drink Alcohol Rarely (base) 1.00 
Often 1.07 
General health Bad 1.16 
Good (base) 1.00 
Tenancy owners (base) 1.00 
Renters 1.87 
Number of adults 1 1.64 
in household 2 1.05 
3+ (base) 1.00 
Number of children 1.00 
in household 1+ 1.11 
Education (highest 
qualification) 
Secondary (base) 
-ýu-rther 
ighýeýr---ý rH! 9 
1.00 
1.02 
133 
Notes: 
i. P<0.005 
ii. P<0.05 
118.47** iii. Model Chi Square 
iv. Nagelkerke Rý . 
05 
V. Hosmer and Lemeshow -4.41 
(ns) 
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Table A6.4: Demographic predictors of theft of vehicle victimisation (logistic 
regression) 
Exp (B) Sig. 
Gender Male 
- 
1.09 
Female (base) - 1.00 
Age 16-29 2.66 
30-59 2.16 
60+ (base) _ 1.00 
Marital group Married/de facto 1.23 
Not married (base) 1.00 
Household Income Under 5K (base) 1.00 
5K under 15K . 62 15K under 20K . 39 20K+ 
. 51 Managing on Well and saving (base) 1.00 
Income Getting by 1.13 
In difficulty 1.70 
Area Type Inner city (base) 1.00 
Urban . 94 
Rural . 52 
Neighbourhood Help each other (base) 1.00 
Type Mixture . 84 
Go own way . 91 
House unoccupied <3 hours . 84 
during the day 3 +hours (base) 1.00 
_. Smoker in Yes 1.19 
household No (base) 1.00 
Drink Alcohol Rarely (base) 1.00 
Often 
. -LOO General health Bad 1.17 
Good (base) 1.00 
Tenancy Owners (base) 1.00 
Renters 1.10 
Number of adults 1 . 50 
in household 2 . 55 
3+ (base) 1.00 
Number of children 
in household 
0 (base) 
1+ 
1.00 
1.16 
_ Education (highest 
qualification) 
Secondary (base) 
Further 
Higher 
1.00 
1.08 
. 73 
Notes: 
= P<0.005 
p<0.05 
iii. Model Chi Square 87.76** 
iv. Nagelkerke R2 . 
04 
V. Hosmer and Lemeshow 
6.19 (ns) 
'16-1 
Table A6.5: Demographic predictors of theft from vehicle victimisation (logistic 
regression) 
Exp (B) Sig. 
Gender Male 
. 96 Female (base) 1.00 
Age 16-29 2.06 
30-59 1.77 
60+ (base) 1.00 
Marital group - Married/de facto - 1.11 
Not married (base) 1.00 
Household Income - Under 5K (base) - 1.00 
5K under 15K 1.41 
15K under 20K 1.31 
20K+ 1.57 
Managing on Well and saving (base) 1.00 
Income Getting by 1.11 
In difficulty 1.46 
Area Type Inner city (base) 1.00 
Urban . 84 
Rural . 65 
Neighbourhood Help each other (base) 1.00 
Type Mixture 1.09 
Go own way 1.04 
House unoccupied <3 hours . 79 
during the day 3 +hours (base) 1.00 
Smoker in Yes 1.14 
household No (base) 1.00 
Drink Alcohol Rarely (base) 1.00 
Often 1.13 
General health Bad 1.13 
Good (base) 1.00 
Tenancy Owners (base) 1.00 
Renters 1.27 
Number of adults 1 . 74 
in household 2 . 75 
3+ (base) 1.00 
Number of children 
in household 
0 (base) 
1+ 
1.00 
1.08 
Education (highest 
qualification) 
Secondary (base) 
Further 
Higher 
1.00 
1.29 
1.14 
Notes: 
= p<0.005 
p<0.05 
Iii. Model Chi Square 150.30** 
iv. Nagelkerke R' . 
03 
V. Hosmer and Lemeshow 
5.79 (ns) 
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Table A6.6: Demographic predictors of card fraud victimisation (logistic 
regression) 
Exp (B) Sig. 
Gender Male 1.24 
Female (base) 1.00 
Age 16-29 2.87 
30-59 2.50 
60+ (base) 1.00 
Marital group Married/de facto 1.52 
Not married (base) _. 1.00 
Household Income Under 5K (base) 1.00 
5K under 15K . 97 15K under 20K 1.42 
20K+ 2.54 
Managing on Well and saving (base) 1.00 
Income Getting by 
. 94 In difficulty 1.77 
Area Type Inner city (base) 1.00 
Urban 1.11 
Rural 1.15 
Neighbourhood Help each other (base) 1.00 
Type Mixture . 98 
Go own way . 79 
House unoccupied <3 hours . 98 
during the day 3+ hours (base) 1.00 
_ Smoker in Yes . 96 
household No (base) 1.00 
_ Drink Alcohol Rarely (base) 1.00 
Often . 84 
General health Bad 1.16 
Good (base) 1.00 
Tenancy Owners (base) 1.00 
Renters 1.57 
Number of adults 1 2.01 
in household 2 1.12 
3 se) 
_ 1.00 
Number of children 
in household 
0 (base) 
1+ 
1.00 
. 79 
Education (highest 
qualification) 
Secondary (base) 
Further 
Hig er 
1.00 
1.26 
1.37 
Notes: 
i. p<0.005 
Ii. P<0.05 
iii. Model Chi Square 
iv. Nagelkerke R2 
V. Hosmer and Lemeshow 
48.38** 
. 
04 
11.72 (ns) 
65 
Table A6.7: Demographic predictors of mugging victimisation (logistic 
regression) 
E Sig. 
Gender Male 
. 57 Female (base) 1.00 
Age 16-29 1.48 
30-59 1.03 
60+ (base) 1.00 
Marital group Married/de facto . 59 Not married (base) 1.00 
Household Income Under 5K (base) 1.00 
5K under 15K . 92 15K under 20K . 93 20K+ 1.20 
Managing on Well and saving (base) 1.00 
Income _ Getting by 
. 91 In difficulty 
. 73 
Area Type Inner city (base) 1.00 
Urban 
. 81 
Rural . 78 
Neighbourhood Help each other (base) 1.00 
Type Mixture . 99 
Go own way 1.09 
House unoccupied <3 hours . 72 
during the day 3+ hours (base) 1.00 
Smoker in Yes 1.63 
household No (base) 1.00 
Drink Alcohol Rarely (base) 1.00 
Often 1.07 
General health Bad 1.99 
Good (base) 1.00 
Tenancy Owners (base) 1.00 
Renters 1.68 
Number of adults 1 1.22 
in household 2 1.07 
3+ (base) 1.00 
Number of children 
in household 
0 (base) 
1+ 
1.00 
. 
86 
Education (highest Secondary (base 1.00 
qualification) Further 
Higher 
1.34 
1.75 
Notes: 
i. ** = p<0.005 
ii. *= P<0.05 
iii. Model Chi Square 
iv. Nagelkerke R2 
V. Hosmer and Lemeshow 
147.69** 
. 06 9.04 (ns) 
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Table A6.8: Demographic predictors of attack victimisation. (logistic regression) 
_Exp 
(B) Sig. 
Gender Male 1.79 
Female (base) 1.00 
Age 16-29 11.26 
30-59 5.92 
60+ (base) 1.00 
Marital group Married/de facto . 45 Not married (base) 1.00 
Household Income Under 5K (base) 1.00 
5K under 15K . 
89 
15K under 20K . 76 20K+ 
. 75 Managing on Well and saving (base) 1.00 
Income Getting by 1.24 
In difficulty 1.75 
Area Type Inner city (base) 1.00 
Urban 1.11 
Rural 1.01 
Neighbourhood Help each other (base) 1.00 
Type Mixture 1.06 
Go own way 1.13 
House unoccupied <3 hours . 89 
during the day 3+ hours (base) 1.00 
_ Smoker in Yes 1.55 
household No (base) 1.00 
Drink Alcohol Rarely (base) 1.00 
Often 1.05 
General health Bad 1.27 
Good (base) 1.00 
Tenancy Owners (base) 1.00 
Renters 
_1.21 Number of adults 1 1.11 
in household 2 . 82 
3+ (base) 1.00 
Number of children 
in household _O 
(base) 
1+ 
1.00 
1.71 
_ Education (highest 
qualification) 
Secondary (base) 
Further 
I Higher 
1.00 
1.24 
1.09 
Notes: 
i. p<0.005 
ii. P<0.05 
iii. Model Chi Square 
iv. Nagelkerke R2 
V. Hosmer and Lemeshow 
501.41** 
. 14 7.50 (ns) 
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Table A6.9: Demographic predictors of sexual attack victimisation (logistic 
regression) 
Exp (B) Sig. 
Gender Male 
. 
14 
Female (base) 1.00 
Age 16-29 9.26 
30-59 4.38 
60+ (base) 1.00 
Marital group Married/de facto . 64 Not married (base) 1.00 
Household Income Under 5K (base) 1.00 
5K under 15K 1.03 
15K under 20K . 57 20K+ 
. 57 Managing on Well and saving (base) 1.00 
Income Getting by 1.02 
In difficulty 
. 79 Area Type Inner city (base) 1.00 
Urban 1.11 
Rural 1.10 
Neighbourhood Help each other (base) 1.00 
Type Mixture . 86 
Go own way 1.09 
House unoccupied <3 hours . 82 
juring the day 3+ hours (base) 1.00 
Smoker in Yes 1.62 
household No (base) 1.00 
_ Drink Alcohol Rarely (base) 1.00 
Often 1.10 
General health Bad 1.28 
Good (base) 1.00 
Tenancy Owners (base) 1.00 
Renters 1.92 
Number of adults 1 2.65 
in household 2 1.42 
3+ ase) 1.00 
Number of children 
in household _O 
(base) 
1+ 
1.00 
1.10 
_ Education (highest 
qualification) 
Secondary (base) 
Further 
Higher 
1.00 
2.02 
2.68 
Notes: 
= P<0.005 
p<0.05 
111.32** iii. Model Chi Square 
iv. Nagelkerke R2 . 16 
V. Hosmer and Lemeshow 
27.23** 
'68 
Appendix 7: Worry and victimisation 
List of Tables: 
Table A7.1: Worry levels for victims and non victims for individual crimes. 
Table A7.2: Association between worry and victimisation across all crime types. 
Table A7.3: Association between worry and victimisation across all crime types 
(PRE measure). 
Table A7.4: Predictors (demographics and victimisation) of worry about 
burglary (logistic regression) 
Table A7.5: Predictors (demographics and victimisation) of worry about theft of 
vehicle (logistic regression). 
Table A7.6: Predictors (demographics and victimisation) of worry about theft 
from vehicle (logistic regression). 
Table A7.7: Predictors (demographics and victimisation) of worry about card 
fraud (logistic regression). 
Table A7.8: Predictors (demographics and victimisation) of worry about 
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Table A7.1: Worry levels for victims and non victims for individual crimes 
% Very 
worried 
% Fairly 
worried 
% Not very 
worried 
% 
-Not at all 
worried 
Burglary 
victims 42 35 18 
Non-victims 18 38 35 
Theft of vehicle _ 
Victims 50 33 12 4 
Non-victims 19- 
- 
36 34 1 
Theft from vehicle 
Victims 28_ 42 24 7 
Non-victims 14 36 38 13 
Card fraud 
Victims 43 34 18 5 
Non-victims 17 31 32 20 
Mugging 
victims 25 32 34 9 
Non-victims 17 26 42 15 
Attack 
- Victims 21 29 36 14 
Non-victims 17 25 39 19 
Rape/sexual attack 
victims -- 36 22 29 13 
Non-victims 19 13 28 41 
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Table A7.2: Association between worry and victimisation across all crime types 
Worry 
Chi 
Square 
Cramer s 
V 
Burglary 185.78** 7.69 12.44* 
. 98 24.80** 25.73** 
-6.8-44-T -3-4.01 
. 10** . 02 . 03 * . 01 . 04 ** . 04 ** ()4 ** Theft of 42.12** 226.70** 120.12** 6.83 - 23.50** 11,61* 5.77 
vehicle . 
05 ** 
. 
13 ** 
. 
09 ** 
. 03 . 
04 ** 
. 
03 * 
. 
02 
Theft from 25.53** 119.90** 266.10** 9.29* 7.31 15.08** 1.67 
vehicle . 
04 
. 
09 ** 
. 
14 
. 
04 
. 
02 
. 03** . 01 . 02 Card fraud 5.739 0.01 3.23 106.91** 3.27 1.23 
. 
02 
. 
00 
. 
02 
. 11** . 
02 
. 
01 
. 
03 
. 02 Mugging 27.16** 15.39** 16.59** 9.19* 42.21** 33.79** 1.93** 1 -7 
. 
03 
. 
03 
. 
03 
. 
03 
. 
05** 
. 
04** 
. 04** . 01** -i Attack 9.63* 8.78* 14.17** 13.45* 
. 
71 17.05** 8.02* 18-55" 
. 
02* 
. 
03 * 
. 
03** 
. 
04* 
. 
01 
. 
03** 
. 
02 
. 
03** 
Sexual 7.05 5.19 2.26 6.36 15.64** 48.92** 33.06** 43.55** 
attack . 
02 
. 
02 
. 
01 
. 
03 
. 
03** 
. 
05** . 
04** 
. 
03** 
**p<0.005 
*p<. 05 
Table A7.3: Association between worry and victimisation across all crime types (PRE measure) 
Worry 
Gamma 
7a cz 7; It., cd a a Cd 
1-0 > IM. 100 
Burglary -. 41 10** -. 02 13** 15** -. 05 16** 
Theft of -. 25** -. 54** -. 39** -. 09 -. 17** 10* -. 09 -. 06 
vehicle 
Theft from -. 11** -. 24** -. 5** -. 03 -. 04 -. 06* -. 02 -. 05* 
vehicle 
Card fraud -. 07 -. 00 -. 05 -. 51** . 06 -. 00 -. 01 . 01 
Mugging -. 17** -. 17** -. 06 -. 23** -. 21** -. 16** -. 17** 
4 Attack -. 08* -. 08* -. 12** . 11* -. 01 -. 12** -. 03 -. 
08* 
Sexual attack -. 23* -. 20 -. 05 . 15 -. 34** -. 51** 
46* 
> 
**p<0.005 
*p<0.05 
Ae A7.4: Predictors (demographics and victimisation) of worry , *glary (logistic regression) about 
Exj) 
__KM 
(B) Sig. 
rider Male (base) 
remale 
1.00 
1.06 
e 16-29 1.47 
30-59 1.37 
60+ (base) 1.00 
irital group Married/de facto 1.69 
Not married (base) 1.00 
)usehold Income Under 5K 1.64 
5K under 15K 1.26 
15K under 20K 1.14 
20K+ (base) 1.00 
anaging on Income Well and saving (base) 1.00 
Getting by 1.27 
In difficulty 1.00 
rea Type Inner city 1.53 
Urban 1.10 
Rural (base) 1.00 
eighbourhood Type Help each other (base) 1.00 
Mixture . 75 Go own way 1.12 
[ouse unoccupied <3 hours 1.01 
uring the day 3+ hours (base) 1.00 
moker in household Yes (base) 1.00 
No 1.14 
Orink Alcohol Rarely 1.06 
Often (base) 1.00 
; -eneral health Bad 1.08 
Good (base) 1.00 
Fenancy Owners _1.29 Renters (base) 1.00 
4umber of adults in 1 1.18 
iousehold 2 1.02 
3+ (base) 1.00 
liumber of children 0 
L13 
n household 
1.00 
Education (highest 
jualification) 
Secondary 
Further 
Higher (base) 
1.18 
1.18 
1.00 
Victimisation Burglary 3.09 
(base = 'no') Theft of vehicle fije-ft from vehicle 
1.35 
1.17 
3 Card fi-aud 1.1 
98 MUM . 4 Attack 1.3 15 Sexual attack 
1. 
Notes: 
j. p <0.005 
ii. p <0.05 
iii. Model Chi Square 173.59** 
iv. Nagelkerke W .0 
V. Hosiner and Lemeshow 
4.49 (ns) 
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Table A7.5: Predictors (demographics and victimisation) of worry about theft of vehicle (logistic regression) 
Gender Male (base) 
Exp (B) 
1.00 
Sig. 
Female 1.18 
Age 16-29 1.30 
30-59 1.01 
60+ (base) 1.00 
Marital group Marr. ied/de facto 1.38 
Not married (base) 1.00 
Household Income Under 5K 1.80 
5K under 15K 1.31 
15K under 20K 1.38 
20K+ (base) 1.00 
Managing on Income Well and saving 1.06 
Getting by 1.18 
In difficulty (base) 1.00 
Area Type Inner city 1.86 
Urban 1.29 
Rural (base) 1.00 
Neighbourhood Type Help each other (base) 1.00 
Mixture . 86 Go own way 1.06 
House unoccupied <3 hours . 89 during the day 3+ hours (base) 1.00 
Smoker in household Yes 1.17 
No (base) 1.00 
Drink Alcohol Rarely 1.16 
Often (base) 1.00 
General health Bad 1.14 
Good (base) 1.00 
Tenancy Owners 1.11 
Renters (base) 1.00 
Number of adults in 1 . 94 
household 2 . 89 
3+ (base) 1.00 
Number of children 0 1.18 
in household 1+ (base) 1.00 
Education (highest Secondary 1.23 
qualification) Further 1.14 
Higher (base) 1.00 
Victimisation 
(base = no) 
Burglary 
Theft of vehicle 
1.20 
3.54 
Theft from vehicle 1.93 
Card fraud . 92 
Mugging 1.47 
Attack 1.08 
Sexual attack 
1.51 
Notes: 
p <0.005 
p <0.05 
ill. Model Chi Square 248.52** 
iv. Nagelkerke R2 . 
07 
V. Hosmer and Lemeshow 
1.22 (ns) 
Table A7.6: Predictors (demographics and victimisation) of worry about theft from vehicle (logistic regression) 
Exp (B) Sig. 
Gender Male (base) 1.00 
Female 
. 89 Age 16-29 1.48 
30-59 1.32 
60+ (base) 1.00 
Marital group Married/de facto 1.20 
Not married (base) 1.00 
Household Income Under 5K 1.59 
5K under 15K 1.25 
15K under 20K 1.20 
20K+ (base) 1.00 
Managing on Income Well and saving . 95 Getting by 1.19 
In difficulty (base) 1.00 
Area Type Inner city 1.54 
Urban 1.27 
Rural (base) 1.00 
Neighbourhood Type Help each other (base) 1.00 
Mixture . 95 Go own way 1.09 
House unoccupied <3 hours . 92 
during the day 3+ hours (base) 1.00 
Smoker in household Yes 1.21 
No (base) 1.00 
Drink Alcohol Rarely 1.07 
Often (base) 1.00 
General health Bad 1.06 
Good (base) 1.00 
Tenancy Owners 1.20 
Renters (base) 1.00 
Number of adults in 1 . 81 
household 2 . 85 
3+ (base) 1.00 
Number of children 0 1.23 
in household 1+ (base) 1.00 
Education (highest Secondary 1.07 
qualification) Further 1.18 
Higher (base) 1.00 
Victimisation 
(base = no) 
Burglary 
Theft of vehicle 
1.38 
2.20 
Theft from vehicle 2.15 
Card fraud . 94 
1.46 
Attack 1.06 
QQ Sexual attack 
Notes: 
= P<0.005 
P<0.05 
iii. Model Chi Square 214.03 
iv. Nagelkerke WA 
V. Hosmer and Lemeshow 
4.51 (ns) 
`75 
Table A7.7: Predictors (demographics and victimisation) of Nvorry about card fraud (logistic regression) 
_ _ 
Exp (B) 
- 
Sig. 
Gender Male (base) 1.00 
Female 1.06 
Age 16-29 1.07 
30-59 1.09 
- 60+ (base) - 1.00 
Marital group Married/de facto 1.34 
Not married (base) 1.00 
Household Income Under 5K 1.05 
5K under 15K 1.04 
15K under 20K 1.08 
20K+ (base) 1.00 
Managing on Income Well and saving 1.02 
Getting by 1.16 
In difficulty (base) 1.00 
Area Type Inner city . 94 Urban 
. 92 Rural (base) 1.00 
Neighbourhood Type Help each other (base) 1.00 
Mixture . 80 Go own way . 97 
House unoccupied <3 hours . 94 
during the day 3+ hours (base) 1.00 
Smoker in household Yes . 98 
No (base) 1.00 
Drink Alcohol Rarely 1.03 
Often (base) 1.00 
General health Bad 1.04 
_ Good (base) 1.00 
Tenancy Owners 1.20 
Renters (base) 1.00 
Number of adults in 1 1.04 
household 2 . 97 
3+ (base) 
- -1.00 
Number of children 0 1.14 
in household 1+ (base) 1.00 
Education (highest Secondary . 98 
qualification) Further 
1.08 
High r (base) 1.00 
Victimisation Burglary 1.25 
(base = no) Theft of vehicle 
1.25 
Theft from vehicle 1.21 
Card fraud 3.30 
u ging 
1.16 
Attack . 67 
Sexual attack . 
36 
Notes: 
= P<0.005 
P<0.05 
iii. Model Chi Square 97.79** 
iv. Nagelkerke R' . 03 
V. Hosmer and Lemeshow 
11.35 (ns) 
I -(l 
-f 
Table A7.8: Predictors (demographics and victimisation) of worry about 
mugging (logistic regression) 
- Exp (B) - - 
Sig. 
Gender Male (base) 1.00 
Female 2.30 
Age 16-29 1.01 
30-59 
. 93 60+ (base) 1.00 
Marital group Married/de facto 1.14 
Not married (base) 1.00 
Household Income Under 5K 1.52 
5K under 15K 1.25 
15K under 20K 1.26 
20K+ (base) 1.00 
Managing on Income Well and saving (base) 1.00 
Getting by 1.38 
In difficulty 1.51 
Area Type Inner city 1.73 
Urban 1.35 
Rural (base) 1.00 
Neighbourhood Type Help each other (base) 1.00 
Mixture . 91 Go own way 1.12 
House unoccupied <3 hours 1.03 
during the day 3+ hours (base) 1.00 
Smoker in household Yes 1.06 
No (base) 1.00 
Drink Alcohol Rarely 1.15 
Often (base) 1.00 
General health Bad 1.15 
Good (base) 1.00 
Tenancy Owners 1.06 
Renters (base) 1.00 
Number of adults in I (base) 1.00 
household 2 1.25 
3+ 1.37 
Number of children 0 
1.15 
in household 1+ (base) 1.00 
Education (highest Secondary 1.05 
qualification) Further 
1.29 
Higher (base) 1.00 
Victimisation Burglary 1.44 
(base = no) Theft of vehicle 
1.40 
Theft from vehicle 1.06 
Card fraud 1.17 
Mugging 1.21 
All Attack 1.07 
4 Sexual attack 
1.2 
Notes: 
= p<0.005 
P<0.05 366.86** 
Iii. Model Chi Square 
iv. Nagelkerke R2 . 
10 
V. Hosmer and Lemeshow 
23.45** 
17 
Table A7.9: Predictors (demographics and victimisation) of worry about attack (logistic regression) 
Gender Mal (base) _. 
Exp (B) 
- 1.00 
Sig. 
Female 2.96 
Age 16-29 1.51 
30-59 1.24 
60+ (base) 1.00 
Marital group Married/de facto 1.04 
Not married (base) 1.00 
Household Income Under 5K 1.77 
5K under 15K 1.26 
15K under 20K 1.22 
20K+ (base) _ 1.00 
Managing on Income Well and saving (base) 1.00 
Getting by 1.42 
In difficulty 1.55 
Area Type Inner city 1.60 
Urban 1.13 
Rural (base) 1.00 
Neighbourhood Type Help each other (base) 1.00 
Mixture . 83 
Go own way 1.15 
House unoccupied <3 hours 1.01 
during the day 3+ hours (base) 1.00 
Smoker in household Yes 1.08 
No (base) 1.00 
Drink Alcohol Rarely 1.19 
Often (base) 1.00 
General health Bad 1.09 
Good (base) 1.00 
Tenancy Owners 1.12 
Renters (base) 1.00 
Number of adults in I (base) 1.00 
household 2 1.24 
3+ 1.37 
Number of children 0 
1.05 
in household 1+ (base) 1.00 
Education (highest Secondary 1.54 
qualification) Further 
1.58 
Higher (base) 1.00 
Victimisation Burglary 1.21 
(base = no) Theft of vehicle 
1.25 
Theft from vehicle 1.12 
Card fraud 1.12 
Mugging . 98 
A A- ttack 1.25 
wal attack 
Notes: 
= p<0.005 
p<0.05 537.60** iii. Model Chi Square 
. 14 iv. Nagelkerke 
R2 
V. Hosmer and Lemeshow 
6.66 (ns) 
27S 
Table A7.10: Predictors (demographics and victimisation) of worry about rape (logistic regression) 
Exp (B) Sig. 
Gender Male (base) 1.00 
Female 9.09 
Age 16-29 2.93 
30-59 1.94 
60+ (base) 1.00 
Marital group Married/de facto 1.02 
Not married (base) 1.00 
Household Income Under 5K 1.11 
5K under 15K 1.30 
15K under 20K 1.25 
20K+ (base) 1.00 
Managing on Income Well and saving (base) 1.00 
Getting by 1.44 
In difficulty 1.67 
Area Type Inner city 1.54 
Urban 1.13 
Rural (base) 1.00 
Neighbourhood Type Help each other (base) 1.00 
Mixture . 86 
Go own way 1.07 
House unoccupied <3 hours . 84 
juring the day 3+ hours (base) 1.00 
Smoker in household Yes . 96 
No (base) 1.00 
Drink Alcohol Rarely 1.19 
Often (base) 1.00 
General health Bad 1.04 
Good (base) 
- -1.00 Tenancy Owners 1.04 
Renters (base) 1.00 
Number of adults in I (base) 1.00 
household 2 1.19 
3+ 1.15 
Number of children 0 . 99 
in household 1+ (base) 1.00 
Education (highest Secondary 1.46 
qualification) Further 
1.27 
Higher (base) 1.00 
Victimisation _ Burglary 1.42 
(base = no) Theft of vehicle 
1.34 
_ Theft from vehicle . 92 
Card fraud 1.22 
Mugging . 96 
Attack 1.06 
Sexual attack 1.10 
Notes: 
= P<0.005 
P<0.05 
ill. Model Chi Square 
iv. Nagelkerke R2 
V. Hosmer and Lemeshow 
1020.23** 
. 29 14.31 (ns) 
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Table A7.11: Predictors (demographics and victimisation) of worry about insult 
(logistic regression) 
Exp (B) Sig. 
Gender Male (base) 1.00 
Female 1.92 
Age 16-29 1.63 
30-59 1.33 
60+ (base) 1.00 
Marital group 
_Married/de 
facto 1.11 
Not married (base) 1.00 
Household Income Under 5K 1.48 
5K under 15K 1.32 
15K under 20K 1.11 
20K+ (base) 1.00 
Managing on Income 
_Well 
and saving (base) 1.00 
Getting by 1.22 
In difficulty 1.26 
Area Type Inner city 1.41 
Urban 1.20 
Rural (base) 1.00 
Neighbourhood Type Help each other (base) 1.00 
Mixture . 96 
Go own way 1.09 
House unoccupied <3 hours 1.03 
during the day 3+ hours (base) 1.00 
Smoker in household Yes 1.07 
No (base) 1.00 
Drink Alcohol Rarely 1.14 
Often (base) 1.00 
General health Bad 1.33 
Good (base) 1.00 
Tenancy Owners 1.15 
Renters (base) 1.00 
Number of adults in I (base) 1.00- - household _ 2 1.01 
3+ 1.07_ 
_ Number of children 0 1.04 
in household 1+ (base) 1.00 
Education (highest Secondary 1.15 
qualification) Further 1.23 
_ Higher (base) 1.00 - 
Victimisation Burglary 1.32 
(base = no) Theft of vehicle 
1.13_ 
Theft from vehicle 1.06 
Card fraud 1.1 L - 
Mugging . 86 
Attack 1.17_ 
Sexual attack 2.81 
Notes: 
i. p<0.005 
ii. p<0.05 
iii. Model Chi Square 226.09** 
iv. Nagelkerke R2 . 
07 
V. Hosmer and Lemeshow 6.38 (ns) 
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